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One of the great benefits of fiscal federalism is that it enables an ongoing quest for optimal
policy solutions. “Laboratory federalism” (see Oates 2008, p. 236) facilitates simultaneous
experimentation with competing policy ideas within a country. The way the federal states
organize local public finance in Germany is such a case of diverse policy choices within a
common overarching framework. Municipal fiscal equalization, transfer dependency and
credit access are prime examples of Germany’s multi-level fiscal structure: At first glance,
common rules and parallel structures dominate. Beneath the surface lie intricate policy
differences that make these three overlapping areas of the fiscal landscape worth studying.
This dissertation aims, first, to show empirically that variation in state policies to-
wards municipalities translates into different fiscal outcomes at the municipal level, and
second, to arrive at meaningful policy implications from these outcomes. In order to lay
the ground for the empirical analysis, we first need to familiarize ourselves with the insti-
tutional characteristics of local public finance in Germany. This is done in the following
section. However, the institutional detail on Germany presented in this dissertation should
not cloud its relevance beyond Germany. The lessons derived here are important for any
federal and any fiscally decentralized country. They are also relevant for the future of
the European Union (EU). If fiscal integration advances in the EU, common pitfalls of
fiscal federalism should be avoided. Only then can we hope that fiscal federalism does
not just bring intergovernmental complexity but also delivers what it is meant to deliver:
Greater responsiveness to citizens’ diverse preferences as well as greater efficiency and
accountability in the public sector.
1
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After giving some essential institutional background (Section 1.1), this introduction
provides an overview of the dissertation (Section 1.2), followed by a summary of each
chapter (Section 1.3).
1.1 Local public finance in Germany
Germany is divided into more than 11,000 municipalities. They constitute the lowest
administrative and fiscal layer beneath the federal level and the 16 federal states (three
city-states and 13 territorial states). Each level has a differing degree of autonomy over
their spending and revenue raising activities, which is in large part enshrined in the na-
tional constitution. The constitution grants municipalities “the right to regulate all local
affairs on their own responsibility” (Art. 28 II GG), which encompasses autonomy on the
revenue and spending side.
Local revenue sources. German municipalities draw revenue from three main
sources: Taxes, fees and charges, and transfers from higher levels of government. Art.
28 II GG specifies that the guarantee of local self-government extends “to the bases of
financial autonomy”, which include “a source of tax revenues based upon economic ability
and the right to establish the rates at which these sources shall be taxed”. Art. 106 GG
further specifies the division of tax revenues between the federal layers of government and
the tax sources to be assigned to municipalities. There are two major municipal taxes:
The property and the business tax. While the tax bases for both of them are defined at
the federal level, their tax rates are set locally. Tax revenue from property taxation fully
accrues to the municipalities. In contrast, the federal level and the states receive part of
the business tax revenue through an apportionment. The property tax can be considered a
“typical” local tax. The suitability of the business tax for the local level is more disputable
given the mobility and volatility of its tax base. Hence, its assignment to the local level
is unusual. Local tax autonomy and especially the German particularity of local business
tax autonomy is a recurring theme in this dissertation.
In addition, municipalities can set and collect local excise and consumption taxes.
They may also introduce new excise taxes as long as they are not comparable to existing
federal taxes. However, revenue from excise and consumption taxes remains negligible
relative to the business and property tax. Finally, municipalities receive 15 percent of na-
tional income tax revenue as well as 2.2 percent of national VAT revenue. The distribution
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of income tax and VAT revenue among individual municipalities is governed by federal
law. The rest is distributed among the federal level and the states. Municipalities do not
have authority over tax bases or tax rates of these shared taxes.
Fees and charges are levied by municipalities for their services such as waste man-
agement or childcare services. Revenue from fees and charges must not exceed and is
supposed to cover the costs caused by the provision of the services for which they are
raised.
Transfers from higher levels of government, i.e. state governments, constitute the
final local revenue source. The federal constitution does not allow any direct financial
flows from the federal to the local level. Hence, although the federal government has
become increasingly more involved in financing local tasks, any federal financial assistance
must be channeled through state budgets. Each federal state determines how grants are
to be distributed among its municipalities. Transfers from state to local governments
take different forms. In particular, they can be unconditional or tied to specific spending
purposes. The majority of transfers is unconditional and paid out as part of municipal
fiscal equalization systems.
Municipal fiscal equalization schemes exist in all 13 territorial states. They all oper-
ate according to the same basic principles: Municipalities whose fiscal need exceeds their
fiscal capacity shall receive a transfer payment, which partially closes the gap. Equal-
ization transfers thus serve an essential financing function, since most municipalities are
unable to meet their financial obligations without state assistance. At the same time, they
serve an equalizing function. All municipalities shall be enabled to provide a comparable
level of local goods and services, as mandated by the national constitution. The depen-
dence of local governments on transfers from higher government levels and the design of
transfer schemes are another theme of this dissertation.
Local public debt can also be considered part of local revenues. However, debt for
investment and consumption purposes needs to be distinguished. Legally, municipalities
may go into debt only for investment purposes, i.e. for financing investment, investment
assistance, or debt restructuring. Municipal debt to finance consumption is ruled out by
state law in all federal states. This seemingly stringent rule is complicated in practice by
the existence of so-called liquidity credits that are meant to fill temporary liquidity gaps
until “real” revenues become available. State regulation on municipal liquidity credits
varies. Depending on state oversight, the (mis-)use of liquidity credits may open an
avenue for regular municipal current deficits. Municipal fiscal performance in terms of
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local budget balances and effective local credit access are additional guiding elements of
this dissertation.
Local spending responsibilities. The constitution guarantees municipalities the
right to regulate their own affairs independently. As such, they are free, within the bound-
aries of the law, to define their own tasks. However, the federal and state level can mandate
particular local tasks or define standards that municipalities must meet in the provision of
local public goods and services. They can also delegate their own tasks to the local level.
Accordingly, local government functions and corresponding spending activities take three
forms. First, there are voluntary local tasks. Municipalities can decide if and how to fulfill
them. Typical examples include the provision of cultural services, sports grounds or youth
centers. Second, there are mandatory local tasks. Municipalities are obliged to fulfill these
tasks. They may decide on their own how to fulfill them, but often need to respect min-
imum standards defined by higher levels of government. The provision of schools, local
public roads or sewage disposal are examples of such tasks. Finally, there are delegated
tasks. Municipalities participate in the provision of federal or state services. The latter
are fully defined by the delegating level of government. The provision of passports to
citizens is such a task; it is carried out by municipalities as mandated by the federal level.
Over the past decades, higher levels of government have increasingly intruded into local
government in Germany. While standards for the provision of local services have increased
and more and more tasks have been devolved to the local level, the provision of adequate
local financing has often lagged behind, causing financial trouble at the municipal level.1
The potential mismatch of local spending and revenues will also come up repeatedly in
this dissertation, as will the question of what constitutes “adequate” local financing.
State influence on local public finance. The (fiscal) interaction between the
state and municipal level is another central theme of this dissertation. The states exert
substantial influence on local public finance through multiple channels that have already
been alluded to in the previous paragraphs.
Through their fiscal equalization schemes, states have great power over the financial
position of their municipalities. The design of these schemes is a state responsibility. When
parameters within the scheme are altered, the local fiscal situation and local fiscal policy
are affected. Transfers outside equalization systems also affect local finances. They may
1From my experience as a public policy consultant, I know that municipalities often deem their financial
resources inappropriate. State governments might of course disagree.
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be unconditional or conditional and they may or may not have a matching requirement –
all of this affects local incentives.
A more obvious channel of state influence is regulatory control.2 States are respon-
sible for ensuring that municipalities act within the boundaries of the law. Budgetary
oversight is perhaps the most important component of state regulatory control. All states
impose similar rules on municipal budgets through their local government laws, in particu-
lar balanced budgets and constraints on local debt. But they have a lot of discretion when
it comes to reacting to rule breaches. Hence, the effectiveness of state monitoring of local
fiscal positions differs, as does the degree of de facto local credit rationing. State fiscal
control involves a trade-off between local fiscal sustainability and budgetary flexibility of
local governments.
Finally, states have decisive influence over the amount of tasks municipalities are
obliged to handle. They can assign tasks to the local level and delegate their own tasks
to municipalities. Therefore, the effective degree of fiscal decentralization varies across
states. In general, municipalities in the Old Länder have a greater share in total local and
state government spending than their counterparts in the New Länder, with corresponding
greater access to financial resources.
1.2 Research questions and chapter overview
German municipalities enjoy tax autonomy, most importantly over business and property
taxation. However, tax revenue along with revenue from fees and charges is typically far
from sufficient to cover rising spending needs. How should the gap be filled? How do
different types of local revenue sources impact fiscal outcomes? How does the system of
local public finance in turn influence local tax policy? These are some of the key questions
of this dissertation. The dissertation’s three chapters are self-contained papers. In the
following, I give a brief overview of the chapters and how they relate to each other.3
All chapters belong to the field of applied economic literature on German munici-
palities, exploring challenges that arise from fiscal federalism in Germany. They study
the local level to derive lessons on policies that are decided upon at the state level or
2Counties, which themselves are part of the municipal level, are the competent regulatory authority for
the municipalities that belong to them. State interior ministries or intermediate state agencies exercise
oversight over counties and cities with county status.
3See Section 1.3 for a more detailed and systematic summary of each chapter.
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even the federal level. While the focus of this dissertation is firmly empirical, all chapters
have a grounding in economic theory, applying fundamental economic concepts to German
municipalities. Thus, the motivation for Chapter 2 comes from the “race to the bottom”
hypothesis and the common-pool literature. The latter is also a central starting point for
Chapter 3, which additionally builds on the flypaper and soft budget constraint literature,
inter alia. Chapter 4 investigates Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing hypothesis.
All chapters make use of empirical, administrative data on German municipalities.
Each chapter is based on a different (but overlapping) dataset that we built from various
official data sources. In particular, we drew data from the Regional Database Germany
(Regionaldatenbank Deutschland), the Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical
Office and the statistical offices of the Länder (Forschungsdatenzentren der Statistischen
Ämter des Bundes und der Länder) and the Statistics Local publications (Statistik Lokal).
Supplementary data came from the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt),
the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) and individual state statis-
tical offices. The resulting database features a range of demographic, socioeconomic and
political indicators for individual municipalities, counties and states. Two chapters (Chap-
ter 3 and 4) work with data on all of Germany (with the exception of the city-states), while
the remaining chapter (Chapter 2) studies municipalities in the most populous state North
Rhine-Westphalia. The chapters predominantly rely on the econometric analysis of panel
data. This data structure allows the use of fixed effects to control for any time-invariant,
municipality-specific omitted variables (see, e.g., Wooldridge [2011]).
Chapter 2 starts by tackling municipal fiscal equalization. Municipal fiscal equaliza-
tion schemes exist in all German territorial states. The transfers provided through these
schemes are an essential pillar of local revenue. Equalization schemes aim to reduce dif-
ferences in the financial capacity of municipalities without distorting their fiscal choices.
Yet it is an unspoken truth among political practitioners that the design of equalization
schemes does have an impact on local fiscal policy. Chapter 2 demonstrates such an im-
pact using the example of standard tax multipliers in North Rhine-Westphalia. It shows
that standard tax multipliers can be used to trigger adjustments of local business tax rates
and to avoid a race to the bottom. At the same time, they may become a threat to state
competitiveness if they lead to upward spirals in tax rates instead.
The results of Chapter 2 seem to suggest that transfers to lower levels of government
are unequivocally beneficial, if they are designed well. This assessment requires some
qualifications, as shown in Chapter 3. Fiscal equalization transfers are not the only types
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of transfers municipalities receive from the state level, nor is the influence of state transfers
limited to tax policy. There is a bigger system of transfers, which includes shared taxes,
conditional and unconditional transfers. Chapter 3 looks at all of these transfers, both as
a whole and separately. It investigates whether there is a relationship between the degree
of municipal transfer dependency and municipal fiscal performance as evidenced by the
budget balance. The findings point to an adverse effect of reliance on transfers. In turn,
fiscal performance is better the bigger the share of own-source revenue in the local revenue
mix. As discussed in Chapter 3, the negative impact of transfer dependency is contingent
on a number of other factors, inter alia on local borrowing autonomy. Formally, municipal
credit access for financing current spending is prohibited in all German states. However,
actual credit access differs in practice. The local budget balance suffers when transfer
dependency and local borrowing autonomy coincide.
Thus, local borrowing autonomy is not an ideal institutional choice when it comes
to local fiscal performance. However, credit access gives municipalities more flexibility in
handling spending pressure. Economic theory even suggests that it could be beneficial
for local tax policy as it could enable municipalities to smooth tax rates over time. This
would reduce the deadweight loss from taxation. Chapter 4 shows that such a beneficial
side effect of local credit access cannot be identified. In fact, empirical analysis points in
the opposite direction: More credit access is associated not with smoother, but with more
volatile local business and property tax rates. Granting municipalities credit access may
lead to unsustainable fiscal behavior. Ultimately, calls for bailouts become more likely
when municipalities can go into debt for current purposes. Thus, the problems created by
transfer dependency are indeed worsened by local credit access.
Where does this leave us? Chapter 4 concludes that in face of rising spending pres-
sures, granting municipalities access to credit is not advisable. It lead to more fiscal
pressure down the road. Instead, one of the main insights of Chapter 4 is that effec-
tive monitoring by state governments of local fiscal positions with the imposition and
enforcement of clear rules is decisive in ensuring long-run fiscal sustainability at the local
level. Lack of effective oversight may facilitate unsustainable debt build-up. The results of
Chapter 3 indicate that an increase of transfers would not be recommendable either. Nor
would it be feasible as states whose municipalities are in fiscal distress typically struggle
with fiscal woes themselves.
Revisiting local spending responsibilities is one option for restoring local fiscal sus-
tainability where it is threatened. This applies in particular to local spending that is due
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to delegated and strongly regulated tasks where any benefits of letting municipalities carry
out these functions are questionable.
Letting municipalities raise more own revenue is another option. It could reduce
local financing gaps, lead to more accountability and ultimately to more sustainable local
public finances. Yet there are institutional obstacles to more local own revenue: Given
that the federal tax structure is determined in the constitution, there is only limited scope
to increase the level of own revenues municipalities have access to. Municipalities do have
the right to raise local excise or consumption taxes, but they must not be comparable with
existing federal taxes. In addition to this significant constraint, state regulations further
limit the right to raise local taxes. Most state laws require new municipal taxes to be
approved by the state level, with approval often being denied (Rehm and Matern-Rehm
2010, p. 130). Perhaps it is time to encourage municipalities instead to make more use
of their constitutionally guaranteed right.4 After all, local excise taxes are often ideal
local taxes. They satisfy the equivalence principle, according to which taxes should be
a reflection of the goods and services provided by the government. The more services a
municipality provides or the better their quality, the more its citizens should be asked to
pay in taxes. When finding new innovative tax bases, attention should be paid to keep
distortions to a minimum.
Granting municipalities more rights with respect to local tax autonomy does not
mean states cannot influence local tax policy. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, municipal
fiscal equalization schemes contain powerful tools for shaping local tax policy, in addition
to budgetary monitoring and regulatory control. Fiscal equalization is essential in order
to provide municipalities with much-needed financial resources. At the same time, fiscal
equalization is not neutral with respect to local policy: It creates direct incentives for the
choice of appropriate local tax rates, local tax effort and beyond. Through their municipal
fiscal equalization schemes, states can set the direction of local tax policy, influence the
general level of tax rates within the state and, through this, impact the competitiveness
of the state as a whole. This in turn affects how much revenue municipalities can generate
from local taxes, as opposed to transfers from above, and how easily they can balance
their budgets.
4Art. 105 IIa GG grants the states the power to legislate with regard to local excise and consumption
taxes, which they deferred to municipalities.
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1.3 Chapters and main findings
This section presents a systematic overview of the chapters comprising this dissertation.
After providing information on co-authorship where applicable, the research question,
main hypotheses, related literature, methodology, key findings and policy implications are
summarized for each chapter.
1.3.1 Chapter 2: How to stop the race to the bottom
Chapter 2 is the result of joint work with Anna Rauch. It was published as “How to stop
the race to the bottom. Empirical evidence from North Rhine-Westphalia” in International
Tax and Public Finance (Rauch and Hummel 2015).
Research question. Chapter 2 investigates the role of standard tax multipliers
in shaping local tax policy. Standard tax multipliers are a widespread feature of fiscal
equalization systems. They are employed to calculate the fiscal capacity from taxes for
which subnational governments enjoy tax autonomy. In the German context, they are
used to normalize business and property tax revenue. If the municipality’s actual tax
multiplier is smaller than the standard tax multiplier, the accounted standardized tax
revenue is greater than actual tax revenue (and vice versa). The chapter asks whether
changes in standard tax multipliers translate into corresponding changes of local tax rates.
Main hypotheses. We hypothesize that local tax rates respond positively to
changes in standard tax multipliers. This makes standard tax multipliers a tool through
which federal states can influence local tax policy. In particular, it ensures that munici-
palities do not engage in a race to the bottom in business taxation and that they uphold
an adequate amount of tax effort. While the effects of most mechanisms within the equal-
ization system are unknown to the municipalities, the municipalities are well aware of
the impact of the standard tax multiplier (i.e. the “overestimation” of tax revenue if the
standard tax multiplier exceeds their tax multiplier). Standard tax multipliers prevent
municipalities from neglecting their own tax sources. They provide a signal for an “appro-
priate” tax rate level, which municipalities are incentivized to follow in order to maximize
their revenue. Thus, practitioners at the state level have devised a clever mechanism to
circumvent common pitfalls of local tax policy.
Related literature. A growing body of literature investigates the incentive ef-
fects of equalization systems on tax policy. Köthenbürger (2002) shows that equalization
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schemes that rely on revenue equalization tend to reinforce tax competition. In contrast,
fiscal equalization in the form of tax base or capacity equalization increases subnational
tax rates and thus attenuates competitive forces, which may be efficiency-enhancing when
competition effects are strong enough (Köthenbürger 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart 2006;
Smart 2007). Egger et al. (2010) exploit a change of the equalization formula in the state
of Lower Saxony and show that this reform had a significant impact on municipalities’
business tax rates for four consecutive years. Büttner (2006) provides evidence that there
is a positive relationship between the marginal contribution rate, defined as the rate at
which an increase in the tax base reduces equalization transfers, and local business tax
rates in the state of Baden-Württemberg. Smart (2007) investigates the effect of equal-
ization among Canadian provinces, showing that an expansion of transfers leads to higher
provincial tax rates. In addition, the hypothesis of standard tax multipliers as a driver
of local tax policy has long been discussed in the applied literature on the evaluation of
and reform options for fiscal equalization systems (e.g., Büttner et al. 2008; Parsche and
Steinherr 1995; Goerl et al. 2013). Baskaran (2014) even takes this hypothesis as a given
in his analysis of local tax mimicking by municipalities in Germany. However, an explicit
test of this hypothesis is absent from the academic literature to date.
Methodology. We adapt the theoretical models used in Smart (2007) and Egger
et al. (2010) to illustrate the interaction of local taxation and fiscal equalization. This
allows us to derive the optimal business tax multiplier as well as the incentive effect of a
change in the standard business tax multiplier. The theoretical prediction is then put to
an empirical test. A quasi-experiment in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia is exploited
to identify the incentive effect. Until 1995, North Rhine-Westphalia’s equalization scheme
featured standard tax multipliers that were differentiated according to municipal popula-
tion size. In 1993, the state constitutional court ruled that this arbitrary differentiation
was not permissible. As a result, North Rhine-Westphalia’s state legislature had to adjust
its municipal fiscal equalization scheme. The court ruling thus led to exogenous variation
in the standard tax multiplier for small municipalities. Our empirical analysis is based
on a balanced panel dataset of annual administrative data for all 396 municipalities of
North Rhine-Westphalia. The dataset covers the time period from 1987 to 2002, thereby
containing information on the pre-reform, reform and post-reform periods. It draws on a
variety of official statistics data sources. The rich and unique dataset includes a number of
municipal and county-level control variables. Our research design combines a municipal-
level fixed effects model with a difference-in-differences approach, where local business tax
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multipliers are regressed on interaction terms between treatment groups and treatment
points. Our identification strategy exploits the exogenous (quasi-experimental) variation
of the standard tax multiplier for “small” municipalities induced by the reform of the
North Rhine-Westphalian municipal fiscal equalization system in the mid-1990s.
Key findings. We find a positive effect of the standard business tax multiplier on
local business tax multipliers, as predicted by theoretical considerations. Upward shifts
in standard business tax multipliers lead to immediate upward adjustments in actual
business tax multipliers. The effect is present for all affected municipalities, and it is more
pronounced for those whose actual tax multipliers are initially below post-reform standard
tax multipliers. The findings are robust to a number of alternative specifications.
Policy implications. Our results have important implications for the practical
design of fiscal equalization schemes. They highlight the importance of the parameters
of equalization systems for shaping local tax policy. Through its choice of the standard
tax multiplier, a state can influence the level of municipal tax rates and the weight of
competitive downward forces. Standard tax multipliers provide a straightforward practical
tool for governments to shape lower-level tax policy, with important consequences for their
own competitiveness.
1.3.2 Chapter 3: Does local transfer dependency weaken fiscal
performance
Chapter 3 is sole-authored.
Research question. Chapter 3 asks whether dependency of local governments on
transfers from higher levels of government negatively affects local fiscal outcomes.
Main hypotheses. The primary hypothesis guiding Chapter 3 is that lower trans-
fer dependency improves fiscal performance and vice versa. Greater reliance on transfers
from higher levels of government is expected to create soft budget constraints and lack of
accountability at the municipal level, both of which contributes to bailout expectations.
Because local governments expect to be bailed out by state governments should they run
into fiscal difficulties, they have less incentive for sound fiscal management. Building on
this hypothesis, the effect of transfer dependency on local fiscal performance might be
contingent on other factors such as local borrowing autonomy, horizontal fiscal imbal-
ances, election years or the degree of spending decentralization in the state in question.
Finally, the effect of transfer dependency might differ depending on the type of trans-
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fer. Shared taxes, conditional and unconditional transfers are all not own revenues. But
the rules governing these transfers differ, which could imply different incentive effects for
municipalities.
Related literature. A growing body of literature has demonstrated harmful ef-
fects of transfer dependency. Indeed, reliance on transfers as opposed to own revenues has
been blamed for larger deficits (Eyraud and Lusinyan 2013; Foremny 2014; Rodden 2002;
de Mello 2007), fiscal crises (Rodden et al. 2003), a lower GDP per capita (Blöchliger
2014), bigger government (Guo 2008), higher debt (Aldasoro and Seiferling 2014), lower
government efficiency (Geys et al. 2010; Boetti et al. 2012), less skilled politicians (Bor-
dignon et al. 2013) or even higher inequality (Hummel and Seiferling 2015). The existing
empirical, quantitative literature shares a major potential flaw. It uses aggregate mea-
sures of subnational transfer dependency at the country level to test transfer dependency’s
empirical effect. Aggregating entire state or local sectors into one unit of analysis conceals
a vast amount of within-country variation in vertical fiscal imbalance. Federal states in
particular feature diverse institutional and fiscal landscapes that create such variation.
As pointed out by Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013) and Rodden (2002), among others, using
disaggregated data would therefore be desirable. Chapter 3 aims to fill this gap and to
verify the results of the existing literature with an in-depth within-country econometric
analysis.
Methodology. The theoretical hypotheses are tested in a disaggregated panel
dataset comprising more than 5,000 German municipalities in all German states from
1998-2013. Local deficits are used as measures of fiscal performance. In the baseline
regression model, municipal deficits per capita are regressed on municipal transfer de-
pendency, defined as the share of transfers in gross current revenues, and controls. The
baseline model relies on conventional fixed effects estimates. To rule out potential bias
from endogeneity of the transfer dependency variable, the baseline results are verified us-
ing an innovative instrumental variable approach. The hypotheses concerning a contingent
effect of transfer dependency on fiscal performance are tested by introducing interaction
terms into the regression model. In addition to analyzing transfer dependency as a whole,
the effect of different types of transfers – shared taxes, conditional and unconditional
transfers – is considered separately.
Key findings. The empirical results confirm a negative impact of transfer depen-
dency on the local budget balance. The effect is aggravated when transfer dependency
coincides with horizontal fiscal imbalances or easy local access to borrowing. The decom-
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posed analysis of dependency on different transfer types suggests that shared taxes and
conditional transfers are responsible for the adverse budgetary effect, while reliance on
unconditional transfers leaves local fiscal performance unaffected.
Policy implications. The findings suggest important policy implications. First,
they bolster the oft-stated recommendation to accompany decentralization on the spend-
ing side with sufficient decentralization on the revenue side. Sound fiscal performance at
the local level requires not only sufficient quantities of local revenue. It also requires the
right kinds of local revenue. A substantial share of own revenues in the local revenue mix
strengthens local legitimacy over the use of financial resources as well as local accountabil-
ity, lessens bailout expectations and improves fiscal discipline. Second, to the extent that
transfers to lower levels of government are required and might even need to be increased,
attention should be paid to the choice of the transfer instrument. Too much emphasis
on shared taxes and conditional transfers to fill local financing gaps might be particularly
damaging in view of fiscal sustainability at the local level.
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Tax smoothing and credit access
Chapter 4 is co-authored with Anna Rauch and Eva Gerhards.
Research question. Are local tax rates less volatile if municipalities have easier
access to credits? Do local governments smooth tax rates if they are granted access to
borrowing? Economic theory shows that public debt can be useful to enhance social
welfare if it enables governments to smooth taxes over time. Chapter 4 investigates the
empirical relationship between credit access and tax smoothing using the case of German
municipalities. If local tax rates are less volatile in federal states granting easier access
to borrowing, there is some benefit to allowing public debt and a trade-off between tax
smoothing and budget discipline arises. If not, local credit rationing is advisable.
Main hypotheses. It is plausible to assume that local governments that enjoy
credit access find it easier to smooth taxes over time. They can afford to refrain from ad-
justing tax rates over the business cycle to ensure stable tax revenues. Allowing automatic
stabilizers to work can easily cause deficits during economic downturns. The optimal re-
sponse to adverse temporary economic shocks may also be to run a budget deficit rather
than exacerbate economic costs through tax rate increases. Thus, we should see more
stable tax rates in federal states where municipalities can make use of liquidity credits to
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finance current deficits. In other words, there should be a positive link between credit
access and tax smoothing, as credit access contributes to smoother tax rates.
Related literature. In his seminal contribution, Barro (1979) puts forward his
theory of tax smoothing. From a welfare perspective, deadweight losses and hence tax
rates should be smoothed over time in order to minimize distortionary costs from taxation.
Credit rationing could inhibit tax smoothing. According to the standard recommendation
of the fiscal federalism literature, lower levels of government should not be granted access
to debt, at least not for financing current deficits (e.g., Oates 2005). However, ruling
out debt finance could prevent subnational governments that enjoy tax autonomy over
certain taxes from engaging in welfare-enhancing tax smoothing. Following the pioneering
work of Barro (1979) and Bohn (1990), a sizable empirical and theoretical literature on
tax smoothing developed. This literature typically asks whether governments do or do not
engage in tax smoothing and finds answers using indirect tests of tax smoothing relying on
the behavior of the budget balance. Examples include Adler (2006), Barro (1979; 1995),
Bohn (1990), Olekalns (1997) and Strazicich (1997).
Methodology. We carry out an in-depth institutional analysis of local credit access
in Germany, which yields an original credit access index. This index reflects the differing
institutional, legal and administrative environment in each German territorial state. In
addition, we define “smoother tax rates” as tax rates that are subject to a smaller number
of changes within a given time period. Our approach allows us to use tax rate data and
investigate tax rate volatility directly. This is in contrast to the indirect tax smoothing
tests prevalent in existing literature.
We refute a positive association between credit access and tax smoothing for the case
of German municipalities based on four steps of empirical, i.e. descriptive and econometric,
analysis. First, we take a closer look at the development of liquidity credits. Next, we
study tax rate volatility. Third, we show descriptively that a positive relationship exists
between tax rate volatility and credit access. Fourth, we confirm the positive association
between credit access and tax rate volatility using an econometric analysis where we regress
tax rate volatility on credit access. The entire analysis is based on a dataset of over 10,000
municipalities in all German territorial states.
Key findings. We find no evidence in favor of a tax smoothing effect of credit access.
Instead, we show that a rising number of German municipalities is making abusive use of
easier credit access and carries a high burden of short-term debt. So-called liquidity credits
that are meant to fill temporary liquidity gaps are increasingly used to cover persistent
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budget deficits over a medium- to long-term horizon. Our results suggest that granting
credit access is an (un)successful attempt of the respective federal states to compensate
for insufficient revenues and to limit upward pressure on tax rates. Credit access triggers
unsustainable behavior, making calls for bailouts more likely.
Policy implications. Our paper provides support for the notion that strict credit
rationing of the local level may be the best institutional choice for higher-level govern-
ments even if there is substantial tax autonomy at the local level. Otherwise calls for
bailouts become more likely. In Germany, federal states with loose attitudes towards local
debt should then follow the example of states that never expanded local credit access in
the first place. Making such a change would necessarily require revisiting local spending
responsibilities and the adequacy of state transfers to the local level. Ensuring effective
monitoring and budgetary oversight is also crucial. Beyond Germany, the findings of this
paper suggest that higher-level governments should think twice before allowing subna-
tional governments, and local governments in particular, access to credit to fund current
expenditures. Chances are local debt will not be used in a welfare enhancing way.
Chapter 2
How to stop the race to the bottom
Abstract
Standard tax multipliers are a widespread feature of fiscal equalization systems. A simple
theoretical model shows that actual tax multipliers respond positively to changes in standard
tax multipliers. This theoretical prediction is tested empirically using data on municipalities
in Germany. A quasi-experiment in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia is exploited to
identify the incentive effect. The empirical results confirm that local business tax policy is
shaped by standard tax multipliers. They provide a straightforward practical tool to avoid
a race to the bottom in local business tax rates.
2.1 Introduction
It is a well-known normative principle among public economists that business taxation
should not be decentralized to subnational levels of government. Otherwise, so the ar-
gument goes, local governments would engage in a harmful “race to the bottom” where
they constantly try to undercut their neighbors’ business tax rates. Resulting tax rates
would be inefficiently low (Oates 1972). A similarly widespread insight is that problems of
overspending and reduced tax effort arise whenever budgeting involves a common pool of
resources (see Raudla [2010] for a review on the use of the “budgetary commons” metaphor
in existing literature).
Germany’s institutional setting involves business tax autonomy for local governments
and a common pool of fiscal equalization transfers from the state to the local level. As a
result, conventional wisdom points to overly low business tax rates as a likely outcome:
Competition for mobile capital presumably pushes tax rates downwards. At the same
16
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time, one might suspect that the common pool of equalization transfers further reduces tax
effort. Indeed, Köthenbürger (2002) shows that equalization schemes that rely on revenue
equalization tend to reinforce tax competition. In contrast, fiscal equalization in the form
of tax base or capacity equalization increases subnational tax rates and thus attenuates
competitive forces, which may be efficiency-enhancing when competition effects are strong
enough (Köthenbürger 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart 2006; Smart 2007). Municipal fiscal
equalization in Germany adheres to the capacity equalization principle, which is also
employed in the transfer systems of countries such as Canada and Australia. In such
systems, jurisdictions’ tax bases are evaluated at a standard tax rate and compared to a
benchmark level of spending or revenue to determine the size of the transfer.1 The transfer
to each jurisdiction decreases in its “fiscal capacity.”
In this paper, we argue that the so-called “standard tax multipliers” (fiktive Hebesätze
or Nivellierungshebesätze) help to prevent both the race to the bottom and the raiding
of the commons. Standard tax multipliers are employed in fiscal equalization schemes
to calculate the fiscal capacity from taxes for which subnational governments enjoy tax
autonomy. In the case of German municipalities, the business tax is one of the most impor-
tant components of fiscal capacity. The use of standard tax multipliers has the following
effect: If the municipality’s actual business tax multiplier is smaller than the standard
tax multiplier, the accounted standardized business tax revenue is greater than actual
business tax revenue (and vice versa). While the effects of most mechanisms within the
equalization system are unknown to the municipalities, the municipalities are well aware
of the impact of the standard tax multiplier (i.e., the “overestimation” of tax revenue if the
standard tax multiplier exceeds their business tax multiplier). Standard tax multipliers
prevent municipalities from neglecting their own tax sources. They provide a signal for
an “appropriate” tax rate level, which municipalities are incentivized to follow in order to
maximize their revenue. Thus, practitioners at the state level have devised a clever mech-
anism to circumvent common pitfalls of local tax policy. Consistent with this argument,
local business tax rates in Germany hardly appear to have been driven by a race to the
bottom. Instead, they exhibited a steady upward trend over the past three decades.2
1In contrast to most such systems, German municipal fiscal equalization schemes rely on a comparison
between “fiscal need” and “fiscal capacity.” Moreover, the sum of all equalization transfers is typically
fixed by the state level and not endogenous.
2Weighted average business tax multipliers in Germany increased from 330 in 1980 and 364 in 1990 to
390 in 2010 (Federal Statistical Office 2014c).
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A growing body of empirical literature investigates the incentive effects of equaliza-
tion systems on tax policy and demonstrates the positive impact of capacity equalization
on local tax rates. Egger et al. (2010) exploit a change of the equalization formula in the
state of Lower Saxony and show that this reform had a significant impact on municipali-
ties’ business tax rates for four consecutive years. Büttner (2006) provides evidence that
there is a positive relationship between the marginal contribution rate, defined as the rate
at which an increase in the tax base reduces equalization transfers, and local business tax
rates in the state of Baden-Württemberg. Smart (2007) investigates the effect of equal-
ization among Canadian provinces, showing that an expansion of transfers leads to higher
provincial tax rates.
This paper presents further evidence of the upward pressure that fiscal equalization
exerts on local tax rates. We add to the literature by focusing the analysis on standard tax
multipliers and using an innovative identification strategy with a new dataset. Standard
tax multipliers are an institutional feature of any equalization scheme that relies on so-
called “representative tax systems,” as well as being present in municipal fiscal equalization
in all thirteen German territorial states.3 The hypothesis of standard tax multipliers as a
driver of local tax policy has long been discussed in the applied literature on the evaluation
of and reform options for fiscal equalization systems (e.g., Büttner et al. 2008; Parsche
and Steinherr 1995; Goerl et al. 2013). Baskaran (2014) even takes this hypothesis as
a given in his analysis of local tax mimicking by municipalities in Germany. He views
a reform of standard tax multipliers in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia in 2003 as
the cause of observable adjustments in actual tax multipliers. This is despite the fact
that, to the best of our knowledge, an explicit test of this hypothesis is absent from the
academic literature to date. We adapt the theoretical models used in Smart (2007) and
Egger et al. (2010) to illustrate the interaction of local taxation and fiscal equalization.
This allows us to derive the optimal business tax multiplier as well as the incentive effect
of a change in the standard business tax multiplier. Beyond the mechanics exposed in
the model, we believe that standard tax multipliers provide an easy-to-read signal to local
policymakers. They view standard tax multipliers as a reference for an appropriate and
politically feasible tax multiplier. In contrast to changes in eligibility criteria, adjustment
levels, or marginal contributions rates, which may also influence local tax multipliers as
3Moreover, fiscal equalization between federal states in Germany also employs standard tax rates to
standardize property transfer tax revenue since the introduction of state tax rate autonomy for this tax
in 2006.
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shown in the previous literature, standard tax multipliers have the same magnitude as
actual multipliers. As a result, changes in standard tax multipliers are easily translated
into perceived necessary adjustments of local multipliers. As stated by Baskaran (2015),
hikes in standard tax multipliers also provide a window of opportunity for local officials
to raise tax multipliers while deflecting the blame to the state level. Thus, we argue that
changes in standard tax multipliers are a more obvious and potentially more powerful
trigger of local tax responses than previously analyzed fiscal equalization parameters.
Standard tax multipliers are often equal, or at least related, to the average of actual
tax multipliers, creating an endogeneity problem in empirical analysis. A quasi-experiment
in North Rhine-Westphalia allows us to solve this problem. Until 1995, North Rhine-
Westphalia’s equalization scheme featured standard tax multipliers that were differentiated
according to municipal population size. In 1993, the state constitutional court ruled that
this arbitrary differentiation was not permissible. As a result, North Rhine-Westphalia’s
state legislature had to adjust its municipal fiscal equalization scheme. The court ruling
thus led to exogenous variation in the standard tax multiplier for small municipalities.
The strict exogeneity of this reform is in contrast to other reforms where standard tax
multipliers are adjusted to better reflect actual average tax multipliers.
Our empirical analysis is based on a balanced panel dataset of annual administrative
data for all 396 municipalities of North Rhine-Westphalia. The dataset covers the time
period from 1987 to 2002, thereby containing information on the pre-reform, reform and
post-reform periods. It draws on a variety of official statistics data sources. The rich and
unique dataset includes a number of municipal- and county-level control variables.
Our research design combines a municipal-level fixed effects model with a difference-
in-differences approach, where local business tax multipliers are regressed on interaction
terms between treatment groups and treatment points. Our identification strategy exploits
the exogenous (quasi-experimental) variation of the standard tax multiplier for “small”
municipalities induced by the reform of the North Rhine-Westphalian municipal fiscal
equalization system in the mid-1990s. We find a positive effect of the standard business
tax multiplier on local business tax multipliers, as predicted by theoretical considerations.
The findings are robust to a number of alternative specifications.
Section 2.2 clarifies the institutional features of the German business tax and munic-
ipal fiscal equalization. Section 2.3 introduces the theoretical model. Section 2.4 explains
our empirical approach and data. Section 2.5 presents the results of the empirical analysis.
Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Institutional background
Germany’s federal structure is a key determining factor of the country’s fiscal landscape.
The federal level, the three city-states and 13 territorial states, and the more than 11,000
municipalities each have differing degrees of tax autonomy over different taxes. For
German municipalities, the business tax (Gewerbesteuer) and the equalization transfers
(Schlüsselzuweisungen) provided to them by their federal state are two of the most im-
portant income sources.4 In 2013, municipal net revenue from the business tax and fiscal
equalization transfers accounted for 15.8 and 14.3% of aggregate municipal income, re-
spectively (Federal Statistical Office 2014b).
2.2.1 Business taxation
It is a particularity of the German tax system that municipalities enjoy business tax auton-
omy. Each municipality sets its own local business tax multiplier (Gewerbesteuerhebesatz).
In contrast, the business tax base and the basic tax rate (Steuermesszahl)5 are defined at
the federal level. The resulting tax rate is determined by multiplying the local business tax
multiplier with the basic federal tax rate. The business tax is charged on operating profits
of corporate and non-corporate firms. In 2013, gross business tax revenue amounted to
43 billion (bn) euros, making it Germany’s third most revenue-generating tax (Federal
Statistical Office 2014a).
2.2.2 Municipal fiscal equalization
In 2013, municipal fiscal equalization transfers in Germany totaled 29.4 bn euros (Federal
Statistical Office 2014b). These transfers serve a double purpose. First, most German
municipalities lack sufficient own revenue sources to fund their tasks. The transfers they
receive from their respective federal state via its municipal fiscal equalization system thus
serve a fundamental financing function. Second, the transfers are designed to reduce
differences in municipalities’ capacities to provide public goods.
4Other relevant sources are the local property tax, the municipal shares of value-added tax (VAT) and
income tax, as well as duties and charges.
5The basic federal tax rate was set at 5% (with lower rates for operating profits below 48.000 euros)
during our sample period. It was reduced to a uniform rate of 3.5% in 2007.
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Municipal fiscal equalization systems function similarly in all German states. All of
them employ the same basic mechanism of comparing a fictitious measure of “fiscal need”




(Schlüsselmasse, i.e., the sum of all equalization transfers paid out in one year in the state
in question) are predetermined. The fiscal equalization transfer Ti of municipality i equals
Ti = α(βNi − Ci) ∀ i with βNi > Ci. (2.1)
Ti depends on the combined effect of the following factors: Adjustment level α, i.e., the
degree to which the difference between fiscal need and fiscal capacity is equalized; fictitious
measure of fiscal need, which is calculated by multiplying a fiscal need number Ni by the
basic amount β; standardized measure of fiscal capacity Ci.6
Municipalities whose fiscal capacity exceeds their fiscal need are called “abundant”
and do not benefit from fiscal equalization transfers. The basic amount is determined via












∀ i with βNi > Ci. (2.2)
While the derivation of the fictitious measure of fiscal need is negligible with respect
to the focus of this paper, the derivation of the standardized measure of fiscal capacity
is not. Fiscal capacity is the sum of standardized business and property tax revenue and
the (unstandardized) municipal share of VAT and income tax revenue. To assure local
tax multiplier autonomy, municipal fiscal equalization systems employ so-called standard
tax multipliers to evaluate tax revenue from taxes for which the municipalities set tax
multipliers (business and property tax). Standard tax multipliers are set by the respective





6In addition to such “common” fiscal equalization transfers, some states employ special transfers to
municipalities suffering from a very low standardized tax revenue to ensure that they achieve a pre-defined
level of fiscal resources. However, this is not the case in North Rhine-Westphalia.
7Due to the endogeneity of the basic amount, the comparative statics of municipal fiscal equalization
are not straightforward and unknown to municipalities.
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with Ri :=business tax revenue, mi :=business tax multiplier and s :=standard tax mul-
tiplier.8
If the actual business tax multiplier is smaller than the standard tax multiplier,
the accounted standardized tax revenue is greater than the actual business tax revenue
(and vice versa). While the effects of most mechanisms within the equalization system
are unknown to the municipalities, they are well aware of the impact of the standard tax
multiplier (i.e., the “overestimation” of tax revenue if the standard tax multiplier exceeds
their business tax multiplier).
2.3 A simple theoretical model
To understand the incentive effect of standard tax multipliers, we develop a simple theoret-
ical model of local taxation and fiscal equalization with two revenue-maximizing local ju-
risdictions. It is a version of the models employed by Egger et al. (2010) and Smart (2007),
which we extend to include the standard tax multiplier as well as the basic amount. It al-
lows us to derive the optimal business tax multiplier and the incentive effect of a change in
the standard business tax multiplier. Suppose there are two municipalities i and j whose
sole income sources are business taxation and fiscal equalization transfers. The business
tax base Bi of municipality i depends not only on its own business tax rate mi, but also
on the one of municipality j, mj:
Bi = B0i + γmj − δmi (2.4)
where B0i ≥ 0 and δ > γ ≥ 0. Tax revenue Ri thus becomes
Ri = mi(B0i + γmj − δmi). (2.5)




= s(B0i + γmj − δmi) (2.6)
where s again denotes the standard tax multiplier.
8Standardized property tax revenue is determined equivalently.
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Assuming that both municipalities are non-abundant, the respective fiscal equaliza-









B0i + γmj − δmi
)
(2.7)
As an auxiliary assumption, suppose that both municipalities seek to maximize their
revenue from taxes and transfers:
max
mi
Ri + Ti (2.8)
The reduced-form equation for the optimal tax rate of municipality i then becomes:
mi∗ = 14δ2 − γ2
[
2δB0i + γB0j + αs
{
γδ + 2δ2 + 1
Ni +Nj
(γNj(γ − δ) + 2δNi(γ − δ))
}]
(2.9)




= 14δ2 − γ2
[
3δγNi +Nj(2δ2 + γ2)
]
> 0 (2.10)
Proposition: An increase in the standard tax multiplier increases the optimal tax mul-
tiplier chosen by the municipalities.
Given this relationship, the use of standard tax multipliers prevents municipalities
from neglecting their own revenue sources and provides a clever way to circumvent the
common pool problem. Because of standard tax multipliers, fiscal equalization acts as
a tax on tax multiplier reductions. Whenever a municipality lowers its tax multiplier
in order to increase its tax base, its fiscal capacity rises. The higher the standard tax
multiplier, the greater are the increase in fiscal capacity and the corresponding reduction
in equalization transfers. What is more, many municipalities consider the standard tax




Ti + αs(B0i + γmj − δmi +B0j + γmi − δmj)
α(Ni +Nj)
.
Chapter 2 Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 24
multiplier as a signal for their own tax policy. In contrast to changes in the adjustment
level α, which also induce tax multiplier reactions, changes in s are easily translated into
appropriate adjustments of the local tax multiplier, as both have the same magnitude.
Therefore, a race to the bottom in local business tax rates does not occur when standard
tax multipliers are used in equalization.
2.4 Empirical approach
In this section we first provide background information on the quasi-experiment exploited
in the empirical analysis, before we present our data sources and outline our empirical
model. Last, we discuss our identification strategy.
2.4.1 Quasi-experiment
We exploit a quasi-experiment in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia for an empirical
test of our proposition. North Rhine-Westphalia offers a promising case to study given
that it is the most populous German state with over 17 million inhabitants. Moreover,
it stands out as a state where municipalities’ business tax multipliers are high relative to
those found elsewhere in Germany. The same applies to its standard tax multipliers.
Like those in the other 12 territorial states, the 396 North Rhine-Westphalian munic-
ipalities receive state transfers through a municipal fiscal equalization system. Each year,
several billion euros (8 bn in 2014) are paid out as equalization transfers. North Rhine-
Westphalia currently sets a single standard tax multiplier with respect to the business tax.
Until 1995, the equalization scheme featured standard tax multipliers that were differenti-
ated according to population size. The fiscal capacity of municipalities with up to 150,000
inhabitants (“small” municipalities) was calculated using a standard tax multiplier of 350.
The fiscal capacity of municipalities whose population size exceeded this threshold (“big”
municipalities) was evaluated with a standard tax multiplier of 380. In 1993, the state
constitutional court ruled that this arbitrary differentiation was not permissible (VerfGH
9/92, 22/92).10 As a result, North Rhine-Westphalia’s state legislature was required to
adjust its municipal fiscal equalization scheme. Standard tax multipliers for municipalities
with less than 150,000 inhabitants were increased in three equal steps between 1996 and
10The differentiation was found to be arbitrary as long as the legislator had not established why it was
warranted for objective reasons.
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1998 to reach the larger cities’ multiplier. This 30-points change amounted to an increase
of 8.5% in the standardized tax multiplier. The court ruling thus led to sizable exoge-
nous variation in the standard tax multiplier for small municipalities. To the best of our
knowledge, this quasi-experiment has not been used in the literature to date.
2.4.2 Data sources
Our empirical analysis is based on a balanced panel dataset of annual administrative data
for all 396 municipalities of North Rhine-Westphalia. The dataset covers the time pe-
riod from 1987 to 2002, thereby containing information on the pre-reform, reform and
post-reform periods. It draws on a variety of official statistics data sources, namely North
Rhine-Westphalia’s statistical office (IT.NRW ), the Regional Database Germany (Region-
aldatenbank Deutschland) and the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur f ür Ar-
beit). The rich and unique dataset includes municipal business tax multipliers, inhabitants,
income tax and VAT shares, employees at place of employment, gross domestic product
(GDP) (at county level), disposable income of private households (at county level), mu-
nicipal debt, tax bases and revenues from property and business taxes, commuters and
municipal surface area. There are 375 “small” and 21 “big” municipalities up until 1999.
From 2000 onwards, one additional city has more than 150,000 inhabitants.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics, 1987-2002
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Business tax multiplier 373.284 35.652 250 490 6336
Income tax share 0.286 0.05 0.17 0.484 4356
GDP 20.732 4.013 13.066 62.922 3960
Inc. of priv. households 16.645 1.642 13.136 21.456 3168
Employees 0.259 0.093 0.048 0.625 3960
Surface area 0.429 0.345 0.028 2.36 4356
Notes: Business tax multiplier (in %), surface area (in hectare (ha) p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000
euro p.c.), employees (p.c.) (municipal level) and income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.),
GDP (in 1,000 euro p.c.) (county level); number of observations: 396 municipalities per year. Own
calculations based on data from IT.NRW, Regional Database Germany and the Federal Employment
Agency.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the most important variables, which are
reported in per capita (p.c.) terms with the exception of business tax multipliers. Between
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1987 and 2002, business tax multipliers in North Rhine-Westphalia varied between 250 and
490, with an unweighted average of 373.28. Table 2.1 also illustrates some data availability
issues. None of the tabulated control variables are available for all years. Municipal income
tax shares, GDP and surface area have only been reported since 1992.11 There are no data
on the disposable income of private households before 1995 or on the number of employees
before 1993. More detailed summary statistics are provided in Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 in
the appendix to this chapter.
Figure 2.1 depicts the difference between average business tax multipliers of “big” and
“small” municipalities between 1992 and 2002.12 The three dashed vertical lines mark the
three reform years where standard business tax multipliers for small municipalities were
raised. As shown, the average business tax multiplier of big municipalities was more than
70 percentage points higher than that of small municipalities at the outset. During the
three reform years, the difference in averages dropped sharply, to a level of 60 percentage
points and below.
11GDP is also missing in 1993.
12In 2003, the standard tax multiplier was increased to 403 for all North Rhine-Westphalian communi-
ties.
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Figure 2.1: Difference in average business tax multipliers between “big“ and
“small“ municipalities, 1992-2002
Source: Own calculations based on data from IT.NRW.
2.4.3 Empirical model
Our research design combines a municipal-level fixed effects model with a difference-in-
differences approach. The dependent variable is the business tax multiplier mi,t of mu-
nicipality i in year t. Our independent variables of interest are the interaction terms
TGi×TPt, t = 1996, ..., 1998 between treatment groups (TGi = 1 if population ≤ 150, 000
and 0 otherwise)13 and treatment points (TP1996 = 1 if t = 1996, TP1997 = 1 if t = 1997,
TP1998 = 1 if t = 1998 and 0 otherwise).
We include two types of control variables to adjust for observable time-variant dif-
ferences between municipalities: Xi,t and Zc,t represent column vectors of municipal-
level variables (debt p.c., share of income tax etc.) and county-level variables (GDP p.c.
etc.), respectively. Furthermore, we control for municipal and year fixed effects (λi,Φt).
The municipal fixed effects account for unobserved but time-invariant omitted municipal-
level factors that may influence business tax multipliers. By adding year fixed effects
13Population size in 1995 determines assignment to treatment groups for the one municipality that
grows beyond 150,000 inhabitants in 2000.
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to the regression equation we are able to control for common shocks affecting tax rates
across all municipalities in a given year. We use the following regression model with
t = 1995, ..., 1998:
mi,t = αTGi + δ1996TGi × TP1996 + δ1997TGi × TP1997 + δ1998TGi × TP1998
+ βXi,t + θZc,t + λi + Φt + εi,t
(2.11)
where the error term εi,t is clustered on the county level.
Our coefficients of interest δ1996, δ1997 and δ1998 measure how the business tax multi-
plier differential between “small” municipalities (treatment group) and “big” municipalities
(control group) changed ceteris paribus (c.p.) between the reference year 1995 and 1996,
1997 and 1998, respectively.
2.4.4 Discussion of identification
Our identification strategy exploits the exogenous (quasi-experimental) variation of the
standard tax multiplier for “small” municipalities induced by the reform of the North
Rhine-Westphalian municipal fiscal equalization system in the mid-1990s. In contrast
to later changes to standard business tax multipliers, this reform was prompted by a
court ruling and is therefore truly exogenous. The chosen identification strategy thus
circumvents typical endogeneity concerns.14 The validity of identification hinges on the
assumption of a common trend between treatment and control groups.15 We assume
that business tax multipliers would have evolved in parallel in the absence of treatment
(conditional on other included independent variables). Without treatment, δ1996, δ1997 and
δ1998 would have to be zero.
Differences in administrative status between the treatment and the control groups
might pose a potential concern regarding this identifying assumption. All 21 cities in the
control groups are cities with county status. Of the 375 municipalities in the treatment
group, only two have county status, while the remaining 373 belong to a county. If there
had been systematic differences in or changes to the financing structure or spending re-
14Standard tax multipliers were not set exogenously in later reforms (2003, 2011).
15Although we distinguish “treated” and “untreated” municipalities, it is important to note that transfer
payments to all municipalities were affected by the reform: The sum of all transfers is fixed and the change
in the standard tax multiplier affects how this sum is distributed among all municipalities.
Chapter 2 Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 29
sponsibilities of municipalities with as opposed to without county status during our sample
period, this might constitute a violation of the common trend assumption. We know of
no such major shifts during the period of interest. Moreover, the revenue sources of cities
with county status are equivalent to those of municipalities belonging to a county: Both
rely on the same types of taxes, fees and charges, transfers, etc. In contrast, counties are
financed solely through state transfers and the Kreisumlage, a financial contribution levied
from municipalities within the county. Through this levy, municipalities belonging to a
county share the responsibility for financing county-level spending. Given this adminis-
trative and fiscal setup, we believe that our treatment and control groups are sufficiently
comparable.
Systematic differences in the degree to which both groups suffer from fiscal distress
and find themselves under the supervision of regulatory authorities might also bias our es-
timation results. In recent years, regulatory authorities have been bound by official decrees
to ensure that local tax multipliers of municipalities operating under budget consolidation
plans are higher or at least equal to average state-wide tax multipliers of municipalities in
their population size range. This might induce upward movements in tax multipliers which
are unrelated to standard tax multipliers. There are unfortunately no official records on
municipalities with budget consolidation plans in the mid-1990s. However, according to
the Ministry of the Interior, the practice of actively influencing tax multipliers is a rela-
tively new phenomenon. To the best of their knowledge, no official decrees existed during
our sample period that would have mandated regulatory authorities to make higher tax
rates a precondition for the approval of budget consolidation plans. What is more, budget
consolidation plans were much less widespread during our sample period than they are
today. Thus, we are confident in the validity of the common trend assumption.
We investigate the common trend by plotting the development of the average busi-
ness tax multipliers of “small” municipalities (treatment group) and “big” municipalities
(control group) between 1987 and 2010 (Figure 2.2). The former is represented by the
gray dashed and the latter by the black dotted line. The corresponding standard tax
multipliers are shown in gray (“small” municipalities) and black (“big” municipalities/
all municipalities). Figure 2.2 supports the common trend assumption. Both groups have
seen a gradual upward trend since 1987. The development of their business tax multipliers
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has been similar for most of the time period. Visible exceptions with some convergence of
averages occurred during the reform years 1996-1998 and 2003 (see also Figure 2.1).16
Figure 2.2: Development of average business tax multipliers and standard
business tax multipliers, 1987-2010
Source: Own calculations based on data from IT.NRW.
2.5 Results
In this section we first present our main results. Next, we perform a number of robustness
checks to validate our results. Last, we provide an extension to test if “small” municipali-
ties’ reactions to the reform differed systematically depending on their pre-reform business
tax multipliers.
2.5.1 Main results
Table 2.2 shows results for two regressions where t = 1995, ..., 1998. We restrict our
main analysis to the reform period as we expect municipalities to react instantaneously to
16As mentioned above, there was another reform in 2003. The incentive effect was stronger for the
group of “small” municipalities due to their lower business tax multipliers.
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changes in applicable standard tax multipliers. Specification I contains baseline results for
a regression without any control variables apart from the usual municipal and year fixed
effects. The regression displayed in Specification II includes income tax shares, GDP and
disposable income of private households, surface area and the number of employees at
place of work (each per capita) as additional controls.
Table 2.2: Regression results
I II
Baseline With controls
Treatment group × 1996 3.694∗∗∗ 3.527∗∗∗
(0.755) (1.077)
Treatment group × 1997 9.406∗∗∗ 6.772∗∗∗
(1.974) (2.296)
Treatment group × 1998 12.047∗∗∗ 8.471∗∗∗
(2.321) (2.883)












Notes: Fixed effects estimates based on Equation 2.11. Balanced panel of all 396 municipalities
for the period 1995 to 1998. Dependent variable: business tax multiplier (in %) (municipal level).
Independent variables of interest: interaction terms between treatment group and treatment points.
Treatment group: "small" municipalities, whose standard tax multiplier was increased in three equal
steps between 1996 and 1998. Control group: "big" municipalities, whose standard tax multiplier
was not affected by the reform. Treatment points: 1996, 1997 and 1998. Base year: 1995. Base
group: control group. Both specifications control for municipal and year fixed effects. Specification
II additionally controls for income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP (in 1,000 euro
p.c.) (county level) and surface area (in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro p.c.) and employees
(p.c.) (municipal level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels:
∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
Chapter 2 Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 32
In line with our expectations, the interaction terms TGi × TPt, t = 1996, ..., 1998,
between treatment group and treatment point dummies are highly significant with positive
estimated coefficients in both regression specifications. According to the baseline specifi-
cation, business tax multipliers of small municipalities were about 3.7 percentage points
higher in 1996 than in 1995 (δ1996 = 3.694), c.p. They rose by another 5.7 percentage
points in the following year (δ1997− δ1996 = 5.712). A smaller adjustment of about 2.6 per-
centage points took place in 1998, the final year of the reform (δ1998−δ1997 = 2.641). Given
the annual increase of the standard tax multiplier of 10 percentage points, the degree of
adjustment of small municipalities’ tax multipliers is remarkable.
Adding time-variant controls slightly affects the coefficients of interest (Specifica-
tion II ). Per capita income tax shares and GDP each turn out to be individually significant
covariates. Per capita disposable income of private households, surface area and employ-
ees at place of employment are jointly significant with the remaining controls and further
improve the goodness of fit as measured by the R2. The results of Specification II support
the general magnitude and the direction of the reform effect. However, they also suggest
that the development of business tax multipliers is affected by time-variant factors aside
from the reform. We expect the common trend between treatment and control groups
to hold conditional on these time-varying factors. Our results are stable across all tested
model specifications.17
2.5.2 Robustness checks
To validate our results, we perform equivalent regressions using the full dataset where t
runs from 1987 to 2002 and corresponding interactions terms TGi×TPt, t = 1987, ..., 1994,
1996, ..., 2002 and year fixed effects are added. Specification III of Table 2.3 shows the
results of such a regression without any further control variables.
17Further potential controls were tested (e.g., debt p.c. and commuters p.c.), but were not significant
and did not improve goodness of fit.
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Figure 2.3: Coefficients on interaction terms
Notes: Dotted lines mark 95% confidence intervals around point estimates.
Source: Own calculations based on data from IT.NRW.
The coefficients of interest, δt, belonging to this regression are also illustrated in
Figure 2.3. Importantly, the interaction terms TGi × TPt, t = 1987, ..., 1994 belonging to
the pre-reform period are all individually and jointly statistically insignificant. In contrast,
the interaction terms TGi × TPt, t = 1996, ..., 2002 of the reform and post-reform period
are all highly significant with positive coefficients, indicating an upward shift of business
tax multipliers triggered by the reform. The estimated adjustment during the reform
years 1996 to 1998 is exactly the same as in Specification I of Table 2.2. In the years
following the reform, estimated coefficients δ1999 to δ2002 remain fairly stable. This lends
support to the notion of an immediate response to each annual change of the standard tax
multiplier.18 Due to limitations in data availability (see Section 2.4.2), a regression using
pre-reform data and a set of control variables is not possible. However, the analysis can be
extended to post-reform years. This is done in Specification IV of Table 2.3 where t runs
from 1995 to 2002 and per capita income tax shares, GDP, disposable income, surface area
18The slightly higher coefficients in 2001 and in 2002 might be due to anticipating reactions to the 2003
reform.
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and employees again have been included as control variables. Again, the reform effects are
significant and their magnitude and direction are in line with our expectations.
Table 2.3: Regression results (extended time period)
III IV
Pre- and post-reform Post-reform
Treatment group × 1987 -1.927
(5.167)
Treatment group × 1988 -3.782
(3.762)
Treatment group × 1989 -4.001
(3.457)
Treatment group × 1990 -3.808
(3.081)
Treatment group × 1991 -0.347
(2.955)
Treatment group × 1992 0.089
(2.343)
Treatment group × 1993 -0.402
(2.138)
Treatment group × 1994 0.888
(1.715)
Treatment group × 1996 3.694∗∗∗ 3.533∗∗∗
(0.755) (0.879)
Treatment group × 1997 9.406∗∗∗ 7.578∗∗∗
(1.975) (1.940)
Treatment group × 1998 12.047∗∗∗ 10.291∗∗∗
(2.323) (2.298)
Treatment group × 1999 12.387∗∗∗ 11.092∗∗∗
(2.383) (2.457)
Treatment group × 2000 12.035∗∗∗ 9.824∗∗∗
(2.398) (2.611)
Treatment group × 2001 14.203∗∗∗ 11.754∗∗∗
(2.416) (2.777)
Treatment group × 2002 14.916∗∗∗ 12.554∗∗∗
(2.562) (2.927)
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III IV
Pre- and post-reform Post-reform












Notes: Specifications III and IV are based on a balanced panel of all 396 municipalities for the
period 1987 to 2002 and 1995 to 2002, respectively. Dependent variable: business tax multiplier (in
%) (municipal level). Independent variables of interest: interaction terms between treatment group
and treatment points. Treatment group: "small" municipalities, whose standard tax multiplier was
increased in three equal steps between 1996 and 1998. Control group: "big" municipalities, whose
standard tax multiplier was not affected by the reform. Treatment points: 1987 to 1994 (only
Specification III ), 1996 to 2002. Base year: 1995. Base group: control group. Both specifications
control for municipal and year fixed effects. Specification IV additionally controls for income of
private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP (in 1,000 euro p.c.) (county level) and surface area
(in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro p.c.) and employees (p.c.) (municipal level). Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
As an additional robustness check, we rerun Specifications I and II of Table 2.2, this
time excluding municipalities that were abundant, i.e., did not receive any equalization
transfers, at any point between 1995 and 1998. This reduces the number of munici-
palities in the treatment group to 316. There are 19 municipalities left in the control
group. Municipalities that did not benefit from equalization transfers presumably faced
weaker incentives to raise their tax multipliers following the increase in their standard tax
multiplier. Some incentive effect remains as it is very hard, if not impossible, for most
municipalities to predict whether their fiscal capacity might exceed their fiscal need in a
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given year. Nonetheless, we expect the estimated treatment effect to be stronger than in
our baseline specification.
Table 2.4 shows the corresponding regression results. The estimated treatment effect
is very similar and slightly more pronounced than in our baseline specifications, confirming
our expectations.
Table 2.4: Regression results (excluding abundant municipalities)
V VI
Baseline With controls
Treatment group × 1996 3.695∗∗∗ 3.386∗∗∗
(0.847) (1.179)
Treatment group × 1997 10.227∗∗∗ 7.325∗∗∗
(2.151) (2.361)
Treatment group × 1998 12.921∗∗∗ 9.024∗∗∗
(2.526) (2.872)












Notes: Fixed effects estimates based on Equation 2.11. Balanced panel of 335 municipalities, which
received transfers in all years from 1995 to 1998, for the period 1995 to 1998. Dependent variable:
business tax multiplier (in %) (municipal level). Independent variables of interest: interaction terms
between treatment group and treatment points. Treatment group: "small" municipalities, whose
standard tax multiplier was increased in three equal steps between 1996 and 1998. Control group:
"big" municipalities, whose standard tax multiplier was not affected by the reform. Treatment
points: 1996, 1997 and 1998. Base year: 1995. Base group: control group. Both specifications
control for municipal and year fixed effects. Specification VI additionally controls for income of
private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP (in 1,000 euro p.c.) (county level) and surface area
(in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro p.c.) and employees (p.c.) (municipal level). Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
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2.5.3 Extension
Lastly, we adapt our model to test if “small” municipalities’ reactions to the reform differed
systematically depending on their pre-reform business tax multipliers. We expect to find
a more pronounced effect for “small” municipalities with a “low” pre-reform business tax
multiplier. We operationalize these considerations by distinguishing two groups within our
original treatment group: Treatment group 1 consists of the 217 “small” municipalities
whose business tax multiplier was smaller than 380 in 1995 (TG1i = 1 if population
≤ 150, 000 and mi,1995 < 380 and 0 otherwise). Treatment group 2 refers to the 158
“small” municipalities with business tax multipliers greater than or equal to 380 in 1995
(TG2i = 1 if population ≤ 150, 000 and m1995 ≥ 380 and 0 otherwise). The corresponding
interaction terms are defined as TG1i × TPt and TG2i × TPt, t = 1996, ..., 1998. We
estimate the following regression equation with t = 1995, ..., 1998:
mi,t = α1TG1i + α2TG2i +
∑1998
t=1996 δ1,t TG1i × TPt +
∑1998
t=1996 δ2,t TG2i × TPt
+βXi,t + θZc,t + λi + Φt + εi,t
(2.12)
Table 2.5 shows the results for differentiated treatment groups, with Specification V
displaying the regression without controls (except for the usual municipal and year fixed
effects) and Specification VI including the same time-variant controls as Specifications II
and IV.
In line with our expectations, we find a much stronger reform effect on the business
tax multipliers of treatment group 1 than on those of treatment group 2. All interaction
terms between treatment group 1 and treatment point dummies are highly statistically
significant with positive estimated coefficients δ1,t. The size of the estimated coefficient
on the interaction term between treatment group 1 and treatment point 1996 is rather
low and close to the one of treatment group 2 (Specification V : δ1,1996 − δ2,1996 = 0.951).
This is not the case in 1997 and 1998: According to Specification V, the business tax
multipliers of treatment group 1 were about 13.4 percentage points higher in 1997 than in
1995 (δ1,1997 = 13.375) and continued rising in 1998 (δ1,1998 = 17.284).
In contrast, the estimated effects of the interaction terms between treatment group
2 and the treatment point dummies are rather stable (δ2,1996 = 3.144, δ2,1997 = 3.956 and
δ2,1998 = 4.855). Moreover, statistical significance of treatment group 2’s interaction terms
Chapter 2 Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 38
is low compared with those of treatment group 1 and in case of δ2,1998 depends on the
specification used.
Table 2.5: Regression results (two treatment groups)
V VI
Two treatment groups With controls
Treatment group (1) × 1996 4.095∗∗∗ 4.782∗∗∗
(1.046) (1.339)
Treatment group (2) × 1996 3.144∗∗∗ 3.360∗∗∗
(0.897) (0.961)
Treatment group (1) × 1997 13.375∗∗∗ 14.279∗∗∗
(2.113) (2.588)
Treatment group (2) × 1997 3.956∗ 3.945∗
(2.080) (2.282)
Treatment group (1) × 1998 17.284∗∗∗ 16.836∗∗∗
(2.209) (2.815)














Notes: Fixed effects estimates based on Equation 2.12. Balanced panel of all 396 municipalities
for the period 1995 to 1998. Dependent variable: business tax multiplier (in %) (municipal level).
Independent variables of interest: interaction terms between treatment groups and treatment points.
Treatment group 1: "small" municipalities whose business tax multiplier was smaller than 380 in
1995, and whose standard tax multiplier was increased in three equal steps between 1996 and 1998.
Treatment group 2: "small" municipalities whose business tax multiplier was greater than or equal
to 380 in 1995, and whose standard tax multiplier was increased in three equal steps between 1996
and 1998. Control group: "big" municipalities, whose standard tax multiplier was not affected by the
reform. Treatment points: 1996, 1997 and 1998. Base year: 1995. Base group: control group. Both
specifications control for municipal and year fixed effects. Specification VI additionally controls
for income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP (in 1,000 euro p.c.) (county level) and
surface area (in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro p.c.) and employees (p.c.) (municipal
level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05,
∗∗∗ 0.01.
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In summary, we find that the rise of the standard business tax multiplier had an
effect on the business tax multipliers of all “small” municipalities, but this effect was
particularly strong for municipalities with a “low” pre-reform business tax multiplier (i.e,
pre-reform business tax multiplier below post-reform standard tax multiplier).
2.6 Conclusion
Conventional economic wisdom suggests that decentralized business taxation and a com-
mon pool of equalization transfers among local jurisdictions should lead to a race to the
bottom in local business tax rates. In practice, however, a simple institutional device,
standard tax multipliers, is used to counteract downward pressure on municipal tax rates
and tax effort. Standard tax multipliers are employed in fiscal equalization schemes in
all German territorial states to assess a municipality’s fiscal capacity independently of its
actual tax multiplier.
Using the case of North Rhine-Westphalia in the mid-1990s, this paper empirically
analyzes the impact of standard business tax multipliers on municipal business tax policy.
The results show that upward shifts in standard business tax multipliers lead to imme-
diate upward adjustments in actual business tax multipliers. This is true for all affected
municipalities. The reaction is more pronounced for municipalities whose business tax
multipliers are below post-reform standard tax multipliers. The findings are robust to a
number of alternative specifications. They also reflect the positive incentive effect derived
from theoretical considerations.
Our results have important implications for the practical design of fiscal equaliza-
tion schemes. They highlight the importance of the parameters of equalization systems
for shaping local tax policy. Through its choice of the standard tax multiplier, a state can
influence the level of municipal tax rates and the weight of competitive downward forces.
Some states choose to set standard tax multipliers that are so low that they have virtually
no signaling effect while others induce a race to the top in local taxation through regular
adjustments of standard multipliers. This partially explains why there is far greater het-
erogeneity in business tax multipliers across federal states than within states in Germany.
By consequence, standard tax multipliers should be regarded as a tool for govern-
ments to shape lower-level tax policy, with important consequences for their own compet-
itiveness.
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2.7 Appendix









1987 342.737 . . . . .
1988 348.838 . . . . .
1989 349.583 . . . . .
1990 352.146 . . . . .
1991 356.376 . . . . .
1992 364.646 0.294 18.849 . . 0.450
1993 369.182 0.294 . . 0.266 0.445
1994 371.593 0.296 19.471 . 0.261 0.440
1995 374.801 0.294 20.066 15.480 0.261 0.434
1996 378.775 0.268 20.288 15.686 0.257 0.430
1997 387.518 0.270 20.603 16.018 0.253 0.426
1998 393.114 0.282 20.992 16.339 0.254 0.423
1999 393.912 0.294 21.287 16.647 0.257 0.420
2000 394.530 0.296 21.699 17.204 0.260 0.418
2001 396.346 0.281 21.884 17.923 0.261 0.416
2002 398.449 0.278 22.181 17.866 0.259 0.414
Total 373.284 0.286 20.732 16.645 0.259 0.429
Notes: Business tax (BT) multiplier (in %), surface area (in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000
euro p.c.), employees (p.c.) (municipal level) and income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.),
GDP (in 1,000 euro p.c.); number of observations: 396 municipalities p.a. Own calculations based
on data from IT.NRW, Regional Database Germany and the Federal Employment Agency.
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1987 338.811 . . . . .
1988 344.813 . . . . .
1989 345.547 . . . . .
1990 348.120 . . . . .
1991 352.533 . . . . .
1992 360.827 0.291 18.505 . . 0.472
1993 365.336 0.291 . . 0.259 0.466
1994 367.816 0.294 19.124 . 0.255 0.461
1995 370.976 0.292 19.690 15.482 0.255 0.455
1996 375.147 0.266 19.935 15.693 0.251 0.451
1997 384.192 0.269 20.239 16.036 0.247 0.447
1998 389.928 0.281 20.604 16.363 0.248 0.444
1999 390.744 0.292 20.899 16.673 0.250 0.440
2000 391.344 0.294 21.289 17.233 0.254 0.438
2001 393.275 0.279 21.471 17.960 0.254 0.436
2002 395.416 0.276 21.755 17.895 0.253 0.435
Total 369.676 0.284 20.351 16.667 0.253 0.450
Notes: Business tax (BT) multiplier (in %), surface area (in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000
euro p.c.), employees (p.c.) (municipal level) and income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.),
GDP (in 1,000 euro p.c.); number of observations: 375 "small" municipalities p.a. Own calculations
based on data from IT.NRW, Regional Database Germany and the Federal Employment Agency.
Chapter 2 Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 42









1987 412.857 . . . . .
1988 420.714 . . . . .
1989 421.667 . . . . .
1990 424.048 . . . . .
1991 425.000 . . . . .
1992 432.857 0.338 24.986 . . 0.055
1993 437.857 0.342 . . 0.382 0.055
1994 439.048 0.334 25.658 . 0.373 0.055
1995 443.095 0.335 26.778 15.444 0.368 0.055
1996 443.571 0.308 26.597 15.554 0.363 0.055
1997 446.905 0.298 27.105 15.704 0.360 0.056
1998 450.000 0.315 27.930 15.915 0.360 0.056
1999 450.476 0.331 28.205 16.189 0.366 0.056
2000 451.429 0.326 29.037 16.692 0.372 0.056
2001 451.190 0.311 29.245 17.260 0.373 0.056
2002 452.619 0.308 29.786 17.344 0.370 0.056
Total 437.708 0.323 27.533 16.263 0.369 0.056
Notes: Business tax (BT) multiplier (in %), surface area (in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro
p.c.), employees (p.c.) (municipal level) and income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP
(in 1,000 euro p.c.); number of observations: 21 "big" municipalities p.a. Own calculations based on
data from IT.NRW, Regional Database Germany and the Federal Employment Agency.
Chapter 3
Does local transfer dependency
weaken fiscal performance
Abstract
This paper investigates whether dependency of local governments on transfers from higher
levels of government negatively affects local fiscal outcomes, using a disaggregated panel
dataset comprising more than 5,000 German municipalities. Both conventional fixed effect
as well as two-stage least squares estimates confirm a negative impact of transfer dependency
on the local budget balance. The effect is aggravated when transfer dependency coincides
with horizontal fiscal imbalances or easy local access to borrowing. A decomposed analysis of
dependency on different transfer types suggests that shared taxes and conditional transfers
are responsible for the adverse budgetary effect, while reliance on unconditional transfers
leaves local fiscal performance unaffected.
3.1 Introduction
Transfers to lower levels of government are a cornerstone of (fiscal) federalism. But wher-
ever there are transfers, there is transfer dependency, or, equivalently, vertical fiscal im-
balance. Both terms indicate that the government level in question is unable to cover all
of its expenses with own revenues.
While some degree of transfer dependency is warranted for tax and spending effi-
ciency as well as equity reasons (Boadway 2006; Boadway 2007; de Mello 2000; Oates
1999), a growing body of literature has shown its harmful effects. Indeed, reliance on
transfers as opposed to own revenues has been blamed for larger deficits (de Mello 2000;
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de Mello 2007; Eyraud and Lusinyan 2013; Foremny 2014; Rodden 2002), fiscal crises
(Rodden et al. 2003), a lower GDP per capita (Blöchliger 2014), bigger government (Guo
2008), higher debt (Aldasoro and Seiferling 2014), lower government efficiency (Boetti
et al. 2012; Geys et al. 2010), less skilled politicians (Bordignon et al. 2013) or even higher
inequality (Hummel and Seiferling 2015). A loss of accountability as well as common pool
problems along with soft budget constraints and bailout expectations are usually identified
as the culprits of these undesirable outcomes (see for example Inman [2003] and Rodden
and Eskeland [2003]).
The existing empirical, quantitative literature shares a major potential flaw. In
all of the aforementioned cases, the analysis is carried out using aggregate measures of
subnational transfer dependency at the country level. Aggregating entire state or local
sectors into one unit of analysis conceals a vast amount of within-country variation in
vertical fiscal imbalance. Federal states in particular feature diverse institutional and
fiscal landscapes that create such variation. As pointed out by Eyraud and Lusinyan
(2013) and Rodden (2002), among others, using disaggregated data would therefore be
desirable. This paper aims to fill this gap and to verify the results of the existing literature
with an in-depth within-country econometric analysis.
As recognized by Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013), Coen-Pirani (2013) and Rodden
(2002), vertical fiscal imbalance should be considered an endogenous outcome, which ques-
tions the reliability of estimation results in most of the literature. Following Eyraud and
Lusinyan (2013), this paper employs an instrumental variable approach to rule out biases
from endogeneity. Innovative instruments suitable to the German institutional context
are identified.
International country-level analyses also suffer from comparability concerns (Bird
and Tarasov 2004; Sharma 2012), which can be avoided in the present paper by limiting the
focus to one country. Moreover, authors typically agree that it is important to distinguish
different types of grants, such as conditional and unconditional grants, and to carefully
assess the classification of shared taxes as either own revenues or transfers. However, few
authors are able to contrast estimation results obtained with different measures of transfer
dependency within their study due to data limitations. Instead, one measure is presented
which is deemed superior to alternative specifications based on the author’s assessment.
This paper adds to efforts at understanding the role of different types of transfers by
decomposing transfer dependency and comparing the impact of each component on local
deficits.
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In this paper, I investigate the impact of vertical fiscal imbalance in the financing
structure of German municipalities on municipal deficits. Germany constitutes an ideal
setting for this purpose. As one of the world’s leading federal states, Germany’s fiscal
structure is characterized by shared taxes and transfers to the state and local level as ma-
jor pillars of subnational finance. While the states derive tax revenue almost exclusively
from shared taxes, municipalities have more substantial tax autonomy. The elements of
local revenues are uniform across the country, but sizable variation in transfer depen-
dency results from the differing generosity of transfer systems and differences in spending
decentralization in the 13 territorial states, as well as differing tax capacity among the
municipalities.
I focus on local deficits for two reasons. First, the negative relationship between
vertical fiscal imbalance and deficits has been asserted by the cross-country literature.
It thus constitutes a suitable testing ground to verify the conclusions drawn with a more
detailed analysis. Second, the increasing political relevance of subnational deficits demands
additional explanatory efforts to inform policy choices. In the context of recent debt
crises, knowing how to prevent fiscal aberrations at all levels of government is crucial.
While Germany is rarely regarded as a “problem country” when it comes to public debt
sustainability, the fiscal woes and debt burdens of municipalities have long been prominent
on the agenda of German policymakers (Gröpl et al. 2010; Heinemann et al. 2009; see
also Chapter 4).1 Internationally, fiscal decentralization is often recommended and has
been employed as a tool for enhancing efficiency in the delivery of public goods and
services, thereby improving public finance and fiscal performance (Ahmad and Brosio
2006; Blöchliger 2013). Indeed, the extent of fiscal decentralization itself has been shown
to have a bearing on fiscal balances (de Mello 2000; Neyapti 2010). But to ensure that
the hopes attributed to decentralization are not disappointed, it has to be done right – for
instance by accompanying decentralization on the expenditure side with decentralization
on the revenue side.2 In Europe such lessons will become ever more important if and when
fiscal integration advances in the European Union.
The results confirm that transfer dependency negatively affects local fiscal outcomes.
Its effect is particularly damaging when municipalities enjoy greater borrowing autonomy
and/or the federal state in which the municipality is situated is characterized by more
1This is despite the fact that the local level as a whole usually runs a budget surplus.
2In addition, the success of fiscal decentralization in aiding fiscal discipline requires a supportive insti-
tutional environment including well-enforced fiscal rules (Neyapti 2013).
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pronounced horizontal fiscal imbalances. Furthermore, the impact of transfer dependency’s
components is not uniform. While both dependency on shared taxes and conditional
transfers are found to dampen the budget balance, unconditional transfers do not exert
statistically significant adverse effects in the sample. The results are robust across a
number of different specifications.
In sum, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, I add to the understand-
ing of local deficits in Germany, pointing out one determinant of higher deficits that has
not received much attention in the German context so far. Here, transfers are usually
looked upon quite favorably and a large share of transfers is tied to objective, supposedly
incentive-compatible criteria. Second, I offer methodological refinements to test the im-
pact of vertical fiscal imbalance on local deficits: Estimates are based on within-variation
at the local level in a dataset covering more than 5,000 municipalities in all German ter-
ritorial states. An IV approach ensures that estimation results are not biased by the
potential endogeneity of the transfer dependency measure. Three decomposed measures
of vertical fiscal imbalance are computed and tested empirically. The role of shared taxes,
unconditional and conditional transfers can thus be differentiated.
Section 3.2 explains the measures of transfer dependency and its components used in
this paper and illustrates their empirical evolution in Germany since the late 1990s. Section
3.3 elaborates why transfer dependency should have an effect on local fiscal performance
from a theoretical perspective, putting forward a number of hypotheses to be tested in
the ensuing empirical analysis. Section 3.4 explains the empirical strategy, the results of
which are presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Transfer dependency in Germany
In this section, the concept and appropriate measures of transfer dependency are discussed
and applied to German municipalities (Section 3.2.1). Afterward, the empirical evolution
of German municipalities’ transfer dependency since 1998 is shown (Section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 Measuring transfer dependency
Germany is a federal country consisting of 16 states. Three of these, the so-called city-
states, do not have a separate municipal level and are excluded from the following analysis.
The remaining 13 “territorial” states comprise more than 11,000 municipalities, with the
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number of municipalities per state varying between 52 (Saarland) and 2,305 (Rhineland-
Palatinate). German municipalities draw revenue from three main sources: Taxes, fees
and charges, and transfers from higher levels of government.
Vertical fiscal imbalance is loosely defined as a “mismatch between revenues and
expenditures at different levels of government” (Sharma 2012, p. 102). It is often – as in
this paper – used synonymously with the term “transfer dependency”, which is commonly
measured as the amount of transfers received by subnational entities relative to their total
spending or revenue (Rodden 2002). Since transfers make up a significant share of local
revenue of German municipalities,3 it is evident that they “suffer” from a vertical fiscal
imbalance.
The difficulty in operationalizing transfer dependency lies in the necessary differen-
tiation between transfers and own revenues (Rodden 2002). For instance, it is unclear
whether shared taxes, over which subnational governments do not enjoy tax autonomy,
should be counted among transfers or own revenues. Moreover, unconditional and con-
ditional grants may have to be distinguished due to their potentially different incentive
effects.
Among the revenue sources of German municipalities, some can be classified as own
revenue with great certainty. First, fees and charges, which are levied under the authority
of each municipality for their services ranging from waste management to childcare ser-
vices, contribute to own revenues. Second, there are a number of taxes under municipal
control. The business tax and the property tax are by far the most important municipal
taxes. In 2013, they accounted for 15.8 percent and 5.8 percent of aggregate municipal
income, respectively. While the tax bases for both of them are defined at the federal level,
the tax rates are defined locally. Hence, each year every municipality sets its own tax rate.
In addition, municipalities can set and collect local excise and consumption taxes. They
may also introduce new excise taxes as long as they are not comparable to existing federal
taxes. However, revenue from excise and consumption taxes remains negligible relative to
that from the business and property tax.4
Shared taxes are more problematic. Municipalities receive 15 percent of national
income tax revenue as well as 2.2 percent of national VAT revenue. The rest is distributed
among the federal level and the states. Municipalities do not have authority over tax
3In 2014, transfers accounted for 59 percent of total local current revenue.
4Such taxes account for roughly 1 percent of municipal revenue (Rehm and Matern-Rehm 2010).
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bases or tax rates of the VAT or income tax. This lack of autonomy indicates that a
classification as grants instead of own revenue is a priori more appropriate. The share of
these taxes accruing to individual municipalities is related to municipal characteristics and
circumstances, as defined by federal law. For the income tax, individual shares depend
on the taxable income of the inhabitants of each city, which is cut off at a threshold.5
The number of (working) inhabitants and their income structure are thus decisive. The
distribution of VAT shares depends on a battery of indicators, including the local number
of employees, the amount of salaries subject to social security contributions and past
shares of business tax revenue. Local VAT revenues thus reflect local economic activity.
It is questionable whether local revenue from these two sources has the same effects as
revenue from “pure” grants.
Finally, municipalities receive transfers from state governments.6 The bulk of trans-
fers is paid out as part of fiscal equalization schemes implemented in all territorial states.7
Apart from their equalizing role, fiscal equalization transfers fulfill a prominent financing
function as most municipalities are unable to cover their expenses with taxes and fees.
Among the transfers, unconditional and conditional transfers can be distinguished. The
majority of transfers are unconditional, with the so-called Schlüsselzuweisungen (general
fiscal equalization transfers) accounting for most of the transfer volume. Most conditional
transfers are investment-related, but there are also earmarked grants for current purposes.
Both conditional and unconditional transfers do undoubtedly not constitute own revenues.
At the same time, they might have differing incentive effects. After all, spending authority
might be more decisive than revenue raising authority in shaping municipal incentives.
Three components of transfer dependency emerge from the above discussion. In each
case, the particular type of dependency is measured as the share of the respective trans-
fers in total local current revenue. Transfer dependency is defined relative to revenues
as opposed to expenditures to avoid a spurious relationship between transfer dependency
5The threshold is currently set at a yearly income of 35,000 euros. It was introduced to avoid incentives
for policies to attract rich households and marginalize poor ones (Rehm and Matern-Rehm 2010).
6Direct financial links between the federal and municipal level are ruled out by the federal constitution.
This ban notwithstanding, there are de facto many federal transfers aimed at municipalities. For instance,
the federal level is responsible for social welfare support for pensioners and, most recently, becoming more
involved in refugee assistance. Due to the constitutional setup however, any such transfers must be
channeled through state budgets, see Bertelsmann Stiftung (2015). The states then typically determine
how to distribute federal transfer money among their municipalities.
7See Chapter2 for a detailed presentation of municipal fiscal equalization in Germany.
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and local deficits in the ensuing analysis.8 The focus on the current budget (Verwal-
tungshaushalt) avoids biases due to one-off events that are typical of the capital budget
(Vermögenshaushalt).
In particular, the first measure is
DepST,i,t =
ITSi,t + V ATSi,t
GREVi,t
(3.1)
where subscripts i and t refer to municipality i in year t, ST :=shared taxes,
DepST,i,t :=dependency on shared taxes, ITSi,t :=income tax share, V ATSi,t :=VAT
share and GREVi,t :=gross current revenue.
The second component measures the dependency on unconditional transfers











where CTi,t :=conditional current transfers and DepCT,i,t :=dependency on condi-
tional transfers.
Together, the three components make up transfer dependency as a whole (DepT,i,t):
DepT,i,t = DepST,i,t +DepUT,i,t +DepCT,i,t =
ITSi,t + V ATSi,t + UTi,t + CTi,t
GREVi,t
(3.4)
3.2.2 Evolution of local transfer dependency in Germany
Despite common local revenue sources, there is significant variation in local transfer de-
pendency across Germany. Figure 3.1 shows average local transfer dependency over 1998
to 2013, as measured by the transfer dependency indicator and its three components pre-
8A definition relative to expenditures would imply classifying local net borrowing, i.e. local deficits,
as either own revenues or transfers, thus making the deficit part of the transfer dependency variable by
construction.
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sented in Section 3.2.1, by federal state. Data on yearly municipal gross current revenue
and transfers were obtained from a combination of sources. Data from 1998 to 2006 were
obtained from the Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the statis-
tical offices of the Länder (Forschungsdatenzentren der Statistischen Ämter des Bundes
und der Länder [FDZ]).9 Data on the years from 2007 to 2013 were requested separately
from each of the 13 state statistical offices.10 The dataset is limited to non-associated
municipalities (verbandsfreie/amtsfreie Gemeinden), i.e. municipalities not belonging to
a municipal association, to ensure municipalities’ administrative statuses and responsibil-
ities are comparable. Due to gaps in data collection and provision, territorial reforms and
budgeting reforms in some of the federal states, the resulting panel dataset is unbalanced.11
State codes and details on the panel structure are given in Table 3.9 in the appendix to
this chapter.
9More specifically, the municipal-level data comes from the the municipal financial statement statistic
(Jahresrechnungsstatistik der Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbände 1998-2006).
10Not all statistical offices were able to provide municipal-level data for the requested time period based
on the territorial status of that time.
11Territorial reforms took place above all in the New Länder and greatly reduced the number of mu-
nicipalities over time. Budgeting reforms in all federal states led to the introduction of accrual budgeting
at the local level. However, time frames are not uniform and in some states, municipalities retain the
option of continuing cash-based accounting. For municipalities in states that have introduced compul-
sory accrual accounting, nationally comparable revenue statistics are no longer provided by the Regional
Database Germany.
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Figure 3.1: Average transfer dependency (percent, average over 1998-2013)
Source: Own calculations based on data from the FDZ and data provided by the statistical offices
of the Länder.
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, reliance on different types of transfers is very het-
erogeneous across states. Shared taxes make up 20.5 percent of total current revenues
on average across states. The average share of unconditional and conditional transfers is
25.6 and 10.4 percent, respectively. Great differences appear across states with respect
to shared taxes and unconditional transfers. In the New Länder, shared taxes make up
only roughly 11 percent of current revenues, while they contribute around a quarter of
revenues in the Old Länder.12 Given that local tax shares reflect economic conditions,
this finding is indicative of the much lower economic strength found in the former GDR.
Apparently, the New Länder try to compensate the lack of tax revenue by providing rela-
tively more unconditional transfers to municipalities, which thus contribute a much larger
share of revenues than in the West. The contribution of conditional transfers to the lo-
12New Länder: Brandenburg; Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; Saxony; Saxony-Anhalt; Thuringia. Old Län-
der: Baden-Württemberg; Bavaria; Hesse; Lower Saxony; North Rhine-Westphalia; Rhineland-Palatinate;
Saarland; Schleswig-Holstein.
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cal revenue mix varies between 4 percent in Hesse and 16.8 percent in Brandenburg. It
shows no clear East-West pattern. However, municipalities in the New Länder are overall
more dependent on transfers as opposed to own revenues than those in the Old Länder.
The only exception is the small western state Saarland, where transfers made up 60.4
percent of current revenues on average during the sample period, which falls within the
range of transfer dependency values of the New Länder. Municipalities were on average
least dependent on transfers in North Rhine-Westphalia (48.9 percent) and most transfer
dependent in Thuringia (65.4 percent).
Table 3.1 provides the numbers behind Figure 3.1, including total transfer depen-
dency.
Table 3.1: Average transfer dependency (percent, average over 1998-2013)
Federal state DepST DepUT DepCT DepT
Baden-Württemberg 28.0 19.3 8.0 55.3
Bavaria 28.5 21.8 6.1 56.4
Brandenburg 11.1 35.9 16.8 63.8
Hesse 31.8 17.4 4.0 53.2
Lower Saxony 23.9 14.8 11.5 50.3
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 10.4 41.3 9.0 60.6
North Rhine-Westphalia 24.4 18.5 6.0 48.9
Rhineland-Palatinate 26.8 10.6 13.3 50.7
Saarland 21.8 27.8 10.9 60.4
Saxony 11.1 34.0 15.0 60.0
Saxony-Anhalt 11.0 32.8 16.4 60.2
Schleswig-Holstein 27.0 15.4 7.5 49.9
Thuringia 11.4 43.5 10.5 65.4
Total 20.5 25.6 10.4 56.5
Source: Own calculations based on data from the FDZ and data provided by the statistical offices
of the Länder.
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the components of local transfer dependency in
the Old (top panel) and New Länder (bottom panel) from 1998 to 2013.13All measures
of transfer dependency exhibit significant variation within states over time. No clear
nationwide trend is discernible from Figure 3.2. In the New Länder however, reliance on
13Tables 3.10 to 3.12 in the appendix list the corresponding yearly values for each transfer dependency
component.
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unconditional transfers appears to have decreased over time. Yearly fluctuations in local
transfer dependency are mostly due to economic volatility, the sensitivity of local (and
state) revenues to economic conditions and, to some extent, local-state bargaining. It
is also clear from Figure 3.2 that the observed differences in the roles of unconditional
transfers and shared taxes have been present since the beginning of the sample period
in 1998: Municipalities in the East have consistently had to rely more on unconditional
transfers and less on shared taxes compared to municipalities in the West.
Figure 3.2: Transfer dependency over time, 1998-2013
Source: Own calculations based on data from the FDZ and data provided by the statistical offices
of the Länder.
In sum, transfer dependency is a broad concept that can be operationalized using a
variety of different measures. The definition of own revenues and the corresponding choice
of the transfer dependency measure are crucial in assessing vertical fiscal imbalances.
Moreover, transfer dependency can be decomposed according to the types of transfers
received by subnational governments. Each measure paints a different picture of inter-
governmental fiscal relations and subnational fiscal autonomy. Within a country like Ger-
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many, substantial variation in transfer dependency exists both across states and over time.
Moreover, the composition of transfers to local governments shows persistently different
patterns across states.
3.3 Transfer dependency’s effect on fiscal perfor-
mance
Theoretical expectations and the findings from existing literature lead to a number of
hypotheses on the relationship between transfer dependency and fiscal performance. Fiscal
performance is discussed in Section 3.3.1. Section 3.3.2 develops the hypotheses to be
tested in the empirical analysis for the local level in Germany.
3.3.1 Fiscal performance
Local deficits are used as a proxy for fiscal performance in this paper. Mirroring the
definition of transfer dependency, the analysis is limited to the deficit in the current
budget, excluding the capital budget. This avoids biases due to one-off events.
The deficit is the result of municipal revenue and spending. It is important to note
that neither one is fully determined by the municipality in question. Transfer dependency
would not be an issue if municipalities had full authority over their revenues and relied
only on own-source revenues. But local autonomy is also constrained on the spending
side. Municipalities have the constitutionally guaranteed right to regulate their own af-
fairs independently, to define their own tasks, and to carry out the spending activities that
go along with them. However, the federal and state level can mandate particular local
tasks or define standards that municipalities must meet in the provision of local public
goods and services. They can also delegate their own tasks to the local level. Accordingly,
local government functions and corresponding spending activities take three forms. First,
there are voluntary local tasks. Municipalities can decide if and how to fulfill them. Typ-
ical examples include the provision of cultural services, sports grounds or youth centers.
Second, there are mandatory local tasks. Municipalities are obliged to fulfill these tasks.
They may decide on their own how to fulfill them, but often need to respect minimum
standards defined by higher levels of government. The provision of schools, local public
roads or sewage disposal are examples of such tasks. Finally, there are delegated tasks.
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Municipalities participate in the provision of federal or state services. The latter are fully
defined by the delegating level of government. The provision of passports to citizens is
such a task; it is carried out by municipalities as mandated by the federal level.
One might wonder if these exogenous constraints leave much scope for local policy-
makers to influence municipal deficits, and if the deficit is still a valid measure of local
fiscal performance. The answer must be affirmative. On the spending side, all munici-
palities retain voluntary tasks, which are the easiest target for spending cuts when fiscal
performance needs to be improved. In case of mandatory tasks, municipalities may have
to respect minimum standards, but are otherwise free to decide how much resources to
devote to task fulfillment. And even delegated tasks can be fulfilled with varying degrees
of efficiency. Nonetheless, acknowledging the fact that municipalities in some states face
more mandated spending responsibilities than in others is important. That is why the level
of spending decentralization in each state is an essential control variable in the regression
analysis (see Section 3.4). On the revenue side, municipalities have authority over fees and
charges, property and business taxes, and some less significant taxes (see Section 3.2.1).
These revenue sources represent essential levers of local fiscal performance. Transfers do
play an important role in municipal budgets and may be decisive in shaping local fiscal
performance – but that is precisely the interest of this paper. The empirical analysis will
show whether changes in transfer dependency affect local fiscal performance.14
3.3.2 Hypotheses on transfer dependency and fiscal performance
H1: Lower transfer dependency improves fiscal performance. Higher transfer de-
pendency depresses fiscal performance.
H1 summarizes the main prediction concerning transfer dependency from the existing the-
oretical and empirical literature. Greater reliance of municipalities on own revenue sources
as opposed to transfers from higher levels of government is expected to improve fiscal per-
formance, as measured by the local deficit, and vice versa. Theoretical explanations as to
why this might be the case originate from several interrelated strands of literature.
Vertical fiscal imbalances mean that there is a wedge between the costs and benefits
of public sector provision at the local level, which creates a common pool problem (see
14To rule out any mere mechanical link between transfer dependency and local deficits, the analysis will
be backed up by an instrumental variable estimation. See Section 3.4 for details.
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Raudla [2010] for a review of the budgetary commons literature): From a municipal per-
spective, transfers form a common pool of resources. Each recipient municipality benefits
directly from transfer revenue, but the costs for raising this revenue are shared collectively.
Subnational governments may therefore underutilize their own tax bases at the expense
of the common pool of sharable revenues. This allows them to shift part of the burden
of local service provision from their taxpayers to taxpayers elsewhere in the economy, cre-
ating a potential political payoff (de Mello 2000). Given the “tragedy of the commons”
(Hardin 1968), this results in overfishing of the common revenue pool.
Another useful starting point for thinking about possible reasons for detrimental
effects of transfer dependency is the literature on the flypaper effect (see Bailey and Con-
nolly [1998] for a review). The flypaper effect refers to the empirical phenomenon that
lump-sum grants to governments have a much greater stimulatory effect on government
spending than an increase of local individual incomes of the same amount, contrary to
what traditional economic theory would suggest.15 There are a number of competing the-
oretical explanations for this effect, one of which is Oates’ (1979) fiscal illusion model. In
this model, grants create a fiscal illusion on the part of local voters who believe that the
cost of goods and services provided by the local government is less than it actually is.16
Local government officials, on the other hand, are assumed to be output maximizers. Due
to this setup, the resulting level of output (and spending) is excessive. It is easy to see
how greater dependence on grants from higher levels of government would thus, over time,
contribute to an increasingly untenable fiscal stance. One might add that in practice, not
only voters but also local government officials themselves might suffer from fiscal illusion,
making the problem worse.
When subnational entities rely on transfers to fund a large share of their spending,
this dependence contributes to moral hazard and soft budget constraints.17 Under soft
budget constraints, local governments are able to or believe to be able to extract additional
funds from the center should they run into fiscal difficulties. Thus, they trust that the
central government (or, as in the present case, the state government), will ultimately bear
the costs of their expenditure. Such bailout expectations induce undesirable fiscal behavior
15The flypaper effect has been summarized as “money sticks where it hits”, see for example Courant
et al. (1979).
16The illusion occurs because local voters consider average instead of marginal tax prices of local services.
17The term “soft budget constraint” was originally introduced by Kornai (1979) to describe the behavior
of state-owned enterprises in socialist economies.
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in the form of overspending, undertaxation, overborrowing or delayed fiscal adjustment
(Rodden et al. 2003).
When fiscal problems arise, local governments that are highly dependent on transfers
can claim that the state government is to blame (Vigneault 2007). The fiscal woes appear
to be due not to irresponsible local fiscal policy, but to insufficient transfers. When local
governments have limited power over their revenue, voters and creditors are equally likely
to direct pressure to the state government instead of punishing local politicians at local
elections. The lack of accountability created by transfer dependency thus contributes to
bailout expectations.
All of these problems – common pool problems, flypaper effect, soft budget con-
straints and lack of accountability – are, of course, intertwined, with each strand of litera-
ture offering a complementary view on problematic effects of intergovernmental transfers.
H2: The effect of transfer dependency is contingent on other factors.
H2.1: The effect of transfer dependency is stronger when local borrowing autonomy
is high.
Limiting borrowing autonomy is one way to counter soft budget constraint problems caused
by transfer dependency (Inman 2003; Rodden and Eskeland 2003). Such hierarchical
mechanisms can take various forms such as completely prohibiting lower level borrowing,
limiting the use of debt or adopting balanced budget rules. As shown by Rodden (2002)
and Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013) in a cross-country context, borrowing autonomy is an
important mediating factor in shaping the impact of transfer dependency on fiscal out-
comes. Fiscal performance is expected to be worst when high reliance on transfers and
ample borrowing autonomy coincide.
For municipalities in Germany, borrowing is officially limited to investment purposes
while debt for consumption purposes is ruled out. Correspondingly, local government laws
in all states contain balanced budget rules for municipalities. Despite this common formal
framework, effective credit access of local governments varies greatly across states and over
time. In some states, current deficits are routinely funded by so-called liquidity credits
(Liquiditätskredite). In Chapter 4, we develop an index of local credit access reflecting
effective local borrowing autonomy in all 13 territorial states in each year from 1998 to
2013. This index is used in the empirical analysis of Section 3.5.
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H2.2: The effect of transfer dependency is stronger when horizontal fiscal imbalances
are large.
Differences in resources available to subnational governments are called horizontal fiscal
imbalances (Bird and Tarasov 2004). More generally, horizontal fiscal imbalances describe
a situation of interregional disparities and heterogeneity between subnational entities. For
the cross-country case, Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013) find that transfer dependency (or ver-
tical fiscal imbalance, as they call it) is more detrimental when countries are characterized
by large horizontal fiscal imbalances, measured as per capita income disparity or income
level disparity within the country. Variation in population size has no significant effect
according to their results. In the present context, differing endowments of population or
income are also judged to be particularly relevant. In states characterized by large popu-
lation or income differentials, fiscal equalization is likely to play a larger role, which could
discourage fiscal discipline. Moreover, heterogeneous states may be more vulnerable to
bailout pressures from individual localities because the fiscal performance (and possible
fiscal wrongdoings) of each municipality is more difficult to judge objectively when each
municipality can claim to be subject to unique circumstances.
H2.3: The effect of transfer dependency is stronger in election years.
Politics may also interfere with transfer dependency’s effect on local fiscal outcomes along
the lines of political budget cycles, which suggest higher spending and lower taxes in
election years.18 In years where state governments face general elections, they may be more
vulnerable to the fiscal demands of municipalities under their jurisdiction. If municipalities
were forced to cut spending and service provision, the local population may be tempted – or
state governments may fear the population might be tempted – to attribute such negatively
felt outcomes to the state government and punish them at the upcoming election. Local
governments which rely on transfers to finance a large part of their expenditure may be
more able to pressure state governments into turning a blind eye on local fiscal indiscipline
when the latter hope to secure reelection. Thus, the effect of transfer dependency on local
deficits should be stronger in election years, as found by Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013) in
their cross-country analysis.
18See, for example, Alesina and Roubini (1992) who find an opportunistic cycle in transfers.
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H2.4: The effect of transfer dependency is stronger when spending is more decentral-
ized.
Finally, the way transfer dependency interacts with the local budget balance may be
affected by the distribution of spending between the local and state level in the state in
question.19 Lacking own resources in the local revenue mix may be particularly damaging
when municipalities face extensive spending responsibilities.
Extensive spending decentralization is especially problematic when it is the result
of delegation instead of “real decentralization”. A large share of local spending in total
government spending within a state usually results when state governments delegate tasks
to the local level, while rules and standards governing the task in question are defined at
the state or even national level. Thus, a lack of autonomy on the revenue side coincides
with a lack of autonomy on the spending side. In Germany, social welfare spending is a case
in point: To a large extent, standards are set by federal law, but execution is often up to
the Länder, who devolve responsibilities to municipalities and counties to varying degrees.
Accountability problems are exacerbated when the distribution of spending responsibilities
is unclear to voters, which is often the case when states devolve the execution of state
responsibilities to the local level.
H3: The effect of dependency on shared taxes, unconditional and conditional trans-
fers differs in strength.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, shared taxes can be viewed as transfers because munic-
ipalities do not have authority over the legal definition of their tax base or tax rate.
Nevertheless, the apportionment of shared taxes to municipalities is related to local eco-
nomic activity. To some extent, the municipality gets resources back that were generated
by its population. This makes shared taxes fundamentally different from “pure” grants.
Conditional and unconditional grants undoubtedly do not constitute own revenues, but
their effect on local deficits might also differ.
The reasons why different transfer types might affect local deficits differently can be
discussed along two dimensions. First, traditional economic theory tells us that grants
have both income and substitution effects. Second, it matters where each transfer type
falls on the continuum of rules versus discretion.
19Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013) test this proposition at the country level, with spending decentralization
measured as the share of subnational own expenditure in general government expenditure.
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Any type of transfer changes local government income and thus results in income
effects. Local government spending will be higher than it would have been without the
transfer, ceteris paribus.20 Lump-sum grants without conditionality or matching require-
ments have only income effects. Shared taxes and unconditional transfers fall into this
category. Matching grants have income and substitution effects. They change local price
ratios and lead to more pronounced increases in spending on the program in question.
Some conditional grants have such a matching dimension. However, matching grants are
typical of the capital budget and not the current budget, which is the focus of the present
analysis. But even without a matching requirement, conditional transfers may have substi-
tution effects. They occur if local government spending in the area on which the transfer
money must be spent was previously below the amount of the transfer received. The
income and substitution effects predicted by conventional economic theory should a pri-
ori not lead to higher deficits, because governments would in theory always respect their
budget constraints, refrain from overspending and allocate resources efficiently given the
constraints posed by grant design. Nevertheless, considering income and substitution ef-
fects reveals an important distinction: Shared taxes and unconditional transfers do not
change price ratios and do not alter the relative allocation of government spending. Con-
ditional transfers, on the other hand, may distort local government behavior, which could
in practice contribute to local overspending.
Another important reason for potentially different incentive effects is the trade-off
between rules and discretion. The degree to which transfers are governed by rules, the
transparency of these rules and the content of the rules matter for fiscal performance (see,
for example, Rodden and Eskeland [2003], Evers [2012], Neyapti and Bulut-Cevik [2014]
and Sanguinetti and Tommasi [2004]). The ability of local governments to influence the
amount of transfers they receive is decisive (Hunter 1974). Dependence on transfers of
any type increases the perception that state governments are ultimately responsible for
local fiscal trouble, as suggested by H1. This perception might be bolstered if transfers
representing suitable bailout channels are readily available. Arguably, transfers that are
paid according to strict and transparent rules that are not easily manipulated by either
the local or state government do not constitute likely bailout channels. Instead, some
discretion over transfers by the state government is required. Otherwise, the state govern-
20In the special case of negative income elasticity of the demand for public goods, theory predicts a
decrease in government spending, see Hyman (2014).
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ment could not be pressured into raising these transfers in times of fiscal shortages and
would not be vulnerable to bargaining and bailout demands.
In the German context, shared taxes are the type of transfer over which state gov-
ernments enjoy the least amount of discretion. The fact that municipalities should receive
income and VAT shares is enshrined in the federal constitution. The details of the distri-
bution mechanism among the federal, state and local level are determined by federal law.
Shared taxes do not appear amenable to bailout pressures.
In contrast, unconditional and conditional transfer are almost exclusively designed
under state authority, with considerable bargaining with local actors. Federal transfers to
municipalities are negligible in comparison.21 The vast majority of unconditional transfers
to municipalities is part of state municipal fiscal equalization schemes. Fiscal equaliza-
tion transfers are meant to reduce differences in local capacities to provide public goods.
In each state, standardized measures of fiscal need and fiscal capacity are compared and
gaps in fiscal capacity are partially filled with transfers. The exact rules pertaining to the
calculation of fiscal need, fiscal capacity, the degree of equalization etc. differ from state
to state. The fiscal equalization schemes are very elaborate and typically ensure that the
calculation of fiscal need does not create incentives for manipulation by municipalities.22
Similarly, the design of fiscal capacity measures preserves incentives for local tax effort
through the use of standardized tax multipliers (see Chapter 2). Consequently, it can
be expected that fiscal equalization transfers contribute only moderately to soft budget
constraint problems. Even so, the mere existence of fiscal equalization may hinder the
economic and fiscal development of poorer regions (McKinnon 1995). Moreover, uncon-
ditional transfers are not made up entirely of rules-based fiscal equalization transfers. In
particular, special need grants (Bedarfszuweisungen) deserve note. Such grants can be
requested by municipalities experiencing unforeseeable, extraordinary hardship such as
natural disasters. Increasingly however, states use them as tools to support fiscal consoli-
dation efforts of indebted municipalities. States enjoy great discretion when granting such
transfers, which makes them suitable potential bailout channels.23
21Direct fiscal transfers from the federal to the local level are even prohibited by the constitution.
Federal transfers are thus channeled through each state (see Footnote 6).
22For this purpose, fiscal need is based on objective criteria such as the number of inhabitants, surface
area, social welfare recipients, school children etc. See Chapter 2 and Section 3.2.1.
23The data do not allow distinguishing fiscal equalization transfers and special need grants in the
empirical analysis.
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Similarly, conditional transfers are characterized by state discretion. Conditional
transfers are granted to individual municipalities with some regularity for purposes such
as sewage management, flood control or childcare services. As with special need grants,
however, there is a tendency to grant ad hoc conditional transfers for budget consolidation
purposes. As a whole, conditional transfers are perhaps the least rules-based transfers
received by German municipalities, such that a large share of conditional transfers in local
revenue should be particularly harmful to fiscal outcomes. In addition and in contrast to
shared taxes and unconditional grants, conditional grants reduce local spending autonomy,
thereby limiting local accountability and the extent to which local expenditures reflect local
policy choices (Bird and Tarasov 2004). Instead, municipalities become mere spending
agents through delegation from the state level (de Mello 2000).
3.4 Empirical strategy
The hypotheses derived in Section 3.3.2 are tested in a fixed effect model relating the local
deficit (or surplus) to local transfer dependency, interaction terms and control variables.
The resulting regression model takes the following form:
deficiti,t = β1DepT,i,t + δXi,t + θYc,t + λZs,t + αi + Φt + εi,t (3.5)
where deficiti,t represents the current deficit of municipality i in year t, relative
to its population. DepT,i,t designates total transfer dependency measured by the sum
of shared taxes, unconditional and conditional transfers relative to gross current revenues
(see Section 3.2). DepT,i,t captures the extent of the common pool problem, the softness of
the local budget constraint, the strength of bailout expectations etc., which may depress
local fiscal performance. The higher the share of transfers in total revenues, the more
others have to pay to finance a municipality’s revenue, the softer is the municipal budget
constraint and the stronger are municipal bailout expectations. From H1, β1 is expected
to be positive.
A number of covariates is introduced and tested in Equation 3.5 to account for
other potential intervening factors. Vector Xi,t designates municipal-level controls (local
population, the dependency ratio24, the number of in-commuters per capita and population
24The dependency ratio is calculated as the share of under 18- and over 65-year-olds in the total
population.
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density). The local population is included to account for the fact that larger cities might
face softer budget constraints, similar to the argument advanced in H2.2. Population-
related variables also control for the fact that spending necessities may depend on the
size and composition of the local population. Local economic strength, which contributes
to a favorable fiscal position, is reflected by the number of in-commuters. Finally, fiscal
pressures due to maintenance costs might also result from a lower population density.
Yc,t contains county-level controls (GDP per capita, the disposable income of pri-
vate households per capita, the number of households eligible for social welfare benefits
per capita and an indicator variable for a left majority at the latest state parliamentary
elections) while Zs,t denotes state-level controls (spending decentralization25 and state
budget balance26). GDP and disposable income per capita again reflect local economic
strength.27 The number of households eligible for social welfare benefits not only indicates
a lack of economic strength, but also accounts for specific local spending needs. Munic-
ipalities in Germany are responsible for the payment of residence and heating costs for
households receiving unemployment benefits.28 The indicator variable for a left majority
proxies the ideological stance of the local administration, which might influence its fiscal
policies. Spending decentralization at the state level captures the role of municipalities in
executing policies in the state as a whole. For given values of transfer dependency, it might
be more difficult for municipalities to balance their budgets when they are responsible for
a wider range of tasks. The fiscal situation of local governments might also be affected by
the state’s fiscal position, which is why the state budget balance is included.
The specification also controls for municipal fixed effects (αi) and year dummies (Φt).
Fixed effects ensure that estimation results are not biased by municipality-specific, time-
constant factors. For instance, the geographic position of a municipality, the mentality of
its people and political leadership or its economic profile and biggest employers might all
have an impact on fiscal performance, which is filtered through the use of fixed effects.
Similarly, year dummies control for the effect on local deficits of events that occur across
25Spending decentralization is measured as the share of municipal spending in total current spending
within a state.
26The state budget balance is measured by the state surplus relative to state expenditure.
27Contrary to what one might expect, GDP and disposable income per capita are not highly correlated
in the sample, such that the joint inclusion of these two variables does not pose multicollinearity concerns.
28Cities with county status bear these costs directly. Municipalities without county status share in
these costs through their contribution to the county’s budget. The local level receives federal assistance
for these costs via the state level.
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the entire cross-section of municipalities. Most importantly, the state of the economy with
its cyclical upturns and downturns is taken into account. The error term εi,t is clustered
at the county level, allowing the unobservables of municipalities belonging to the same
county to be correlated.29
A central challenge to be tackled in the empirical analysis is the potential endogene-
ity of the transfer dependency variable. Transfer dependency can hardly be considered to
be exogenous. The amount of transfers a municipality receives is dependent on a myriad
of economic and institutional factors, as explained in Section 3.2. One particular concern
is potential reverse causality: The amount of transfers awarded may – at least in part – be
the result of a bargaining process between communities and state governments, in which
local fiscal stances might be an important bargaining parameter. Thus, the assumed flow
of causation from transfer dependency might also run the opposite direction, with the level
of transfer dependency dependent upon the recipient government’s deficit situation, e.g.,
in case of consolidation assistance transfers. Hence, regression results obtained without
addressing endogeneity concerns may be viewed with some legitimate skepticism. One way
to counter endogeneity problems is the use of one or several instrumental variables. Such
variables are correlated with the (potentially) endogenous variable, i.e. transfer depen-
dency, without themselves belonging into the structural model characterized by Equation
3.5. They allow consistent estimation of β1 even in the presence of endogeneity. To check
whether estimation results may be biased by endogeneity, Equation 3.5 is re-estimated
using an instrumental variable approach.
This step, i.e. two-stage least squares estimation, is also necessary to rule out an
additional source of potential bias. One may suspect a mechanical link between the local
deficit per capita and the transfer dependency measure because the construction of both
numbers contains total revenues. If own revenues rise in a given year in a municipality, for
example due to higher business tax revenue, while all other factors are held constant, this
increase corresponds to a lower deficit and a lower weight of transfers in the revenue mix.30
29One important reason why errors might be correlated at the county level is that counties exercise
regulatory oversight over their municipalities. They may thus become involved in the municipal budget
process (see Chapter 4).
30Nevertheless, there is no clear mechanical link between the two variables. Transfer dependency as
defined in this paper can increase for two reasons. First, it can increase because transfers to the munici-
pality increase. Mechanically, i.e. holding all other factors fixed, one would expect the deficit to decrease
following such an increase in transfer dependency. Second, transfer dependency can increase because own
revenues decrease. Mechanically, this would lead to a higher deficit. Thus, there is no unambiguous
mechanical link between the transfer dependency and the deficit variable.
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A positive correlation between transfer dependency and local deficits could be the result
of the common pool, soft budget constraint, accountability problems etc. underlying H1
or the reflection of a mere mechanical effect. In the baseline regression, employing fixed
effects and year dummies is a first strategy to ensure that the behavioral impact of transfer
dependency is correctly identified.31 Using two-stage least squares is a second and more
complete strategy. By replacing the transfer dependency variable with fitted values of the
first stage regression, the possibility of a pure mechanical construction effect is eliminated.
Hypothesis H2 and its corresponding sub-hypotheses advance conditional effects of
transfer dependency and thus require an interaction term to be introduced into the re-
gression model, as shown in Equation 3.6.
deficiti,t = β2DepT,i,t + β3DepT,i,t × Is,t + δXi,t + θYc,t + λZs,t + αi + Φt + εi,t (3.6)
The variable Is,t takes different forms depending on the sub-hypothesis. For a test of
H2.1, total transfer dependency is interacted with borrowing autonomy, as measured by
a state-level index of credit access.32 For H2.2, the interaction is with alternate measures
of horizontal fiscal imbalance (standard deviation of population, of disposable income of
private households per capita, or of GDP per capita among all municipalities of a state).
An election year dummy or state spending decentralization are interacted with transfer
dependency to investigate the validity of H2.3 and H2.4, respectively. Finally, a model
containing all relevant contingent effects is estimated.
H3 is tested by introducing dependency on shared taxes (DepST,i,t), dependency on
unconditional transfers (DepUT,i,t) and dependency on conditional transfers (DepCT,i,t)
separately into the regression model instead of total transfer dependency (DepT,i,t).
deficiti,t = β4DepST,i,t + β5DepUT,i,t + β6DepCT,i,t + δXi,t + θYc,t + λZs,t + αi + Φt + εi,t
(3.7)
31After all, municipal characteristics – for instance, the general level of the municipality’s spending and
revenue – and time-specific effects such as the state of the economy are partialled out by municipal and
time fixed effects.
32The credit access index is developed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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Given H1, coefficients for each type of transfer dependency should be positive. Fol-
lowing H3, the strongest effect is expected for conditional transfers, followed by uncondi-
tional transfers.
Table 3.2 summarizes the expectations on the coefficients of interest given H1 to H3.
Table 3.2: Expected coefficients
Hypothesis Expectation on coefficient of interest
H1 β1 > 0
H2.1-2.4 β2 > 0 ; β3 > 0
H3 β4 > 0 ; β5 > 0 ; β6 > 0
β6 > β5 > β4
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 in the appendix recap variable definitions and list data sources
for the calculation of all variables used in the regression analysis. Summary statistics of
the main regression variables are given in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics






Transfer dependency 55.413 11.943 4.455 99.322 73538
Dependency on
shared taxes




21.312 11.397 -5.864 77.339 73538
Dependency on
conditional transfers
7.335 4.753 -3.143 69.108 73538
Credit access index 1.512 1.003 0 5 73538
Standard deviation of
GDP p.c.
6.038 2.4 1.1 9.426 69953
Standard deviation of
household income p.c.
1.472 0.472 0.292 2.612 69953
Standard deviation of
population
33664.507 21646.196 6467.447 196730.641 73538
Election year 0.261 0.439 0 1 73538
Spending
decentralization
38.541 2.577 28.733 46.026 51002
Source: Own calculations. For data sources see Table 3.13 in the appendix.
3.5 Results
This section first presents baseline results concerning Hypothesis 1 (Section 3.5.1), which
are then verified using an instrumental variable approach (Section 3.5.2) and a robust-
ness check (Section 3.5.3). Finally, the results concerning the econometric analysis of
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are presented (Section 3.5.4).
3.5.1 Baseline results
Table 3.4 shows results for three regressions aimed at testing Hypothesis 1. According
to this hypothesis, greater reliance on transfers from higher levels of government as op-
posed to own revenues negatively affects fiscal performance. The dependent variable is
the municipal deficit per capita in all cases. All specifications control for municipal and
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year fixed effects as well as local population. Regression I is augmented with additional
controls in columns II (GDP and disposable household income per capita) and III (GDP
per capita, spending decentralization and state surplus/expenditure ratio).33 Due to the
differing set of controls with mixed data availability, the sample size varies from over
70,000 observations in specification I to less than 50,000 observations in specification III.
Transfer dependency is estimated to have a positive and strongly significant effect
on local deficits across all specifications. This result is in accordance with Hypothesis 1.
The estimated coefficients imply that a 1 percentage point increase in transfer dependency
leads to an increase of local deficits (or, equivalently, a decrease of local surpluses) by 12.5
to 15.7 euros per inhabitant, ceteris paribus. Figure 3.3 plots the estimated partial effect
based on regression III, holding all other variables at their mean values.
Larger cities appear to have lower deficits per capita, as evidenced by the negative
coefficient of the population variable. This negative association is surprising given that
bigger cities were hypothesized to face softer budget constraints. All other control co-
efficient show the expected signs: A greater GDP, higher income of private households
or higher surplus at the state level all reduce municipal deficits. In contrast, the deficit
is higher the more decentralized spending is in the respective state. The latter effect
even surpasses transfer dependency’s impact on the local fiscal position. As hypothesized,
it is apparently more difficult for municipalities to balance their budgets when they are
responsible for executing a wider range of tasks.
33Other potential controls listed in Section 3.4 were tested but were not statistically significant or did
not significantly alter the regression results. In particular, private household income per capita was not
significant in specification III.
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Table 3.4: Regression results - Hypothesis 1
I II III
Transfer dependency 12.74∗∗∗ 12.53∗∗∗ 15.73∗∗∗
(0.83) (0.77) (0.93)
Population -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP p.c. -7.78∗∗∗ -5.59∗∗∗
(2.36) (1.55)




State surplus/expenditure ratio -5.05∗∗∗
(0.97)
Constant -714.61∗∗∗ -123.31 -
1712.13∗∗∗
(45.62) (129.14) (150.51)
Observations 72807 69210 48907
R2 0.13 0.13 0.17
Municipalities 5281 5281 5119
Notes: Fixed effects estimates based on Equation 3.5. Unbalanced panel of 5119 to 5281 munic-
ipalities for the period 1998 to 2013 (specification I ), 1998 to 2012 (specification II ), or 2001 to
2011 (specification III ). Dependent variable: current budget deficit per capita (municipal level).
Independent variable of interest: transfer dependency (municipal level). All specifications control
for municipal and year fixed effects. Specification I additionally controls for local population
(municipal level). Specification II further controls for GDP p.c. (in 1000 EUR) and income
of private households p.c. (in 1000 EUR) (county level). Specification III does not control
for private household income but instead controls for spending decentralization and the state
surplus/expenditure ratio (state level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county.
Significance levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
3.5.2 Exploring endogeneity
Before moving on to test Hypotheses 2.1 to 3, we need to verify whether the results
obtained so far might be biased by the potential endogeneity of the transfer dependency
variable or a possible mechanical link between local deficits and transfer dependency. For
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Figure 3.3: Partial effect of transfer dependency
Notes: Partial effect of transfer dependency based on regression III in Table 3.4 (solid line). Dashed
lines show the 95% confidence interval. All other variables are held at their mean value.
Source: Own calculations. For data sources see Table 3.13 in the appendix.
this purpose, the regression model is re-estimated using an instrumental variable approach.
The results are presented in Table 3.5. The number of employees at place of employment
per capita, the share of school-age population and the surface area per capita are proposed
as instruments for transfer dependency.
In order for these variables to qualify as valid instruments, they should not directly
impact local deficits per capita (instrument exogeneity) while being correlated with the
endogenous variable, i.e. transfer dependency (instrument relevance). The surface area
per capita should have a very limited effect on local budget outcomes. It accounts for
differences between rural and city municipalities. A correlation with transfer dependency
is suspected because the surface area of municipalities is part of the distribution formulas
of equalization transfers in some states and may also influence the composition of local tax
revenue. The local share of school-age population could modify the composition of local
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spending given that municipalities are responsible for the construction and maintenance
of school buildings as well as for local public transport of school children. Nonetheless, a
direct impact on the deficit seems unlikely. In contrast, a positive association is expected
between the share of school-age population and transfer dependency. A number of federal
states include the number of school children in the distribution criteria of equalization
transfers and pay out conditional transfers directed at financing school-related activities.
The number of employees per capita should also not directly influence local deficits: It
is likely to be positively associated with both spending and revenues, but not with the
deficit per se. Jurisdictions with a relatively high number of employees per capita are likely
to rely more on own revenue sources, in particular business tax and VAT revenues, and
less on transfers from higher levels of government.34 Finding suitable instruments is very
challenging in practice, and even the ones proposed here have limitations. Relatively little
variation over time is a flaw of all suggested instruments, and it is a particular concern
for the municipal surface area, limiting this instrument’s explanatory value.35 In addition,
the relationship between the instrument and transfer dependency, as well as potential re-
maining interdependencies with the deficit, are often less than clear-cut. Take the number
of employees per capita: As stated above, it is usually positively related to spending and
revenues, and hence not directly related to the deficit. However, counteracting effects on
spending also exist, which could create an association between employees and municipal
deficits. When employment decreases in a municipality, social welfare spending is bound
to increase, albeit with a time lag. The regressions below would not reveal such dynamic
effects. Thus, the selected instruments are vulnerable to some legitimate criticism.
Column I of Table 3.5 serves as a plausibility check. It tests whether the proposed
instruments should have been included as regular controls into the regression, which would
also be an indication of a violation of instrument exogeneity. In a fixed effect regression
of local deficits per capita on transfer dependency, the usual controls and the suggested
three instruments, all potential instruments are (individually and jointly) statistically
insignificant.
Turning to the two-stage least squares regression, column II shows the first-stage
regression results. Here, all proposed instruments are statistically significant, making them
34Local VAT revenues respond positively to increases in the number of employees as this is one of the
main indicators determining the distribution of VAT shares among municipalities, see Section 3.2.1.
35Variation in municipal surface areas does exist, but most variation in the surface area per capita comes
from the fluctuation of the number of inhabitants.
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relevant instruments for transfer dependency. The second stage, in column III, reports
transfer dependency to be significant at the 10% level with an estimated coefficient of
13.91. This lies within the range of the baseline results presented in Table 3.4. Hence,
endogeneity does not appear to be a major concern in the present sample.36 The remaining
hypotheses can thus legitimately be tested by means of the standard fixed effects regression
model.
36Moreover, the overidentification test (Hansen J statistic) presented in the lower panel of Table 3.5
confirms instrument validity.
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Table 3.5: Regression results - Instrumental variable estimation
FE model IV model
First stage Second stage
I II III
Dependent variable deficit p.c. transfer dependency deficit p.c.
Transfer dependency 15.79∗∗∗ 13.91∗
(0.92) (7.22)
Population -0.01∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP p.c. -5.81∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -5.98∗∗∗
(1.58) (0.05) (2.01)
Spending decentralization 24.92∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗ 25.19∗∗∗
(3.29) (0.10) (3.64)
State surplus/expenditure ratio -4.98∗∗∗ 0.00 -5.19∗∗∗
(0.94) (0.02) (0.95)
Employees at place of 27.75 -23.00∗∗∗
employment p.c. (163.39) (2.42)
Share of school-age population -0.02 0.00∗∗
(0.01) (0.00)




Observations 48705 48689 48689
R2 0.17 0.15 0.17
Municipalities 5113 5097 5097
Hansen J statistic - - 2.07
(p-value) - - (0.36)
Notes: Fixed effects and two-stage least squares estimates based on Equation 3.5. Unbalanced panel
of 5097 to 5113 municipalities for the period 2001 to 2011. Dependent variable in FE model and
second stage of IV model: current budget deficit per capita (municipal level). Transfer dependency
(municipal level) is treated as exogenous in the FE model. It is the dependent variable in the first
stage of the IV model and is instrumented in the second stage with the number of employees at
place of employment, the share of school-age population and the surface area p.c. (municipal level).
All specifications control for municipal and year fixed effects, local population (municipal level),
GDP p.c. (in 1000 EUR, county level), spending decentralization and the state surplus/expenditure
ratio (state level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels: ∗
0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
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3.5.3 Robustness
To test the robustness of the results obtained in the previous sections, the actual current
deficit per capita is replaced by the primary current deficit per capita as the dependent
variable in Equation 3.5. The primary deficit might be a more suitable measure of current
fiscal performance as it is not biased by interest payments that are due to past fiscal
decisions. Due to limited data availability, using the primary deficit reduces the sample size
as well as the underlying time period, which now runs from 1998 to 2006. Corresponding
regression results are reported in Table 3.6. The employed controls in columns I to III
correspond to those used in Table 3.4. The reported coefficients for transfer dependency
are within the range of previous estimates, giving us greater confidence in the validity of
all presented regression results.
3.5.4 Additional results
Table 3.7 provides regression results exploring the validity of Hypothesis 2 and its sub-
hypotheses, all of which are concerned with potential interactive effects between transfer
dependency and other factors.37 First, column I of the table investigates whether transfer
dependency is more detrimental to local fiscal outcomes when municipalities enjoy greater
access to borrowing (Hypothesis H2.1). For this purpose, transfer dependency is interacted
with a credit access index running from 0 (no credit access) to 6 (complete credit access).
The regression supports the hypothesized link: More local borrowing autonomy indeed
exacerbates transfer dependency’s impact on local deficits.
Columns II to IV address Hypothesis H2.2, namely that transfer dependency af-
fects fiscal outcomes more strongly when horizontal fiscal imbalances are large. This is
confirmed by the regressions, which show a positive and significant interaction effect no
matter if horizontal fiscal imbalances are measured by the standard deviation of GDP,
household income or population of all municipalities within a state. However, the best fit
is achieved in regression III, which employs the standard deviation of household income
as the chosen indicator of horizontal fiscal imbalance.
Columns V and V I deal with Hypotheses H2.3 and H2.4, respectively. In both
cases, the interaction term fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.
37All regressions in Table 3.7 include the same controls as column III in Table 3.4, i.e. munici-
pal and year fixed effects, population, GDP per capita, spending decentralization and the state sur-
plus/expenditure ratio.
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Table 3.6: Regression results - Robustness check using primary deficit
I II III
Transfer dependency 11.98∗∗∗ 11.99∗∗∗ 15.41∗∗∗
(0.85) (0.85) (1.12)
Population -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP p.c. -12.98∗∗∗ -8.34∗∗
(2.98) (3.25)




State surplus/expenditure ratio -6.90∗∗∗
(1.24)
Constant -688.25∗∗∗ -26.97 -
1552.99∗∗∗
(52.63) (208.65) (180.95)
Observations 44854 44845 30028
R2 0.09 0.09 0.13
Municipalities 5273 5272 5110
Notes: Fixed effects estimates based on Equation 3.5, where the current deficit per capita is replaced
by the current primary deficit per capita. Unbalanced panel of 5110 to 5273 municipalities for the
period 1998 to 2006 (specifications I and II ) or 2001 to 2006 (specification III ). Dependent variable:
current primary budget deficit per capita (municipal level). Independent variable of interest:
transfer dependency (municipal level). All specifications control for municipal and year fixed effects.
Specification I additionally controls for local population (municipal level). Specification II further
controls for GDP p.c. (in 1000 EUR) and income of private households p.c. (in 1000 EUR) (county
level). Specification III does not control for private household income but instead controls for
spending decentralization and the state surplus/expenditure ratio (state level). Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
Thus, neither upcoming elections (H2.3) nor spending decentralization (H2.4) appear to
alter the way transfer dependency affects the municipal budget balance.
Finally, the last column of Table 3.7 includes all interaction effects that were found
to be significant in the previous regressions. Transfer dependency is interacted with both
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credit access and horizontal fiscal imbalances (as measured by the standard deviation of
household income) to present a unified test of Hypothesis 2. Both terms retain statisti-
cally significant coefficients that are almost equal to their previously estimated coefficients
(columns I and III). Moreover, transfer dependency itself is still individually significant,
as was the case in all previous regressions. Compared to regression III in Table 3.4,
the estimated coefficient is markedly lower, indicating that transfer dependency’s isolated
impact was previously overestimated.
In sum, while no support was found for any contingent effect of elections years or
spending decentralization, the impact of transfer dependency does seem to be contingent
on local credit access and horizontal fiscal imbalances, as predicted by Hypothesis 2.
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Table 3.7: Regression results - Hypothesis 2
H2.1 H2.2 H2.3 H2.4 H2
I II III IV V VI VII
Transfer 15.31∗∗∗ 13.78∗∗∗ 10.92∗∗∗ 14.72∗∗∗ 15.75∗∗∗ 18.79∗∗∗ 10.52∗∗∗
dependency (TD) (1.04) (0.99) (0.91) (0.96) (0.93) (5.81) (0.93)
Population -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP p.c. -5.58∗∗∗ -5.94∗∗∗ -4.28∗∗∗ -5.40∗∗∗ -5.59∗∗∗ -5.61∗∗∗ -4.27∗∗∗
(1.54) (1.53) (1.52) (1.53) (1.55) (1.56) (1.51)
Spending 21.78∗∗∗ 24.40∗∗∗ 32.56∗∗∗ 25.74∗∗∗ 25.18∗∗∗ 29.67∗∗∗ 29.20∗∗∗
decentralization (4.01) (3.22) (3.55) (3.22) (3.27) (8.84) (4.37)
State surplus/ -4.41∗∗∗ -4.42∗∗∗ -8.01∗∗∗ -5.48∗∗∗ -5.10∗∗∗ -5.04∗∗∗ -7.39∗∗∗
expenditure ratio (1.17) (0.86) (1.15) (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) (1.37)
TD × credit 0.26∗ 0.26∗
access (0.14) (0.14)
TD × SD of GDP 0.31∗∗
(0.13)
TD × SD of 3.26∗∗∗ 3.25∗∗∗
household income (0.61) (0.61)
TD × SD of 0.00∗∗∗
population (0.00)
TD × election year -0.04
(0.05)
TD × spending -0.08
decentralization (0.15)
Constant -1580.83∗∗∗ -1663.71∗∗∗ -2004.63∗∗∗ -1737.77∗∗∗ -1710.73∗∗∗ -1881.98∗∗∗ -1876.91∗∗∗
(177.77) (145.82) (170.33) (148.91) (150.50) (349.58) (199.81)
Observations 48907 48907 48907 48907 48907 48907 48907
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Municipalities 5119 5119 5119 5119 5119 5119 5119
Notes: Fixed effects estimates based on Equation 3.6. Unbalanced panel of 5119 municipalities
for the period 2001 to 2011. Dependent variable: current budget deficit per capita (municipal
level). Independent variable of interest: transfer dependency (municipal level) and its interactions
(interaction with credit access index (state level, specification I and VII ), horizontal fiscal im-
balances as measured by the standard deviation of GDP p.c. (state level, specification II ), the
standard deviation of private household income p.c. (state level, specification III and VII ) or the
standard deviation of population (state level, specification IV ), an election year dummy (state level,
specification V ) or spending decentralization (state level, specification VI ). All specifications control
for municipal and year fixed effects, population (municipal level), GDP p.c. (in 1000 EUR, county
level), spending decentralization and the state surplus/expenditure ratio (state level). Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
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Hypothesis 3 is taken up in Table 3.8.38 According to H3, transfer dependency’s
impact on local fiscal performance is not uniform but instead depends on the types of
transfer the municipality relies on. Dependency on shared taxes, unconditional transfers
and conditional transfers are expected to weigh on fiscal discipline unequally. Given the
institutional and incentive structure of these transfer types in Germany, conditional trans-
fers were expected to be most harmful to fiscal performance, followed by unconditional
transfers and, finally, shared taxes.
Table 3.8 shows that these expectations are only partially confirmed. While it is true
that each type of transfer puts a different strain on local deficits, the order of estimated
effects is not in line with theoretical expectations. Shared taxes are estimated to have
by far the strongest negative impact, followed by conditional transfers. Dependency on
unconditional transfers, on the other hand, does not affect local deficits in a statistically
significant manner. This may be due to the institutional design of the majority of uncon-
ditional transfers to municipalities in Germany, which preserves incentives for tax effort
and is not easily manipulable (see Section 3.3).
These results point to the importance of including shared taxes in any measure of
“total” transfer dependency. Neglecting them, as is often done due to data availability
issues, could lead to drastically underestimating the negative side effects of lacking revenue
autonomy. On the other hand, the results confirm that when it comes to “actual” transfers,
unconditional transfers should be preferred over conditional transfers whenever possible.
Why do shared taxes appear to be so detrimental although they should not have
substitution effects and although their distribution among municipalities is not subject to
state discretion and/or state-municipal bargaining? De Mello (2000) suggests one poten-
tial explanation. He argues that the complete lack of state discretion over shared taxes
devolved to the municipalities may pose fiscal challenges. It may reduce incentives for
efficient management of these funds at the local level and weaken coordination efforts
between the state and its municipalities. De Mello (2000) argues that this is particularly
true for revenue-sharing formulas of broad-base taxes – which is the case here. Further
research should aim to substantiate this explanatory avenue.
38The controls employed in columns I to III correspond to those used in the regressions shown in
Table 3.4.
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Table 3.8: Regression results - Hypothesis 3
I II III
Dependency on shared taxes 32.03∗∗∗ 31.79∗∗∗ 38.38∗∗∗
(1.63) (1.52) (1.67)
Dependency on unconditional transfers 0.80 0.18 0.63
(0.53) (0.52) (0.58)
Dependency on conditional transfers 8.97∗∗∗ 9.73∗∗∗ 12.59∗∗∗
(0.98) (1.00) (0.92)
Population -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP p.c. -7.30∗∗∗ -3.93∗∗
(2.70) (1.74)




State surplus/expenditure ratio -12.24∗∗∗
(1.01)
Constant -949.97∗∗∗ -119.16 -1934.71∗∗∗
(55.66) (137.44) (169.37)
Observations 72807 69210 48907
R2 0.22 0.23 0.31
Municipalities 5281 5281 5119
Notes: Fixed effects estimates based on Equation 3.7, where transfer dependency is replaced by
its components. Unbalanced panel of 5119 to 5281 municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013
(specification I ), 1998 to 2012 (specification II ), or 2001 to 2011 (specification III ). Dependent
variable: current budget deficit per capita (municipal level). Independent variables of interest:
dependency on shared taxes, unconditional transfers, or conditional transfers (municipal level). All
specifications control for municipal and year fixed effects. Specification I additionally controls for
local population (municipal level). Specification II further controls for GDP p.c. (in 1000 EUR)
and income of private households p.c. (in 1000 EUR) (county level). Specification III does not
control for private household income but instead controls for spending decentralization and the
state surplus/expenditure ratio (state level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county.
Significance levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
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3.6 Conclusion
Theoretical considerations lead to the expectation that local governments which rely more
heavily on transfers from higher levels of government will tend to produce less favorable
fiscal outcomes. This paper is the first to confirm this proposition empirically for a large
disaggregated dataset, using the case of municipalities in Germany. The results indicate
that transfer dependency lowers the local budget balance and that its effect is aggravated
when it coincides with horizontal fiscal imbalances within the federal state in question
and/or easy local access to borrowing. A detrimental interactive effect of the occurrence
of parliamentary elections or the degree of spending decentralization at the state level, on
the other hand, could not be detected.
Moreover, not all transfers are created equal. Thick institutional knowledge of the
country in question is required to construct convincing, decomposed transfer dependency
measures. Shared taxes, unconditional and conditional transfers each weigh differently on
local fiscal performance. Aggregate measures of transfer dependency may therefore be too
broad to adequately reflect the channels through which different types of transfers influence
budgetary outcomes. For the sample of German municipalities, a statistically significant
harmful effect could only be demonstrated for shared taxes and conditional transfers.
Unconditional transfers were not found to affect local deficits in either direction. This
neutrality of unconditional transfers may be due to the institutional design of the majority
of unconditional transfers to local jurisdictions in Germany, which places great emphasis on
incentive-compatibility, stringent rules and objective, non-manipulable eligibility criteria.
Future research should aim to verify whether this result also holds in other countries where
unconditional transfers may not be as well-designed. The strong negative impact of shared
taxes underscores the importance of including shared taxes into any aggregate measure of
transfer dependency – if an aggregate measure is still deemed appropriate –, which is not
always done in current research due to limited data availability.
The findings suggest important policy implications. First, they bolster the oft-stated
recommendation to accompany decentralization on the spending side with sufficient de-
centralization on the revenue side. Sound fiscal performance at the local level requires
not only sufficient quantities of local revenue. It also requires the right kinds of local
revenue. A substantial share of own revenues in the local revenue mix strengthens local
legitimacy over the use of financial resources as well as local accountability, lessens bailout
expectations and improves fiscal discipline. Second, to the extent that transfers to lower
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levels of government are required and might even need to be increased, attention should
be paid to the choice of the transfer instrument. Too much emphasis on shared taxes and
conditional transfers to fill local financing gaps might be particularly damaging in view of
fiscal sustainability at the local level.
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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.9: Federal states in data sample
Federal states Code Sample period Number of Average number of
observations observations per year
Schleswig-Holstein SH 1998 to 2006 937 104.1
Lower Saxony LS 1998 to 2011 4038 288.4
North Rhine-Westphalia NW 1998 to 2008 4356 396
Hesse HE 1998 to 2013 6813 425.8
Rhineland-Palatinate RP 1998 to 2011 683 48.8
Baden-Württemberg BW 1998 to 2013 17691 1105.7
Bavaria BV 1998 to 2013 32877 2054.8
Saarland SL 1998 to 2006 468 52
Brandenburg BB 1998 to 2006 929 103.2
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern MV 1998 to 2006 512 56.9
Saxony SX 1998 to 2006 2059 228.8
Saxony-Anhalt SA 1998 to 2006 278 30.9
Thuringia TH 1998 to 2013 1926 120.4
Table 3.10: Average of dependency on shared taxes over time
Year SH LS NW HE RP BW BV SL BB MV SX SA TH Total
1998 30.8 24.3 25.6 32.4 27.3 28.7 27.6 21.8 12.2 11.0 10.9 9.8 10.0 25.2
1999 29.5 24.9 26.1 32.7 27.4 28.6 28.1 21.7 11.6 11.0 12.3 11.6 11.0 25.6
2000 29.0 24.6 25.3 35.2 28.4 29.0 28.4 23.6 12.0 11.3 11.7 10.0 10.0 25.8
2001 28.2 23.9 24.6 34.9 27.6 29.1 29.6 22.2 11.8 10.3 11.0 10.2 10.5 26.6
2002 27.4 23.8 25.0 34.0 26.8 29.7 29.1 21.9 10.8 9.9 10.1 10.8 10.5 26.2
2003 26.8 23.9 25.8 33.0 27.2 30.0 28.6 22.1 10.1 9.9 10.6 10.6 11.4 25.9
2004 24.4 21.5 22.6 30.8 24.4 27.4 26.6 20.9 10.6 9.3 10.4 11.4 10.9 23.9
2005 22.8 21.6 22.2 30.6 26.1 27.0 26.9 21.2 10.6 9.8 10.4 11.2 11.1 23.8
2006 23.7 23.4 23.2 31.1 25.5 26.5 27.5 20.5 12.1 10.8 12.5 12.1 11.8 24.5
2007 . 24.2 23.5 31.3 27.1 27.3 29.0 . . . . . 13.2 27.1
2008 . 25.8 24.2 32.1 27.3 28.1 29.6 . . . . . 15.0 28.0
2009 . 24.6 . 31.4 28.9 28.2 29.7 . . . . . 14.9 28.3
2010 . 24.4 . 30.2 25.3 27.0 28.0 . . . . . 11.4 27.5
2011 . 24.2 . 29.7 25.8 26.6 28.7 . . . . . 11.4 27.6
2012 . . . 28.8 . 27.1 29.6 . . . . . 12.0 28.4
2013 . . . 29.9 . 27.8 29.6 . . . . . 12.3 28.9
Total 27.0 23.9 24.4 31.8 26.8 28.0 28.5 21.8 11.3 10.4 11.1 10.9 11.7 25.9
Source: Own calculations based on data from the FDZ and data provided by the statistical offices of the
Länder.
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Table 3.11: Average of dependency on unconditional transfers over time
Year SH LS NW HE RP BW BV SL BB MV SX SA TH Total
1998 14.3 15.8 18.9 16.1 10.7 17.2 21.0 25.9 36.2 43.7 34.0 38.1 45.8 21.8
1999 14.0 14.5 18.8 17.2 10.5 19.6 21.3 27.3 35.6 42.9 34.5 36.1 45.6 22.5
2000 15.2 15.3 20.2 16.7 10.7 20.6 21.8 28.0 35.0 42.9 35.8 36.3 47.9 23.3
2001 17.1 15.8 20.7 17.8 11.0 19.3 23.7 29.7 35.4 42.7 36.2 35.6 44.9 22.9
2002 16.8 15.0 20.7 18.2 11.4 19.2 24.4 29.6 35.9 43.2 36.3 34.5 45.1 23.2
2003 16.3 13.1 16.6 17.5 11.3 17.1 24.1 28.1 38.2 42.5 35.5 31.7 44.8 22.2
2004 15.0 13.3 19.9 15.6 10.6 16.8 23.1 26.4 33.8 39.8 33.7 29.7 44.4 21.7
2005 16.2 13.0 16.5 15.9 10.5 16.0 22.5 27.2 35.7 36.0 31.7 29.4 42.4 20.7
2006 14.0 13.2 15.6 16.3 10.0 18.6 21.8 28.1 36.4 32.5 27.8 30.3 39.5 20.7
2007 . 16.2 17.0 18.5 9.8 19.6 21.0 . . . . . 37.8 19.9
2008 . 14.6 18.4 18.1 9.5 20.6 21.0 . . . . . 35.8 20.1
2009 . 17.3 . 19.2 10.4 20.9 21.7 . . . . . 39.2 21.2
2010 . 14.5 . 16.2 10.9 21.5 21.1 . . . . . 33.9 19.6
2011 . 16.0 . 17.4 10.6 21.3 19.8 . . . . . 32.6 19.3
2012 . . . 18.9 . 19.7 19.7 . . . . . 29.2 19.6
2013 . . . 19.0 . 20.3 20.8 . . . . . 34.5 20.3
Total 15.4 14.8 18.5 17.4 10.6 19.3 21.8 27.8 35.8 40.7 34.0 33.5 40.2 21.6
Source: Own calculations based on data from the FDZ and data provided by the statistical offices of the
Länder.
Table 3.12: Average of dependency on conditional transfers over time
Year SH LS NW HE RP BW BV SL BB MV SX SA TH Total
1998 7.1 15.3 6.1 3.3 14.1 7.0 5.3 14.4 18.7 9.9 16.0 18.8 14.4 8.1
1999 7.3 14.7 6.0 3.4 13.2 7.0 5.3 13.2 18.4 9.4 15.6 17.8 13.3 8.0
2000 7.2 14.5 6.0 3.3 14.1 7.0 5.2 11.7 17.1 9.3 15.1 16.6 12.1 7.7
2001 7.4 14.2 5.9 3.3 13.6 7.6 5.4 11.6 19.5 8.7 14.3 16.6 10.3 7.7
2002 7.3 13.8 6.0 3.4 13.5 8.0 5.3 11.1 19.5 8.8 16.9 18.1 9.6 7.9
2003 7.9 14.1 6.0 3.6 14.3 8.1 5.2 10.8 19.9 8.4 15.7 18.0 8.7 8.0
2004 7.8 13.3 5.5 3.6 14.3 9.2 4.7 11.3 17.4 8.5 13.7 16.9 7.6 7.8
2005 7.8 11.4 6.9 3.8 12.6 9.0 4.4 7.7 12.7 8.8 13.3 13.7 5.4 7.3
2006 7.5 9.1 6.1 3.4 12.1 8.1 5.1 6.2 12.3 8.7 14.0 13.1 7.7 7.1
2007 . 7.6 5.6 3.9 11.9 7.2 6.4 . . . . . 8.4 6.5
2008 . 8.0 6.3 4.0 11.1 6.9 6.6 . . . . . 8.3 6.6
2009 . 8.6 . 4.6 13.7 8.1 7.3 . . . . . 8.8 7.5
2010 . 8.9 . 4.9 14.0 8.1 7.5 . . . . . 21.3 7.6
2011 . 8.2 . 6.1 13.9 8.3 7.6 . . . . . 20.9 7.8
2012 . . . 4.5 . 9.4 7.9 . . . . . 21.8 7.9
2013 . . . 5.3 . 9.4 8.6 . . . . . 15.3 8.3
Total 7.5 11.5 6.0 4.0 13.3 8.0 6.1 10.9 17.3 9.0 15.0 16.6 12.1 7.6









Table 3.13: Variable definitions and data sources, main variables
Variable Definition Data Source
deficit current spending minus current revenues (in EUR),
relative to population
Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical
Office and the statistical offices of the Länder,
Regional Database Germany
primary deficit current spending (excluding interest payments) minus
current revenues (in EUR), relative to population
Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical
Office and the statistical offices of the Länder
transfer
dependency
share of shared taxes, unconditional and conditional
transfers in gross current revenue
Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical




share of shared taxes in gross current revenue Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical





share of unconditional transfers in gross current
revenue
Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical





share of conditional transfers in gross current revenue Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical




state-level index of credit access Chapter 4 of this dissertation
horizontal fiscal
imbalance
standard deviation of population, disposable income of
private households per capita, or of GDP per capita
among all municipalities of a state
Regional Database Germany, Statistik lokal
election year dummy for election years of state parliamentary
elections
Regional Database Germany, Statistik lokal
spending
decentralization
share of municipal spending in total current spending
within a state (in percent)








Table 3.14: Variable definitions and data sources, control variables
Variable Definition Data Source
Municipal-level controls
population registered local inhabitants Regional Database Germany, Statistik lokal
dependency ratio share of under 18- and over 65-year-olds in the total
population
Regional Database Germany, Statistik lokal
school-age
population
share of under 18-year-olds in the total population Regional Database Germany, Statistik lokal
employees at place
of employment
number of employees at place of employment per capita Federal Employment Agency (BA)
employees at place
of residence
number of employees at place of residence per capita Federal Employment Agency (BA)
in-commuters number of in-commuters per capita Federal Employment Agency (BA)
surface area surface area per capita Regional Database Germany, Statistik lokal
density population relative to surface area Regional Database Germany, Statistik lokal
County-level controls
GDP GDP per capita Regional Database Germany, Statistik lokal
social welfare
households
number of households eligible for social welfare benefits
per capita
Federal Employment Agency (BA)
left majority dummy for a left majority at the latest state
parliamentary elections




state surplus/deficit relative to state expenditure Federal Statistical Office, FS 14 R 3.1
Chapter 4
Tax smoothing and credit access
Abstract
Are local tax rates less volatile if municipalities have easier access to credits? Do local
governments smooth tax rates if they are granted access to borrowing? Economic theory
shows that public debt can be useful to enhance social welfare if it enables governments to
smooth taxes over time. This paper investigates the empirical relationship between credit
access and tax smoothing using the case of German municipalities. If local tax rates are less
volatile in federal states granting easier access to borrowing, there is some benefit to allowing
public debt and a trade-off between tax smoothing and budget discipline arises. If not,
local credit rationing is advisable. We carry out an in-depth institutional analysis of local
credit access in Germany, which yields an original credit access index. We refute a positive
association between credit access and tax smoothing for the case of German municipalities
based on four steps of empirical, i.e. descriptive and econometric, analysis. The entire
analysis is based on a dataset of over 10,000 municipalities in all German territorial states.
4.1 Introduction
In the context of recent debt crises, political practitioners emphasize risks associated with
high public debt levels and try to design effective measures for limiting debt build-up.
Public debate often portrays debt as something that is best avoided or at least strictly
limited. Otherwise, countries might one day have to suffer the consequences in the form
of debt crises, recessions, fiscal austerity and painful reforms to clean up the mess.1
1The controversy on the risks associated with high debt levels was fueled by the research of Reinhart
and Rogoff (2010), which posits a link between rising debt levels and weak economic growth and its critical
replication by Herndon et al. (2014).
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On the other hand, economic theory suggests that public debt can be a useful tool
to maximize social welfare. In his seminal contribution, Barro (1979) puts forward his
theory of tax smoothing. From a welfare perspective, deadweight losses and hence tax
rates should be smoothed over time in order to minimize distortionary costs from taxation.
Credit rationing could inhibit tax smoothing. Though the ability to run budget deficits
and access debt is not a necessary condition for tax smoothing, it greatly improves chances
of tax smoothing in practice. However, the proliferation of public debt and political efforts
for restraining debt demonstrate that it is not used solely for this laudable purpose.2 Rules
on debt and budget deficits may therefore be warranted.
The question whether debt access should be limited is not only relevant at the na-
tional level. In federal states where subnational levels of governments enjoy tax autonomy,
higher-level governments set the legal framework which determines budget and debt rules
for lower levels. As this paper argues, governments may face a trade-off between enforcing
budget discipline and easing tax smoothing when designing these rules. According to the
standard recommendation of the fiscal federalism literature, lower levels of government
should not be granted access to debt, at least not for financing current deficits (e.g., Oates
2005). However, ruling out debt finance could prevent subnational governments that enjoy
tax autonomy over certain taxes from engaging in welfare-enhancing tax smoothing.
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between credit access and tax
smoothing using the case of municipalities in Germany. Two distinguishing characteristics
make German municipalities particularly suitable for the analysis: First, all municipalities
in Germany enjoy autonomy over the business tax and the property tax, with the former
being highly volatile. Their (in)ability to smooth these tax rates over time is thus a
salient issue. Second, in the last two decades some German federal states have eased their
municipalities’ access to credits, while other states still strictly enforce credit rationing
of municipalities for current expenditures. Given local tax autonomy and the variation
in local credit rationing amongst German federal states, this paper asks: Are local tax
rates less volatile in federal states where municipalities have easy access to credits? If the
answer is affirmative, there is some benefit to allowing public debt and the aforementioned
trade-off between tax smoothing and budget discipline arises. If the answer is negative, the
potential benefits of credit access do not materialize in practice and local credit rationing
is advisable.
2Further purposes of debt established by economic theory are counter-cyclical fiscal policy or intergen-
erational equity.
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We contribute to the literature, first, by developing and using an innovative and
intuitive approach to investigating the strength of tax smoothing behavior. In contrast to
existing studies, we do not ask whether governments do or do not engage in tax smoothing.
Instead, we analyze whether tax rates become smoother and thus closer to Barro’s ideal if
the institutional setting becomes more accommodating. We focus on smoothing taxes over
the business cycle, factoring out the structural, long-term tax smoothing component. The
sizable empirical and theoretical literature on tax smoothing following the pioneering work
of Barro (1979) and Bohn (1990) typically defines tax smoothing as constant tax rates in
the case of perfect foresight. In case of imperfect foresight tax rates are changed whenever
new information about the expected permanent expenditure path arises.3 On this basis we
define “smoother tax rates” as tax rates that are subject to a smaller number of changes
within a given time period. This measure constitutes an intuitive and straightforward
translation of theoretical tax smoothing definitions found in the literature into the context
of local tax policy. Our approach also allows us to use tax rate data and investigate tax
rate volatility directly. This is in contrast to the indirect tax smoothing tests prevalent
in existing literature, which rely on the behavior of the budget balance or government
expenditure over time.4
Second, we establish a link between tax smoothing and actual credit access that is
to the best of our knowledge almost entirely missing from the literature to date. While
credit access is typically not an issue at the national level, it becomes crucial once we
move to subnational levels of government.5 The empirical analysis yields an original
index of local credit access based on the differing institutional, legal and administrative
environment in each state. This index allows us to investigate the relationship between
credit access and the strength of tax smoothing at the local level based on a dataset of
3See, e.g., Adler (2006), Bohn (1990), Ghosh (1995) and Strazicich (1997).
4Indirect tests of tax smoothing typically rely on a theoretical model which derives a clear relationship
between tax rates and the budget surplus. They use the theoretical model to predict how the budget sur-
plus should evolve if the government engages in tax smoothing. There is an array of different econometric
tests (depending on the particular question, the available data and model) to examine if the development
of the budget surplus found in the actual data is in line with the predicted path of the model. Depending
on the degree of divergence tax smoothing is confirmed or rejected. See, e.g., Adler (2006), Barro (1979,
1995), Bohn (1990), Olekalns (1997) and Strazicich (1997).
5Most existing studies focus on tax smoothing at the national level, where free credit access can be
assumed. Notable exceptions are Strazicich (1997) and Reitschuler (2010). Strazicich (1997) investigates
tax smoothing at the subnational level with data from the United States and Canadian provinces, pointing
out that results differ by federal level. Reitschuler (2010) introduces the notion that fiscal rules such as
those of the European Union, which limit debt access, may inhibit tax smoothing.
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over 10,000 municipalities in all German territorial states. In our empirical analysis we
find no evidence in favor of a tax smoothing effect of credit access.
Third, we show that a rising number of German municipalities is making abusive
use of easier credit access and carries a high burden of short-term debt. So-called liq-
uidity credits that are meant to fill temporary liquidity gaps are increasingly used to
cover persistent budget deficits over a medium- to long-term horizon. Our results suggest
that granting credit access is an (un)successful attempt of the respective federal states to
compensate for revenues that are insufficient to cover rising spending needs and to limit
upward pressure on tax rates. Credit access triggers unsustainable behavior, making calls
for bailouts more likely. Our paper provides support for the notion that strict credit ra-
tioning of the local level may be the best institutional choice for higher-level governments
even if there is substantial tax autonomy at the local level.
Section 4.2 starts by explaining the institutional setting. Section 4.2.1 portrays the
rules governing local borrowing in the territorial states and provides information on local
tax autonomy. Section 4.2.2 details the construction of an original index of local credit
access and proposes a measure for tax rate volatility. In Section 4.3 we provide evidence
against a contribution of credit access to tax smoothing; we present it in four steps. The
first three steps in Section 4.3.1 are based on a descriptive analysis. This is complemented
by a fourth, econometric step in Section 4.3.2. Section 4.4 summarizes the findings and
concludes.
4.2 Local credit access and tax autonomy
In the first part of this section we provide information on the institutional background.
We outline the rules governing local borrowing in the territorial states before turning to
local tax autonomy. In the second part of this section, we present our index of credit
access and introduce our measure of tax rate volatility.
4.2.1 Institutional background
Local credit access. Federal states grant municipalities varying access to debt. The legal
framework for local government finances is defined by local government laws (Gemeinde-
ordnungen) and associated regulation in each state. In the following, we analyze legal
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provisions and their evolution in each of the 13 territorial states. The three city-states, in
which a separate municipal level does not exist, are excluded.
When talking about local public debt in Germany, debt for consumption and invest-
ment purposes needs to be distinguished. As per state law in all states and contrary to the
state and federal level, municipalities may only go into debt to finance investment, invest-
ment assistance, or to restructure existing debt. Formally, debt for consumption purposes
is ruled out. Accordingly, local government laws in all states stipulate that municipalities
ought to balance their budget each year.
However, liquidity gaps that may arise throughout the budget year even when rev-
enues do not fall short of expenditures make (short-term) credits for consumption purposes
a necessity. Unlike financing credits, which are used to fund investment, such liquidity
credits (Liquiditätskredite or Kassenkredite) are not part of local revenues in a legal sense.
They are meant to ensure the timely settlement of liabilities and to fill short-term liquidity
gaps until “real” revenues become available.6
In principle, municipalities cannot plan a budget deficit. This would seemingly
violate the balanced budget rules that are enshrined in all local government laws. At first
sight, it thus seems that there is barely any scope for tax smoothing at the local level. In
practice, however, (planned) budget deficits are commonplace.
Why is that so? First, the balanced budget rules of some states give municipalities
some leeway by allowing the use of reserves to finance temporary deficits. Second, the
regulatory authority in question may reject unlawful budgets, but it is not obliged to
intervene.7 Regulatory authorities may tacitly approve deficits. Third, even if the budget
is rejected, the deficit does not necessarily disappear. Instead, municipalities without a
valid budget operate under the rules of provisional budget management, which allow them
to carry out their most important tasks and, among other things, levy taxes at previous
rates. Changes to tax rates are typically prohibited.
In addition, budgets containing a deficit can be made legal under certain circum-
stances. A number of states require municipalities that do not achieve budgetary equi-
librium to submit a budget consolidation plan, which specifies how the municipality will
return to budget balance in the coming years. In most cases, this plan requires approval
6Given that liquidity credits are not classified as revenues, they cannot be used to balance the budget.
7In case of cities with county status and some big non-associated cities, the state interior ministry is
usually the competent regulatory authority. In some states, lower public authorities fulfill this role. For
municipalities belonging to a county, regulatory control is exercised by the county.
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by the regulatory authority. If approval is denied, the municipality once again finds itself
under provisional budget management. Although they were intended as an instrument
for enhancing fiscal sustainability, budget consolidation plans also provide a legal avenue
for running deficits without the restrictions of provisional budget management. What was
once devised as an arrangement for fiscal emergency situations has become widespread.
Estimates claim that about a third of all municipalities in Germany was operating either
under a budget consolidation plan or provisional budget management as of 2010 (Spars
et al. 2010).
All local government laws contain a paragraph specifically on the purpose of and the
rules relating to liquidity credits. The wording of these paragraphs gives a first indication
of the degree of local credit rationing in the respective state. Table 4.9 in the appendix to
this chapter provides an overview of the current wording of these paragraphs in each of the
federal states. All provisions emphasize that liquidity credits serve the timely settlement
of expenses and the prevention of late payments. This purpose implies their temporary
nature. Another common theme is the subsidiarity of liquidity credits: They may only
be used if no other funds are available. Moreover, all local government laws require the
municipality to define a ceiling up to which liquidity credits may be taken in a given
budget year.8 In all states except Brandenburg, this ceiling must be set in the budget
by-law. The budget by-law typically has to be submitted to the competent regulatory
authority, which checks its lawfulness. In addition, some states specify that liquidity
credit ceilings have to be approved by the regulatory authority if they exceed a threshold
(Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-
Anhalt, Thuringia), which is defined relative to the municipalities’ expenses or revenues.
Bavaria goes one step further by ruling out credit ceilings above a threshold level.
A higher degree of local credit rationing can be assumed in states where approval
clauses for liquidity credit ceilings (or fixed ceilings) exist. In these states, regulatory
authorities are required by law to formally approve or reject problematic credit ceilings.
A priori, this suggests stricter oversight. It also gives regulatory authorities an additional
lever to limit municipal budget deficits, apart from rejecting budgets or, where applicable,
budget consolidation plans.
State regulations regarding liquidity credit ceilings have evolved over time. In fact,
all local government laws included an approval clause of credit ceilings at one time or
8This ceiling continues to hold under provisional budget management.
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another. Table 4.1 lists the most recent approval clauses that once were or still are in
effect in state laws.9 The time of abolishment of approval clauses varies greatly across
states. North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate were the first to abolish such
clauses in 1994. Brandenburg enacted the most recent abolishment in 2008. Interestingly,
there seems to be a trend reversal given that two states, Hesse and Saxony-Anhalt, have
reintroduced approval clauses in recent years. This may have been in response to soaring
levels of short-term local debt.
Table 4.1: Abolishment and introduction of approval clauses
Federal states Approval clause
abolished on
Wording of current or abolished approval clause
Baden-
Württemberg
– § 89 (3) GemO The liquidity credit ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds one fifth of the profit and loss
budget’s ordinary expenses.
Bavaria 01.09.1997 Art. 73 (2) GO The liquidity credit ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval if 1. the ceiling for the
core budget exceeds one sixth of the administrative
budget’s revenues, 2. the ceiling for owner-operated
municipal enterprises exceeds one sixth of the profit
plan’s revenues.
Brandenburg 01.01.2008 § 87 (2) GO The liquidity credit ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds one sixth of the administrative
budget’s revenues.
Hesse 01.01.1999 § 105 (2) HGO The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it
exceeds one fifth of the administrative budget’s
revenues.
Lower Saxony – § 122 (2) NKomVG The ceiling set in the budget
by-law requires approval by the regulatory authority if
it exceeds one sixth of the cash-flow budget’s revenues
for current administrative activities.
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
– § 53 (3) KV M-V The liquidity credit ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds ten percent of the cash-flow
budget’s current revenues for administrative activites.
North
Rhine-Westphalia
17.10.1994 § 74 (2) GO NRW The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it
exceeds one sixth of the administrative budget’s
revenues.
9Where current local government laws still contain approval clauses, the state listing corresponds to
Table 4.9 in the appendix.
Chapter 4 Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 93
Federal states Approval clause
abolished on
Wording of current or abolished approval clause
Rhineland-
Palatinate
12.06.1994 § 105 (2) GemO The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it
exceeds one sixth of the administrative budget’s
revenues.
Saarland 01.01.2007 § 94 (2) KSVG The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it
exceeds one sixth of the administrative budget’s
revenues.
Saxony – § 84 (3) SächsGemO The liquidity credit ceiling set in
the budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds one fifth of the profit and loss
budget’s ordinary expenses.
Saxony-Anhalt 31.08.2003 § 91 (2) GO LSA The liquidity credit ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds one fifth of the administrative
budget’s revenues.
Schleswig-Holstein 31.03.2006 § 87 (2) GO The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority.
Thuringia – § 65 (2) ThürKO The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval if 1. the ceiling for the core budget
exceeds one sixth of the administrative budget’s
revenues, 2. the ceiling for owner-operated municipal
enterprises or municipal institutions exceeds one sixth
of the profit plan’s revenues.
Approval clause
reintroduced on
Wording of reintroduced approval clause
Hesse 24.12.2011 § 105 (2) HGO The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority.
Saxony-Anhalt 01.07.2014 § 110 (2) KVG LSA The liquidity credit ceiling set in
the budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds one fifth of the cash budget’s
revenues for current administrative activities.
Source: Local government laws. Translation by authors.
Yet, the effective degree of credit rationing does not only depend on the letter of the
law, but also on its enforcement by regulatory authorities. For instance, approval clauses
would not make a difference if all credit ceilings were approved indiscriminately. The
administrative and political culture in each federal state may have an impact on how rules
are interpreted when legal terms leave scope for discretion. For example, the requirement
of a balanced budget and the stated purpose of liquidity credits imply that maturities
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should normally not exceed one fiscal year. However, local and state policy makers have
started to argue that the law does not stipulate rules on permissible maturities for liquidity
credits. On these grounds, credit periods of several years have been declared acceptable.
The political weight, personal beliefs and competence of individual decision-makers both in
municipalities and regulatory authorities may also influence enforcement. In addition, the
equipment and staffing of regulatory authorities may be pivotal both in their capacity to
detect rule breaches and in their decision to intervene or to refrain from intervention when
they do. Capacities may soon be exhausted when a large share of municipalities within
the authority’s jurisdiction is struggling with fiscal weakness and mounting liquidity credit
stocks.
In order to grasp differences in law enforcement and interpretation across states,
Table 4.10 in the appendix to this chapter provides information on relevant state circular
decrees, ordinances and other official statements regarding the treatment of municipal
liquidity credits and budget deficits. Through decrees and ordinances, state governments
give instructions that are binding for regulatory authorities (Heinemann et al. 2009). Other
official statements also shed light on the prevalent interpretation of legal rules.
A couple of findings emerge from Table 4.10. First, strictness of state enforcement
and interpretation of their – very similar – legal rules relating to balanced budgets and
liquidity credits differ markedly. While many states show a trend towards a loosening of
rules by lengthening acceptable maturities or allowing larger permanent stocks of liquidity
credits, others maintain a stricter reading of the law. Moreover, the instructions given to
regulatory authorities once again illustrate that a breach of the balanced budget rule often
becomes acceptable once municipalities submit a budget consolidation plan. The circular
decrees also highlight that there is a link between such budget consolidation plans and
local tax policy, as regulatory authorities are urged to ensure that tax rates are sufficiently
high in the municipalities in question. Provisional budget management, much like budget
consolidation plans, has become widespread and has triggered increasingly lax responses
by the authorities.
Thus, even if liquidity credits are not intended to be a tax smoothing tool, local
governments may use them as such: Municipalities located in states where they can access
liquidity credits to fill budget deficits may delay or even altogether avoid adjustments to
their business and property tax rates. The question remains whether they make use of
this theoretical possibility in practice.
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Local tax autonomy. Municipalities in Germany draw revenues from a variety of
sources such as taxes, transfers from the state level, and duties and charges. Among the
taxes, two stand out: The business tax (Gewerbesteuer) and the property tax (Grund-
steuer)10 not only make up a significant share of local revenue, but in contrast to most
other taxes their tax rates are set autonomously by municipalities. Every year, each of
the more than 11,000 municipalities in Germany sets its own tax multipliers. In 2013,
gross business tax revenue in Germany summed up to 43 billion (bn) euros while property
tax revenue stood at nearly 12 bn euros. Net revenue from business and property taxes
accounted for 15.8% and 5.8% of aggregate municipal income, respectively.
German municipalities do not enjoy full autonomy over business taxation. The
federal government uniformly defines the tax base as well as a basic tax rate (Steuer-
messzahl)11 for the entire country. The actual business tax rate, which is levied on firm
profits, is determined by multiplying the basic federal rate with a multiplier (Hebesatz)
set by each municipality. Municipalities are free in their choice of a multiplier, as long as
it does not fall below 200%.12
As in the case of business taxation, the property tax base and a basic tax rate
are set at the federal level. The tax base is constituted by the so-called uniform values
(Einheitswerte) of the property, which are meant to reflect the property’s value as of a
reference date (not its current market value) and which are fixed by federal tax author-
ities according to standardized procedures. Municipalities in turn fix the multiplier that
produces the final tax rate in conjunction with the basic federal rate.13 The latter is not
uniform. It depends on the type of property to be taxed and its location (East versus
West Germany).14 For simplicity, we will refer to local business tax multipliers and local
property tax multipliers as business tax rates and property tax rates in the remainder of
this paper.
Business and property tax rates have to be set in the budget by-law at the beginning
of each year. The budget by-law and hence applicable tax rates may be amended until
10When referring to the property tax, we mean the Grundsteuer B, which is one of two types of property
taxes in Germany. The other, called Grundsteuer A, which is also levied by municipalities, only accounts
for roughly 3% of total property tax revenue.
11The basic federal tax rate is currently set at 3.5%.
12This floor was introduced in 2004 in order to restrain detrimental tax competition. However, only a
very small number of communities had multipliers below the threshold prior to the reform.
13There are no restrictions on admissible property tax multipliers.
14It currently varies between 2.6‰ and 10‰.
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the end of the budgetary year. However, tax rates changes within the budgetary year are
rare in practice.
4.2.2 Measuring credit access and tax rate volatility
An index of credit access. In order to assess the impact of local credit access on the
volatility of local tax rates, the information on institutional features discussed in Section
4.2.1 needs to be condensed into an index of credit rationing and credit access. The
index presented in this paper reflects the qualitative and quantitative analysis of credit
access in all states. The index takes into account observable institutional characteristics
that have an influence on local credit access, as discussed in Section 4.2.1. We also aim
to capture unobservable institutional characteristics relating to the enforcement of legal
rules by regulatory authorities. To do so we use quantitative information on aggregate
local liquidity credit stocks as a proxy. The resulting index will be the primary variable
of interest in the descriptive and econometric analysis presented in Section 4.3.
More precisely, the qualitative part of the index accounts for institutional charac-
teristics that were found to ease or limit credit access for municipalities. Three of the
included characteristics relate to the existence and design of approval clauses for liquidity
credit ceilings. The fourth takes into account circular decrees or ordinances which expand
local credit access by extending permissible maturities or allowing larger permanent stocks
of liquidity credits, amongst others. Yet, as discussed in Section 4.2.1, the effective degree
of credit rationing does not only depend on the letter of the law, but also on the way in
which regulatory authorities choose to act when it comes to approving credit ceilings or
responding to rule breaches. Circular decrees can shed some light on the practice of regu-
latory authorities, but a lot remains unobservable. In part, such unobservable parameters
may be captured by quantitative information on aggregate local liquidity credit stocks,
which is thus used to complement the qualitative side of the index. By using data on ag-
gregate local liquidity credit stocks, we assess the effective strength and credibility of the
rules. Data on liquidity credits were obtained from North Rhine-Westphalia’s statistical
office. It is a panel dataset covering all German municipalities from 1998 to 2013.15
15The percentiles employed in the construction of the credit access index are calculated using the full,
unbalanced panel of all municipalities.
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Index scores are assigned as follows. We begin by considering the qualitative infor-
mation gathered in Section 4.2.1. We translate it into index points running from zero to
three:
• 0 points if the local government law contains an unconditional approval clause or an
upper limit for liquidity credit ceilings,
• + 1 point if the local government law contains a conditional approval clause for
liquidity credit ceilings,
• + 2 points if the local government law contains no approval clause for liquidity credit
ceilings.
• + up to 1 point if circular decrees are in force which expand credit access beyond
what is suggested by the letter of the law.
The index scores reflect the central role of approval clauses for liquidity credit ceilings.
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, stricter credit rationing can be assumed when approval
clauses exist. Unconditional approval clauses or an upper limit for liquidity credit ceilings
represent the strictest institutional choice. The assignment of index scores for circular
decrees is less clear-cut. Whether 0, .5 or 1 point was given depends on the exact wording
of circular decrees and the amount of leeway given to municipalities. The case of North
Rhine-Westphalia may serve as an example. The first known directive dates from 2003.
It specified reporting requirements for municipalities with approved budget consolidation
plans. Additional reporting was not considered to ease credit access. Hence, 0 points were
given for circular decrees for North Rhine-Westphalia’s 2003 index. In 2004, a directive
stated for the first time that municipalities may have permanent stocks of liquidity credits,
up to a ceiling. This shift in the administration’s treatment of liquidity credits is worth
.5 index points. Yet another level of credit access was reached in 2006: A circular decree
allowed liquidity credit maturities of up to 5 years, which clearly contradicts the initial
purpose of liquidity credits as temporary income fillers. Hence, 1 point is given from 2006
onwards. All considered circular decrees and index points are documented in the appendix.
Quantitative information on yearly liquidity credit stocks in all municipalities of a
state is used as a proxy for severity of enforcement with corresponding index points from
zero to three:
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• + 0 points if the aggregate stock of municipal liquidity credits per person is below
the 15th percentile (14.8 euros per person) of all territorial states,
• + 1 point if the aggregate stock of municipal liquidity credits per person is above the
15th percentile and below the 85th percentile (544 euros per person) of all territorial
states,
• + 2 points if the aggregate stock of municipal liquidity credits per person is above
the 85th percentile of all territorial states,
• + 1 point if more than one third of municipalities in the respective federal state have
a liquidity credit stock of more than 544 euros per person.
Rules relating to the existence and approval of budget consolidation plans do not flow
into the index as their impact on credit access is ambiguous (see Section 4.2.1). It would
be desirable to also include a criterion relating to the percentage of municipalities with
liquidity credit stocks of more than a certain percentage of their annual administrative
revenues. However, we refrained from doing so due to data availability issues (see Section
4.3.2).
The index suffers from some caveats. In particular, some of the points can be assigned
objectively, while others require the authors’ individual assessment and interpretation.16
The latter is particularly true for the translation of circular decrees into index scores.
Moreover, the thresholds involved in the construction of the quantitative part of the index
are somewhat arbitrary, as is the weighting of the criteria. However, these caveats are
common when it comes to index constructions, see, e.g., Ciagala and Heinemann (2012).17
According to the above set of rules, the index of local credit access is calculated
for each federal state for each year between 1998 and 2013. It runs from 0 (no credit
access/complete credit rationing) to 6 (complete credit access/no credit rationing). Table
4.2 lists the resulting index values. Table 4.14 in the appendix details the points given for
each characteristic in each year.
16In an effort to improve our judgment, we consulted with a number of experts on local public finance
in Germany to ensure we have a deep understanding of the evolution of local debt rules in Germany.
17There are more advanced index construction procedures such as, for instance, indexes based on the
principal component analysis (see, e.g., International Monetary Fund 2009). However, they are beyond
the scope of this research.
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Württemberg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
Bavaria 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Brandenburg 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Hesse 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3
Lower Saxony 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
North Rhine-
Westphalia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.5 4.5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6
Rhineland-
Palatinate 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
Saarland 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5
Saxony 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Saxony-
Anhalt 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Schleswig-
Holstein 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Thuringia 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Notes: Index based on institutional characteristics that ease or limit credit access for municipalities
and on quantitative information on local liquidity credit stocks, developed by authors. See Table
4.14 in the appendix for more detailed information on the assignment of index scores.
A measure of tax rate volatility. We propose the number of tax rate changes per
municipality within a given time period as a measure of tax rate volatility. The number
of tax rate changes gives equal importance to each tax rate adjustment regardless of its
magnitude or its direction.18 A smaller number of changes would seem more in line with
tax smoothing, ceteris paribus. Steady tax rates reduce the distortionary costs of taxation.
Changes to tax rates not only raise distortionary costs but also induce further costs, e.g.,
18We consider the number of tax rate changes to be the most natural and intuitive translation of the
tax smoothing ideal to the available data. Alternative measures of tax rate volatility that would have
reflected the magnitude of changes, such as the standard deviation of tax rates during the sample period,
were considered in the analysis but did not produce any additional or conflicting insights. It is not clear
whether a small number of tax rate changes or a small standard deviation of tax rates produces a smaller
deadweight loss from taxation. However, transaction costs likely depend more on the number of changes,
and less on their magnitude. For this reason and for the sake of brevity, we limit the presentation to the
number of tax rate changes.
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bargaining costs between the administration and the public (inhabitants and firms). Over
the business cycle, automatic stabilizers should be left to work without any intervention
in tax rates.19
The number of tax rate changes will be used in the descriptive analysis in Section
4.3.1 (Step 2 and 3) and as the dependent variable in the empirical model presented in
Section 4.3.2. We calculate the number of tax rate changes for the business and the
property tax, respectively. In addition, the sum of changes for both taxes is considered to
obtain a complete picture of local tax policy. For this purpose, we built a panel dataset
covering all German municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013. Data on local tax rates at
the municipal level from 2009 to 2013 are made available online by the Regional Database
Germany (Regionaldatenbank Deutschland). Tax rates from 2001 to 2008 were obtained
from the Statistics Local publications (Statistik Lokal). Data on all years before 2001 were
requested directly from the respective statistical office of the federal state in question. Most
analyses that follow were carried out for the balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for
which we have information on the business and property tax rates as well as on liquidity
credits in all 16 years.20
4.3 Analyzing tax smoothing at the local level
It is plausible to assume that local governments that enjoy credit access find it easier
to smooth taxes over time. They can afford to refrain from adjusting tax rates over
the business cycle to ensure stable tax revenues. Allowing automatic stabilizers to work
can easily cause deficits during economic downturns. The optimal response to adverse
temporary economic shocks may also be to run a budget deficit rather than exacerbate
economic costs through tax rate increases. Thus, we should see more stable tax rates
19Apart from this cyclical component, which is the focus of this paper, tax smoothing also has a
structural, long term component. It demands that all available information on long-term future spending
needs should be used to devise an optimal tax rate today that takes into account future developments,
allowing for a steady tax rate and a smaller adjustment than if adjustment were delayed. Nevertheless,
the number of changes necessary to deal with new information on spending needs should be kept to a
minimum, too.
20The total number of municipalities in the balanced panel dataset is smaller than the actual total
number of municipalities in some states where not all municipalities exist in all 16 years due to territorial
reforms. This is particularly true for Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt. The balanced panel dataset is the
data basis for Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 as well as Table 4.11 in the appendix. It is furthermore employed
to calculate the average number of tax rate changes by state presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 and in the
econometric analysis. For more information on data see Section 4.3.2.
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in federal states where municipalities can make use of liquidity credits to finance current
deficits. In other words, there should be a positive link between credit access and tax
smoothing, as credit access may contribute to smoother tax rates. In the following, we
refute such a positive association for the case of German municipalities, based on four
steps of empirical, i.e. descriptive and econometric, analysis. The first three descriptive
steps are presented in Section 4.3.1. Section 4.3.2 is devoted to the final, econometric step.
4.3.1 Descriptive analysis
We start our descriptive analysis by first taking a closer look at the actual development of
liquidity credits (Step 1). Next, we study tax rate volatility (Step 2), before linking tax
rate volatility and credit access (Step 3).
Step 1: The development of liquidity credits is not cyclical
If liquidity credits were used as a tax smoothing tool, the stock of liquidity credits should
behave cyclically. However, this is not the case empirically. Figure 4.1 pinpoints that easier
credit access coincided with dramatic increases in local per capita short-term liquidity
credits in some federal states (Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and
Saarland) over the past decades. Levels of local per capita short-term liquidity credits
do not behave cyclically – at least at the aggregate level. Instead of showing alternating
increases and reductions, they exhibit a steady rise with varying slopes over time. This
suggests a misuse of liquidity credits to cover rising spending needs. It is a valid argument
that this behavior does not rule out the simultaneous use of liquidity credits for tax
smoothing. However, as the results of the next steps show, tax rates tend to be rather
stable overall. In particular, municipalities in federal states affected by high local liquidity
credit burdens tend to enact more tax rate changes. Thus, the evolution of liquidity credits
suggests that credit access is not (mainly) used for tax smoothing purposes.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of short-term liquidity credits (in euro p.c.), 1991-2013
Source: Own compilation with data retrieved from Fachserie 14 Reihe 5 (2013) by the Federal
Statistical Office. Data cover the entire municipal level (municipalities, municipal associations and
counties).
Step 2: Tax rate changes are rare overall
If local credit access facilitated tax smoothing at the local level, tax rate changes should
be particularly rare in federal states where municipalities have ample access to credit.
However, local tax rates are remarkably stable across Germany, regardless of local credit
access. Table 4.3 provides information on the proportion of municipalities with property
and business tax rate changes within the reference period 1998 to 2013 by federal state.
Table 4.11 in the appendix gives the equivalent information in terms of absolute
numbers of municipalities.21 From the tables, it is clear that tax rate changes are overall
rather rare. In case of property taxes, the majority of municipalities changed their tax
rate two to four times within our 16-year horizon. Less than 5% enacted five or more
changes, with a maximum of eleven changes. Roughly a quarter changed their tax rate
21The total number of municipalities indicated in the Table 4.11 is smaller than the actual total number
of municipalities in some states where not all municipalities exist in all 16 years due to territorial reforms.
This is particularly true for Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt, see Footnote 20.
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Table 4.3: Proportion of municipalities with tax rate changes, 1998-2013



























































Baden-Württemberg 10.3 34.7 51.1 3.9 21 54.1 24.4 .5
Bavaria 41.1 37.5 21.1 .3 48.4 33.6 17.7 .2
Brandenburg 20.7 44.8 31 3.4 53.4 31 15.5 0
Hesse 6.7 22.1 63.7 7.6 16.2 35.2 47.5 1.2
Lower Saxony 4 23.8 67.2 5.1 6.2 27.3 61.5 5
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 22.3 41.1 35.9 .7 34.1 38 25.6 2.3
North Rhine-Westphalia 0 4.5 74.7 20.7 1 13.9 78.8 6.3
Rhineland-Palatinate 2.3 10.1 83.9 3.6 13.8 43.1 42.6 .4
Saarland 9.8 43.1 41.2 5.9 2 5.9 80.4 11.8
Saxony 4.8 19 63.8 12.4 19.3 30 46.9 3.8
Saxony-Anhalt 10.6 12.4 51.6 25.5 16.1 13 42.9 28
Schleswig-Holstein 11.8 24.8 53.5 10 14.1 35.8 47.4 2.7
Thuringia 8.9 57.3 33 .8 7.1 57.6 34.5 .8
Total 14.2 27.3 53.6 4.9 21.4 38.3 38.2 2.1
Notes: Proportion of municipalities with tax rate changes calculated for the balanced panel of 10,160
municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Regional Database Germany, Statistics Local and
state statistical offices.
only once, while 14.2% left their tax rate completely unchanged. Two to four is also the
most frequent number of changes in most of the federal states. Only in Brandenburg,
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saarland and Thuringia, the majority of municipalities had
only one tax rate change, but not by a big margin. Bavaria stands out in that a majority
of its municipalities enacted no property tax rate change during the reference period.
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Business tax rates show similar patterns, but with even more overall tax rate stability.
Roughly a fifth of municipalities did not change their business tax rate at all from 1998
to 2013. One change or two to four changes were each carried out by about 38% of
municipalities. Only 2% changed their business tax rate five to eleven times. It is also
worth noting that changes in both property and business tax rates are most often in the
direction of higher tax rates. 96% of property tax rate changes and 93% of business tax
rate changes were increases. This might be a reflection of increased spending pressure
at the local level in recent years. The pattern suggests that German municipalities in
general aim to smooth taxes (i.e. keep them stable) – cyclical tax policy would involve
tax reductions as well as tax hikes.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 complement the above information by looking at the timing of
tax rate changes. The tables present the share of municipalities in each federal state that
changed their tax rate in a given year compared to the previous year’s tax rate.
In Bavaria and Brandenburg, the share of municipalities with either property or
business tax rate changes never exceeds 20%.22 In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony,
this is true for business tax rates only. In all other states, there is at least one year and up
to seven years of high tax rate volatility where more than 20% of all municipalities enacted
tax rate changes.23 Often, such years coincide for property and business tax rates, although
business tax rates again show less overall volatility. However, years of high volatility do
not necessarily coincide between states. This suggests that municipalities adjust their tax
rates mostly in response to state-specific shocks. Such shocks could consist of changes
in expenditure requirements when states devolve parts of their tasks to the local level
or modify standards relating to the execution of local tasks. Changes in municipal fiscal
equalization schemes are also possible triggers of tax rate changes (see Chapter 2). Changes
in the degree of credit access granted by states could also constitute a shock to which local
governments react. The tables also point to higher overall volatility of tax rates in recent
years, starting in 2010, with many federal states experiencing high volatility years at the
same time. The rise in tax rate volatility towards the end of our time horizon is a further
indication that credit access does not seem to contribute to smoother tax rates, given that
credit access has generally increased and not decreased over the last two decades.
22Information on Brandenburg needs to be treated with caution given the high number of missing
municipalities due to territorial reforms, see above.
23The share of municipalities with tax rate changes can go up to more than 50, 70 or even 90%.
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Table 4.4: Proportion of municipalities with property tax rate change from































































































1999 6.9 4.2 8.5 11.4 12.4 1.4 9.6 4.5 5.9 24.5 9.2 7.9 2.6 6.6
2000 4.0 3.7 6.8 10.2 17.0 2.7 10.6 45.5 5.9 26.9 14.1 7.0 1.6 15.9
2001 6.5 3.7 3.4 3.1 10.9 2.4 14.9 23.6 2.0 22.8 8.6 27.8 4.0 12.7
2002 6.8 4.2 16.9 14.0 20.7 2.9 18.2 9.4 7.8 19.0 12.3 13.8 2.9 9.7
2003 15.2 12.7 10.2 9.0 22.6 2.4 77.5 6.6 19.6 22.1 19.0 11.1 3.2 13.8
2004 28.3 13.7 15.3 17.8 22.4 2.9 8.3 4.2 2.0 26.6 21.5 19.1 1.6 13.3
2005 34.4 8.5 11.9 17.1 19.8 8.9 15.9 16.0 13.7 19.7 20.2 10.2 5.9 15.1
2006 17.6 5.0 15.3 6.9 8.5 10.3 14.6 9.1 9.8 12.8 17.8 17.8 3.0 10.0
2007 6.1 3.5 3.4 10.2 8.7 11.5 8.1 2.0 5.9 11.7 14.1 6.7 3.2 5.5
2008 4.6 2.6 3.4 7.8 7.6 8.4 6.3 1.7 5.9 6.9 14.7 6.5 2.2 4.5
2009 2.8 2.6 6.8 5.9 10.0 5.0 4.8 1.5 3.9 9.0 33.1 10.0 2.2 4.9
2010 18.6 7.0 8.5 18.1 19.8 20.4 18.9 2.0 11.8 19.3 57.1 20.7 5.2 12.5
2011 20.5 7.7 13.6 22.1 11.4 19.2 49.0 76.5 17.6 13.1 38.0 30.8 60.1 35.0
2012 9.3 5.3 10.2 33.5 17.8 13.4 41.9 36.0 33.3 19.3 26.4 13.5 23.8 20.1
2013 5.1 3.9 11.9 50.4 22.6 20.2 40.7 14.6 33.3 13.4 27.0 19.1 15.6 15.8
Total 11.7 5.5 9.1 14.8 14.5 8.3 21.2 15.8 11.2 16.7 20.8 13.9 8.6 12.2
Notes: Proportion of municipalities with property tax rate change from previous year to current year
calculated for the balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Regional Database Germany, Statistics Local and
state statistical offices.
Figure 4.2 shows the patterns of property and business tax rate levels that result
from the observed tax rate adjustments. For each state, the figure displays the weighted
average of tax rates of all municipalities in the respective state over the period 1998 to
2013. The small number of changes is reflected in slowly-moving average tax rates in most
Chapter 4 Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 106
Table 4.5: Proportion of municipalities with business tax rate change from































































































1999 3.5 2.9 6.8 6.4 8.3 3.1 7.3 3.7 2.0 19.7 9.8 4.1 4.1 4.8
2000 2.1 2.4 3.4 9.7 13.0 4.3 8.1 21.0 2.0 19.7 11.7 4.5 2.7 9.1
2001 5.0 4.9 5.1 2.9 13.0 3.1 11.6 23.6 98.0 16.6 8.6 27.8 4.9 13.2
2002 3.0 3.3 1.7 7.6 21.4 3.3 12.6 10.3 0.0 9.7 10.4 14.9 3.3 8.6
2003 4.0 6.5 3.4 4.5 20.4 2.9 64.6 7.1 2.0 12.1 12.9 9.6 3.0 9.9
2004 8.7 8.2 0.0 9.0 17.5 5.1 7.1 4.9 2.0 14.8 16.6 15.7 2.7 8.8
2005 24.1 5.4 5.1 9.0 15.3 6.7 12.1 14.5 82.4 7.2 16.0 7.6 5.2 11.6
2006 19.4 3.7 10.2 4.5 7.5 7.2 10.1 6.1 7.8 6.2 14.1 16.3 3.3 8.3
2007 5.3 2.6 3.4 5.9 6.2 8.9 6.1 2.1 11.8 8.6 14.1 5.4 2.7 4.4
2008 3.1 4.5 1.7 5.2 7.7 4.8 6.1 1.7 5.9 5.2 10.4 4.8 3.3 4.2
2009 2.3 4.2 3.4 6.4 11.3 3.4 4.5 1.1 5.9 6.6 23.9 8.1 2.4 4.7
2010 7.4 7.9 5.1 11.4 19.3 14.8 10.6 1.8 13.7 13.4 49.1 16.0 6.1 9.7
2011 12.9 8.3 10.2 16.4 13.0 16.6 38.6 20.7 13.7 13.1 42.9 16.2 60.6 19.7
2012 6.3 5.8 1.7 21.1 18.1 12.7 31.8 15.0 37.3 13.1 42.3 9.3 24.4 13.9
2013 4.4 4.5 10.2 38.5 20.2 17.8 30.6 10.0 19.6 11.0 35.6 12.5 15.1 12.8
Total 7.0 4.7 4.4 9.9 13.3 7.2 16.4 9.0 19.0 11.1 19.9 10.8 9.0 9.0
Notes: Proportion of municipalities with business tax rate change from previous year to current year
calculated for the balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Regional Database Germany, Statistics Local and
state statistical offices.
states. An upward trend is discernible in most states concerning both taxes, which is
in general more pronounced for the property tax. North Rhine-Westphalia and Saxony
have seen particularly strong increases in their average property tax rate level. It is worth
noting that North Rhine-Westphalia has seen dramatic increases of municipal liquidity
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credits over the same time period, while Saxony’s liquidity credit stocks have remained
low. Rising local spending pressures across Germany could explain the generalized upward
trend in local tax rates.
In sum, local tax rates are relatively stable across Germany, with little variation
across states. They have followed a slow upward trend in recent decades, without any
visible cyclicality. Whether the federal state in question has seen simultaneous increases
in local credit access or built-ups in effective municipal liquidity credit stocks has no
apparent effect on tax rate volatility.
Figure 4.2: Development of business and property tax rate (in %), 1998-2013
Notes: Data represent the weighted average for all municipalities.
Source: Own compilation based on datafrom the Regional Database Germany.
Step 3: Positive relationship between credit access and tax rate volatility
If local credit access contributed to tax smoothing, this positive association should be
visible in a joint analysis of the data. In the third step of our line of argument, we
approach such a possible relationship between credit access and tax rate volatility through
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a graphical analysis. Figure 4.3 plots the relationship between credit access and property
and business tax rate changes. The y-axis represents the average number of tax rate
changes in the municipalities in the state in question from 1998 to 2013. The scattered
triangles and crosses refer to the property and business tax, respectively. The x-axis shows
the average credit access index for each federal state. This corresponds to the average of
the index developed in Section 4.2.2 over the 16 years from 1998 to 2013.
Figure 4.3: Average credit access and tax rate changes (I)
Notes: Cross section aggregated at the state level derived from balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities
for the period 1998 to 2013. Average number of tax rate changes (differentiated by business and
property tax) in the municipalities for each federal state (y-axis). Average credit access index for
each federal state (x-axis). Lines represent the linear fit predicting the average number of tax rate
changes from the average credit access index.
Source: Credit access index developed by authors. Average number of tax rate changes is calculated
from data provided by the Regional Database Germany, Statistics Local and state statistical offices.
No clear relationship emerges from Figure 4.3. If anything, a positive association
between credit access and tax rate volatility seems discernible, with Bavaria and North
Rhine-Westphalia marking the two ends of the spectrum from low credit access and few
tax rate changes to high credit access and many tax rate changes. A possible positive
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relationship is supported by the linear fit predicting the average number of (property and
business) tax rates changes from the the average credit access index (the dotted and the
dashed line refer to the property and business tax, respectively). Both lines ascend slightly
and run almost in parallel. A positive link between credit access and tax rate changes
would contradict the rationale of the tax smoothing hypothesis, whereby access to credit
financing should allow municipalities to smooth their taxes and thus limit the number of
tax rate changes.
Figure 4.4: Average credit access and tax rate changes (II)
Notes: Cross section aggregated at the state level derived from balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities
for the period 1998 to 2013. Average number of tax rate changes in the municipalities for each federal
state (y-axis). Average credit access index for each federal state (x-axis). The dotted line represents
the linear fit predicting the average number of tax rate changes from the average credit access index.
Source: Credit access index developed by authors. Average number of tax rate changes is calculated
from data provided by the Regional Database Germany, Statistics Local and state statistical offices.
Figure 4.4 again investigates a possible relationship between credit access and the
frequency of tax rate changes, this time considering the state average of the sum of changes
in the business and property tax in the state’s municipalities. Jointly considering both
taxes allows for a more complete picture of the volatility of local tax rate policy. Empiri-
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cally, a small number of property tax changes generally coincides with a small number of
business tax changes and vice versa. As a result, the fitted line in Figure 4.4 has a positive
and steeper slope than the fitted lines in Figure 4.3.
How can one explain that greater credit access does not seem to lead to less tax rate
volatility, as evidenced by the preliminary graphical analysis? One potential explanation
lies in the fact that we may have overlooked an important intervening variable so far: Local
spending pressure. As alluded to in the preceding section, municipalities in Germany have
in general witnessed an expansion of their spending responsibilities in recent years. In
light of Germany’s federal institutional design this was a structural, mainly exogenous
phenomenon from the local perspective. A further important characteristic is that local
spending pressure varies across federal states.24 Consequently, the positive link between
tax rate changes and the credit access index might be explained by spending pressure.
The results of this graphical analysis need to be interpreted with great caution.
The plots show a supposed unconditional relationship, i.e. not controlling for potentially
important covariates (e.g., spending pressure). Moreover, the information available in our
dataset has been condensed to an exceptionally high level of aggregation to produce the
above graphs. Behind the 13 data points depicted here for each state lie more than 10,000
individual municipalities over 16 years. Thus, the preliminary conclusions drawn from the
graphical analysis should be verified by an econometric analysis at the municipal level that
makes the most of the available data potential and takes spending pressure into account.
This is what we do next (Step 4).
4.3.2 Econometric analysis
This section is devoted to our fourth and last analytical step. We first provide information
on our data sources and descriptive statistics, before presenting the econometric analysis.
24Higher spending needs have arisen in particular in the area of social welfare, which is to a large degree a
local task although standards are prescribed by federal law. The exact extent of municipal responsibilities
depends on state law, as the states can choose to carry out (social and other) tasks themselves or to
devolve them to the local level. The extent to which spending is decentralized and the extent to which
potential spending increases are offset by increased state transfer allocations differ between federal states.
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Step 4: Positive relationship between credit access and tax rate volatility not
rejected
Data. The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset with yearly administrative data
on all German municipalities from 1998 to 2013. Data were retrieved from different sources,
depending on the variable and the time horizon in question. Data on liquidity credits,
which are part of the construction of the credit access index, were provided by North Rhine-
Westphalia’s statistical office. The indicator funding need growth (see below) was calcu-
lated by the authors and is only available between 1998 and 2006. Its components were
obtained directly from the municipal financial statement statistic (Jahresrechnungsstatis-
tik der Gemeinden/Gemeindeverbände), which is compiled by the Research Data Centres
of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder (Forschungsdaten-
zentren der Statistischen Ämter des Bundes und der Länder [FDZ]). Data on employees
are provided by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). All other
municipal-level variables, including local business and property tax rates, were obtained
from a combination of sources. Municipal-level data from 2009 to 2013 are available on-
line through the Regional Database Germany (Regionaldatenbank Deutschland). Data for
the years from 2001 to 2008 came from the Statistics Local publications (Statistik Lokal).
Data on all previous years were requested separately from each of the 13 state statistical
offices.25 Some control variables such as the gross domestic product (GDP) and income of
private households are only available at the county level. All such variables are provided
online by the Regional Database Germany for the full period of interest.
Our baseline sample covers all municipalities for which we have information on busi-
ness and property tax rates as well as liquidity credits. This original dataset is an unbal-
anced panel containing 198,113 observations. The unbalanced nature of the panel is due
above all to territorial reforms that took place in the New Länder and greatly reduced
the number of municipalities. Hence, the number of observations in the original sample
shrinks from 14,102 observations in 1998 to 11,112 observations in 2013. Table 4.12 in
the appendix reports for each state the share of municipalities for which we have one, two
etc. years of observations. All Bavarian and North Rhine-Westphalian municipalities are
represented in the dataset in all 16 years. For the remaining states, the share of munici-
palities that exist during the full time period varies from 9.1% in Brandenburg to 99.8% in
25Not all statistical offices were able to provide information on municipal-level data for the requested
time period on the basis of the territorial status of that time.
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Rhineland-Palatinate. In order to avoid biases caused by municipalities that only existed
in a fraction of years, the remaining analysis is limited to the balanced panel of 10,160
municipalities with 16 years of observations.26
Employing the balanced rather than the unbalanced panel dataset is more appro-
priate for our analysis, but it might raise selection concerns.27 We handle this issue by
providing detailed information on the nature of the problem (see discussion for Table 4.12
and 4.13). We also present our results by state while carefully pointing out the related
problems (see, e.g., Footnote 22). Table 4.13 in the appendix lists the number of mu-
nicipalities contained in the balanced panel by state. While Saarland and Brandenburg
are represented with less than 60 municipalities, Rhineland-Palatinate and Bavaria each
contribute more than 2,000 observations to the sample. Such differences are partly due to
the aforementioned territorial reforms, which cause incomplete samples for some states.
However, they also arise because of differing institutional landscapes with major differ-
ences in city size and number. The two states with full samples are cases in point: The
most populous federal state North Rhine-Westphalia is divided into only 396 municipali-
ties while Bavaria, the state with the biggest surface area, is extremely fragmented with
2,056 municipalities. We discussed the use of weights to account for such differences in
the econometric analysis, but decided to employ state dummies instead.
Dependent variable and main independent variables of interest. The de-
pendent variables in our econometric model are the number of business tax and property
tax rate changes of each municipality over our 16-year horizon. We consider both of them
separately as well as their sum. Our research interest – the impact of credit access on tax
rate volatility – demands some degree of data aggregation to derive meaningful volatility
measures. It only makes sense to analyze the number of tax rate changes within a suffi-
ciently long time frame. That is why we aggregate our dataset for our main analysis into a
cross section without a time dimension. Our independent variable of interest is the credit
access index, which is outlined in detail in Section 4.2.2. Following our train of thought
26To adjust for the territorial reforms by setting the current territorial status as, for example, done by
Fuest et al. (2016) is not an option. This requires data harmonization by, e.g., demeaning and would lead
to artificial variation in our variable of interest (tax rates). To maximize the number of municipalities
in the balanced panel, we corrected the identifiers of municipalities that were affected by county-level
territorial reforms. In such cases, the identity or size of the county a municipality belongs to is changed
without changing the municipality itself.
27Whether a municipality is affected by a territorial reform mainly depends on population size besides
geographical and administrative characteristics.
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on spending pressure (outlined in the previous section), another important independent
variable is funding need growth (in %). We define local funding need as the difference
between total municipal current outlays and non-autonomous municipal current revenue.
Funding need growth is defined as the percentage increase of funding need between 1998
and 2006. This is used as a proxy for funding need growth from 1998 to 2013, as necessary
information on local revenue is not available beyond 2006.28 The variable is meant to
capture long-term, permanent increases in expenditures that need to be financed by local
own revenue. We hypothesize that funding need growth may have contributed to rising
tax rates across Germany during our sample period. When faced with permanent, greater
spending responsibilities, raising taxes (as opposed to taking out liquidity credits) is the
right course of action from a welfare perspective.29 Our dependent variable, the number of
tax rate changes, may contain both cyclical tax rate adjustments and upward-trending tax
rate adjustments. By partialling out the effect of funding need growth on the number of
tax rate changes, we hope to explain the latter.30 Cyclical tax rate adjustments are then
left to be explained. Cyclical tax rate adjustments that are meant to smooth revenues
over the business cycle could be avoided through the use of liquidity credits, which would
enhance social welfare. If municipalities use liquidity credits in this way in practice, the
regression would show a negative correlation between credit access and tax rate volatility.
28Non-autonomous revenues are transfers from the state level in the form of shared taxes, conditional
and unconditional transfers (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of non-autonomous revenues). Thus,
local funding need measures local expenditures that need to be financed out of municipal own revenue, in
particular business and property taxes. We excluded 121 observations that were outliers with respect to
funding need growth.
29In contrast, perfect tax smoothing demands that fiscal policy does not adjust to cyclical spending
increases.
30Other control variables also help to explain upward-trending tax rate adjustments, but funding need
growth is the most important control variable in this respect. We cannot distinguish between cyclical
tax rate fluctuations and upward trends in tax rates in our dependent variable, the number of tax rate
changes. Accounting for funding need growth in the regressions allows us to circumvent this problem.
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Table 4.6: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Number of changes PT rate 1.956 1.414 0 11 10160
Number of changes BT rate 1.441 1.215 0 11 10160
Number of changes 3.397 2.365 0 21 10160
Index 2.277 1.139 0.875 4.375 10160
Funding need growth 42.562 118.138 -984.519 999.782 10160
Mun. assoc. status 0.468 0.499 0 1 10160
Population 6895.983 28791.314 6.25 1287749.375 10160
Employees 0.187 0.175 0 7.697 10031
Priv. income 17308.891 1890.876 13055.429 28235.133 10160
GDP 21587.731 6345.324 6119.703 79894.067 10160
Left majority 0.307 0.361 0 1 10160
Notes: Cross section derived from balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for the period 1998 to
2013. All variables except numbers of changes and funding need growth correspond to the mean
over the 16-year horizon. Funding need growth (in %) is defined as the growth in funding need
between 1998 and 2006. Number of changes, funding need growth (in %), municipal association
status, population, employees (p.c.) are municipal-level variables; GDP, private income (both in
euro p.c.) and left majority at state elections are county-level variables; the index of credit access is
a state-level variable.
Source: Own calculations based on data provided by the FDZ, the Regional Database Germany, the
Federal Employment Agency, Statistics Local and state statistical offices.
Descriptive statistics. Table 4.6 shows summary statistics for the aggregated
dataset derived from the balanced panel. The table first lists the three dependent vari-
ables tested in the regression analysis: The number of property tax (short: PT) changes,
the number of business tax (short: BT) changes and the sum of changes of both taxes,
each calculated over the full 16-year horizon. Next is our main independent variable of
interest: The credit access index. The rest of the table shows the most important control
variables: Funding need growth (in %), the dummy for municipal association status, pop-
ulation, number of employees at place of employment (per capita (p.c.)), income of private
households, GDP (both in euro p.c.) and left majority at state parliamentary elections,
respectively. Municipal association status is coded as 1 if the municipality belongs to a
municipal association (Amtsgemeinde, Samtgemeinde or Verbandsgemeinde) and 0 other-
wise. Municipal associations exist in seven out of the 13 territorial states. All independent
variables correspond to the municipality-specific average of the underlying variable over
the 16 years of the reference period.
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Tables 4.15 and 4.16 in the appendix provide summary statistics for the same vari-
ables by state. All variables except for the number of employees are available for all 10,160
municipalities.
Econometric model. To estimate the effect of credit access on tax rate volatility,
we use the following model:
Ci,t = αIs + βXi + δYc + λs + εi (4.1)
where Ci,t is the number of tax rate changes in municipality i between 1998 and
2013. The index t denotes the tax type (business, property or both).
Our independent variable of interest is local credit access, which is measured by the
mean of the credit access index by federal state across time (IS). We aggregate our dataset
into a cross section in order to create the best possible volatility measures based on tax
rates during the full time period. The obvious drawback is that we have to work in a cross
section environment with significantly less observations.
We add a number of controls to account for further confounding factors: Xi and Yc
represent vectors of municipal-level controls (funding need growth (in %), population, gross
outlays (in euro p.c.), employees at place of employment, employees at place of residence,
in-commuters (all three p.c.), gross revenue excluding business and property taxes, revenue
from shared taxes (both in euro p.c.) and municipal association status) and county-level
controls (GDP and income of private households (both in euro p.c.), left majority at state
parliamentary elections), respectively. We calculated the mean and the standard deviation
of all potential controls and tested them in the regressions. Furthermore, we included state
dummies λs. The error term εi is clustered at county level.
Discussion of identification. The main concern with identification lies in the
fact that our analysis is limited to a simple cross section due to the aggregation involved
in investigating volatility over a sufficiently long time period. Aggregation over the full
time horizon greatly reduces the number of observations from 162,560 to 10,160.31 Since
municipal fixed effects cannot be employed, it is essential to account for other covariates
31As an alternative to full aggregation, one might consider splitting the reference period into sub-periods,
thus maintaining a panel data structure. However, data availability limits our reference period to the 16
years between 1998 and 2013. 16 years is a sufficiently long time frame to derive volatility measures, but
eight or even four years is not enough in practice. Given the low incidence of changes in tax rates and
credit access, further limiting the time frame means there is not sufficient variation in the data to identify
the effect of our key variable.
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that are potentially related to the volatility of local tax rates, including time-constant
information.
A priori, controlling for population and budgetary variables seems particularly im-
portant. The capacity of municipalities to adjust their tax rates to external requirements
may depend on the size of their population. Fluctuations in population, captured by its
standard deviation over the covered time period, may also influence tax rate volatility. In
addition, gross outlays per capita are expected to have a significant impact. Due to an
array of tasks mandated by the federal level, municipalities in Germany have only limited
autonomy of decision over their spending. Rising spending pressures might cause frequent
(upward) adjustments in tax rates, which is why we consider funding need growth to be
an important control variable. The concept of funding need growth captures the possi-
bility that states may offset increased local spending responsibilities by allocating more
transfers to municipalities. As defined here, funding need growth will only occur where
spending rises without compensating transfers. Local revenue sources aside from business
and property taxes may also be crucial in the decision to alter tax rates, for instance in
hope of filling rising revenue gaps. Economic strength may also be an important inter-
vening factor. Municipalities that are well-off economically may face less financial distress
and may be in a position where raising tax rates is not necessary. Variables such as GDP
and income of private households, as well as the number of employees and in-commuters,
are meant to capture the economic position. Finally, past research found that the ideo-
logical identity of the government (left- or right-wing) may influence fiscal policy. This is
proxied by an indicator variable for a left majority at the most recent state parliamentary
elections.
The volatility of local tax rates may also differ systematically depending on the in-
stitutional characteristics of the municipalities. Some cities, particularly big ones, enjoy
county status and have additional responsibilities compared with municipalities belonging
to a county. Within the group of county-affiliated municipalities, one can further dif-
ferentiate between municipalities grouped within a municipal association (Amtsgemeinde,
Samtgemeinde or Verbandsgemeinde) and non-associated municipalities, with the latter
facing more responsibilities than the former. All cities with county status are also non-
associated. The regression controls for these administrative differences.
Results. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the regression results from the regression model
in Equation 4.1. Columns I to III present the results from a regression of the number of
property tax changes while Columns IV to VI show the results for the number of business
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tax changes (both in Table 4.7). To give a complete picture Columns VII to IX in Table
4.8 pinpoint the results for the sum of tax rate changes of both taxes (note the coefficients
of Table 4.7 sum up to the respective ones of Table 4.8, e.g., 0.47891 (I ) + 0.47217 (IV )
= 0.95108 (VII )).
Table 4.7: Regression results with number of property and business tax rate
changes as dependent variable
Property tax Business tax
I II III IV V VI
Index 0.47891***0.47810***0.44103*** 0.47217***0.47108***0.49288***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.053) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032)
Funding need growth 0.00024* 0.00020 0.00032** 0.00028**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)










Left majority 0.11729 -0.20938
(0.176) (0.158)
Constant 1.29872***1.29070*** 0.81940 0.55293***0.54209*** 0.57354
(0.147) (0.148) (0.501) (0.062) (0.062) (0.385)
Observations 10160 10160 10031 10160 10160 10031
Adjusted R2 .254785 .2550867 .2638504 .1952969 .196146 .2045603
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Estimation based on Equation 5.1. Cross section derived from balanced panel of 10,160
municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013. Dependent variable: Number of property (I to III ) and
business (IV to VI ) tax rate changes (municipal level). All independent variables (except for funding
need growth) are averaged over time. Independent variable of interest: Index of credit access (state
level). All specifications control for state dummies. Specification II and V additionally control for
funding need growth (in %). Specification III and VI add municipal association status, population,
employees (p.c.) (municipal level) and private income, GDP (both in euro p.c.) and left majority at
state elections (county level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance
levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
The first column for each tax (Regressions I, IV and V II) presents baseline results
of a regression of tax rate changes on credit access without any control variables aside
from state dummy variables. In each case, the credit access index is strongly significant
with an estimated coefficient of about .48 and .47 for the property and the business
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tax, respectively, and .95 for both taxes. These results are in line with the graphical
analysis presented in the previous section. Regressions II, V and V III introduce the
most important control variable: Funding need growth (in %).32
Credit access is still estimated to have a positive, significant impact on the number
of tax rate changes, with the coefficients still ranging between .48 and .47 for the property
and the business tax, respectively, and .95 for both taxes. Hence, introducing funding
need growth only has a marginal negative effect (and does not lead to a sign reversal).
The coefficient for funding need growth is statistically significant and positive, but so close
to zero that an economic significance is questionable. The last column (Regressions III,
V I and IX) adds a dummy for the municipal association status, population, the number
of employees at place of employment (p.c.), income of private households and GDP (both
in euro p.c.) and a dummy for a left majority at the most recent state elections. Of these,
only the municipal association status is significant. The introduction of the controls does
not significantly alter the results. Compared to the previous regressions, the estimated
coefficient of credit access dropped slightly to .44 for the property tax and to .93 for both
taxes, but it slightly increased to .49 for the business tax. These results seem to contradict
the existence of cyclical tax smoothing at the local level in Germany.33
However, there are a number of caveats. First, as evidenced by a low AdjustedR2
between .20 and .26, the regressions leave the bulk of tax rate volatility unexplained. This
is despite a high number of observations. Secondly, the applied method of ordinary least
squares estimation in a cross section is particularly vulnerable to omitted variables that
might bias estimated coefficients. Thirdly, credit access only varies at the state level,
making reliable identification of its effect more challenging. We are therefore left with
interesting correlations that do not necessarily imply a causal effect. Nonetheless, the
econometric analysis confirms the results of the descriptive analysis: Credit access does
not seem to make a contribution towards smoother tax rates at the local level in Germany.
32Besides funding need growth we tested an array of other variables related to funding need (mean value
of funding need over 1998-2006, funding need in 1998, average annual growth of funding need between
1998 and 2006). None of the specifications altered the coefficient of the credit access index significantly.
33We ran all regressions presented here using the subsample of all non-associated municipalities. Given
the administrative differences between municipalities in Germany, excluding associated municipalities from
the sample is a straightforward robustness check. The remaining municipalities are all non-associated (with
or without county status), making the sample more homogeneous, but also smaller. The results confirm
the existence of a positive link between credit access and tax rate volatility.
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Table 4.8: Regression results with total number of tax rate changes as de-
pendent variable
VII VIII IX
Index 0.95108*** 0.94918*** 0.93391***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.080)
Funding need growth 0.00056*** 0.00048**
(0.000) (0.000)












Constant 1.85165*** 1.83278*** 1.39295
(0.197) (0.198) (0.814)
Observations 10160 10160 10031
Adjusted R2 .2531876 .2538554 .2627839
State dummies yes yes yes
Notes: Estimation based on Equation 5.1. Cross section derived from balanced panel of 10,160
municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013. Dependent variable: Total number of property and
business tax rate changes (municipal level). All independent variables (except for funding need
growth) are averaged over time. Independent variable of interest: Index of credit access (state level).
All specifications control for state dummies. Specification VIII additionally controls for funding
need growth (in %). Specification IX adds municipal association status, population, employees
(p.c.) (municipal level) and private income, GDP (both in euro p.c.) and left majority at state
elections (county level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels:
∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
Discussion of results. Contrary to what one might expect, easy access to credit is
not used by municipalities to limit the frequency of tax rate adjustments. Instead, credit
access and tax rate volatility go hand in hand. Why is that the case?
In Section 4.3.1, we hypothesized that spending pressure may have induced upward
trends in local tax rates, and that this long-term development could be responsible for a
seeming positive connection between credit access and tax rate volatility. We accounted for
permanent fiscal pressure that may lead to financial difficulties by controlling for funding
need growth. We aimed to investigate if, once we filtered out any non-cyclical tax rate
adjustments, we might be able to see a contribution of credit access toward smoother tax
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rates. However, we still cannot reject a positive link between credit access and tax rate
volatility. This may be due to the imperfections of the funding need growth variable.
As explained, the data necessary to calculate funding need is only available up to 2006.
Funding need growth from 1998 to 2006 was therefore used as a proxy for funding need
growth over the full time horizon. Possibly, this proxy does not sufficiently capture local
long-term spending pressure and hence cannot explain long-run movements in local tax
rates.
Alternatively, credit access may be associated with unsustainable fiscal behavior.
Some municipalities bear rising liquidity credit stocks and at the same time continually
raise their tax rates, for instance in North Rhine-Westphalia. Rising liquidity credits and
upward trends in tax rates are both mirrors of financial weakness – municipal revenues
are insufficient to cover rising spending needs.
Such a situation may arise through a combination of unsustainable behavior on the
part of municipalities and the states in which they are located. First, states may themselves
face fiscal distress and provide insufficient funding to municipalities, which then find it
difficult to balance their budgets. If states – knowing that they would have to increase
funding to alleviate local revenue shortages – then turn a blind eye on local deficits, a
vicious circle may be set in motion. Discovering that they enjoy de facto credit access,
municipalities may maintain unsustainable levels of spending, which need to be financed
through higher taxes and liquidity credits. The institutional link between local debt and
tax rates established by budget consolidation plans contributes to this outcome (in states
where such plans are used). Under budget consolidation plans, municipalities may be
forced to raise their tax rates in order to ensure approval by the regulatory authority (see
Section 4.2.1). In response, states may grant even more credit access.
Effective monitoring by state governments of local fiscal positions with the imposition
and enforcement of clear rules is thus decisive in ensuring long-run fiscal sustainability at
the local level. Lack of effective oversight and accommodation in face of rising liquidity
credit stocks may facilitate unsustainable debt build-up at the local level.
It appears that smoothing tax rates (or revenues) over the business cycle is not the
predominant concern for municipalities in Germany. Instead, maintaining a certain level of
spending and generating just enough income is the priority. Municipalities keep tax rates
stable as long as possible. When revenue shortages arise, federal states may ease credit
access in an attempt to compensate for revenue shortfalls and to limit upward pressure
on tax rates. Municipalities make use of liquidity credits to complement tax revenues.
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Ultimately, tax rates are raised, no matter if credit is accessible or not. Local credit
access is not a tax smoothing tool. Instead, it is an indication of insufficient revenue and
insufficient budgetary oversight.
4.4 Conclusion
The theory of tax smoothing suggests that giving governments access to debt financing
could be welfare enhancing, as allowing governments to smooth their taxes over time can
reduce distortionary costs from taxation. While it is clear from a theoretical viewpoint
that tax smoothing is beneficial, it is unknown whether governments with credit access do
in fact engage in tax smoothing. Political decision-makers might not realize the potential
benefits from tax smoothing and instead take advantage of debt to finance unsustainable
levels of current expenditures. The possible relationship between credit access and tax
smoothing is particularly important where lower level governments enjoy tax autonomy.
The standard fiscal federalism literature objects to granting credit access to lower federal
levels. At the same time, credit rationing might inhibit tax smoothing.
This paper uses the unique institutional setting of German fiscal federalism to study
the behavior of municipalities in Germany and to test whether credit access is associated
with lower tax rate volatility. Germany is a promising case to study given that munici-
palities enjoy autonomy over property and business tax rates and differ in the degree of
credit access allowed by the respective federal state. To operationalize local credit access,
the institutional environment and empirical level of local indebtedness in each of the 13
territorial states were examined in detail to derive an index of local credit access. We
propose the number of tax rate changes within a 16-year time frame as a measure of tax
rate volatility. The descriptive and econometric modeling is based on a sample of more
than 10,000 municipalities across Germany.
Employing a line of argument based on four steps of data analysis, we provide evi-
dence against a contribution of credit access to tax smoothing at the local level. We start
by showing that the development of liquidity credit stocks has not been cyclical (Step 1).
In fact, easier credit access coincides with dramatic increases in local per capita short-term
liquidity credits in some federal states. In Step 2 we pinpoint that tax rate changes are
rather rare in all federal states regardless of credit access. We find no cyclical behavior
involving tax reductions and tax hikes. Instead, we find a rise in tax rate volatility towards
Chapter 4 Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 122
the end of our time horizon, despite easing credit access. Next, we show graphically that
there is a possible positive relationship between tax rate volatility and credit access. This
contradicts the notion that credit access might induce less volatile tax rates (Step 3). We
suggest spending pressure as a potential explanation. Last, we employ an econometric ap-
proach in which we account for spending pressure (Step 4). However, the empirical results
also suggest a positive link, which would point to an improper use of local debt. Hence,
we cannot reject the positive relationship between credit access and tax rate volatility.
It therefore appears that whether federal states allow their municipalities access to
debt or not has no impact on the stability of their tax rate choices. Local tax rates are
not less volatile, and instead tend to be more volatile, in federal states which grant their
municipalities ample access to debt. While local tax rates in Germany are generally rather
stable over time, this still gives cause for concern. Further research will be required to
validate this conclusion. If it is confirmed, important implications follow. If the major
theoretical justification for public debt for consumption expenditures crumbles in practice,
there is a case for more credit rationing, at least at the local level. Otherwise calls for
bailouts become more and more likely. In Germany, federal states with loose attitudes
towards local debt should then follow the example of states that never expanded local credit
access in the first place. Making such a change would necessarily require revisiting local
spending responsibilities and the adequacy of state transfers to the local level. Ensuring
effective monitoring and budgetary oversight is also crucial.
Beyond Germany, the findings of this paper suggest that higher-level governments
should think twice before allowing subnational governments, and local governments in
particular, access to credit to fund current expenditures. Chances are local debt will not
be used in a welfare enhancing way.
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4.5 Appendix
Table 4.9: Wording of current liquidity credit paragraph
Federal states Current wording
Baden-
Württemberg
§ 89 GemO (1) The municipality has to ensure timely settlements of
expenses. (2) To ensure timely settlement of expenses, the municipality
may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget
by-law, provided no other funds are available. The authorization
continues to hold until the budget by-law for the following year is
passed. (3) The liquidity credit ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it exceeds one fifth of
the profit and loss budget’s ordinary expenses.
Bavaria Art. 73 GO (1) To ensure timely settlement of expenses, the
municipality may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the
budget by-law, provided no other funds are available. (2) The ceiling
set in the budget by-law shall not exceed one fifth of the cash-flow
budget’s revenues for current administrative activities and one sixth of
the administrative budget’s revenues, respectively, for the core budget,
and one sixth of the profit plan’s revenues for owner-operated
municipal enterprises.
Brandenburg § 76 BbgKVerf (1) The municipality has to ensure solvency through
appropriate liquidity planning at all times. (2) For the timely
settlement of expenses, the municipality may take out liquidity credits
up to the ceiling set by the municipal council. The decision on the
liquidity credit ceiling is to be reported to the regulatory authority
immediately.
Hesse § 105 HGO (1) For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality
may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget
by-law, provided no other funds are available. This authorization holds
beyond the current budget year until the announcement of the new
budget by-law. (2) The ceiling set in the budget by-law requires
approval by the regulatory authority.
Lower Saxony § 122 NKomVG (1) For the timely settlement of expenses, the
municipalities may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the
budget by-law, provided no other funds are available. This
authorization holds beyond the current budget year until the entry into
force of the new budget by-law. Sentence 2 also holds for a new ceiling
set in the new budget by-law before its entry into force, provided it
does not exceed the amount specified in paragraph 2. (2) The ceiling
set in the budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory authority
if it exceeds one sixth of the cash-flow budget’s revenues for current
administrative activities.
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Federal states Current wording
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
§ 53 KV M-V (1) The municipality has to ensure solvency at all times.
(2) For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality may take
out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget by-law and
approved according to paragraph 3, provided no other funds are
available. This authorization holds beyond the current budget year
until the public announcement of the new budget by-law. (3) The
liquidity credit ceiling set in the budget by-law requires approval by the
regulatory authority if it exceeds ten percent of the cash-flow budget’s
current revenues for administrative activites.
North
Rhine-Westphalia
§ 89 GO NRW (1) The municipality has to ensure solvency through
appropriate liquidity planning at all times. (2) For the timely
settlement of expenses, the municipality may take out liquidity credits
up to the ceiling set in the budget by-law, provided no other funds are
available. This authorization holds beyond the current budget year
until the promulgation of the new budget by-law.
Rhineland-
Palatinate
§ 105 GemO (1) The municipality has to ensure solvency at all times.
(2) For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality may take
out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget by-law, provided
no other funds are available. This authorization holds beyond the
current budget year until the public announcement of the new budget
by-law. (3) § 49 does not apply to the take-up of liquidity credits.
Saarland § 94 KSVG (1) For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality
may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget
by-law, provided no other funds are available. This authorization holds
beyond the current budget year until the announcement of the new
budget by-law. (2) If, given the budget reorganization plan, it is
apparent that a balanced budget is not possible in the foreseeable
future, the municipality may take out liquidity credits with maturities
beyond the budget year, provided this is economically necessary.
Saxony § 84 SächsGemO (1) The municipality has to ensure timely settlements
of expenses. (2) For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality
may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget
by-law, provided no other funds are available. The authorization
continues to hold until the budget by-law for the following year is
passed. (3) The liquidity credit ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it exceeds one fifth of
the profit and loss budget’s ordinary expenses.
Saxony-Anhalt § 110 KVG LSA (1) For the timely settlement of expenses, the
municipality may take out credits up to the ceiling set in the budget
by-law, provided no other funds are available. The authorization
continues to hold until the budget by-law for the following year is
passed. (2) The liquidity credit ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it exceeds one fifth of
the cash budget’s revenues for current administrative activities.
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Federal states Current wording
Schleswig-Holstein § 87 GO For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality may
take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget by-law,
provided no other funds are available. This authorization holds beyond
the current budget year until the announcement of the new budget
by-law.
Thuringia § 65 ThürKO (1) For the timely settlement of expenses, the
municipality may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the
budget by-law, provided no other funds are available. This
authorization holds beyond the current budget year until the
promulgation of the new budget by-law. (2) The ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval if 1. the ceiling for the core budget
exceeds one sixth of the administrative budget’s expenses, 2. the
ceiling for owner-operated municipal enterprises or municipal
institutions exceeds one sixth of the profit plan’s revenues.
Source: Local government laws. Translation by authors.




Brandenburg 24.07.2013 If the budget by-law is passed in violation of the general balanced
budget principle, this constitutes an unlawful act that is to be
objected by the regulatory authority. The obligation for objection is
not applicable if the budget by-law is accompanied by a budget
consolidation plan.
Budget consolidation plans require approval by the regulatory
authority. A consolidation period beyond the financial planning
horizon [five years] is usually not approvable. Exceptions are
possible if the consolidation plan demonstrates exceptional
willingness to consolidate.
Municipalities requiring a budget consolidation plan should set
property and business tax rates at least equal to the weighted
average of tax rates in municipalities of their size range. A
reduction of tax rates is not permissible until a structurally
balanced budget is reached.
22.06.2004 Liquidity credits beyond the credit ceiling will be condoned, though
not formally approved, for municipalities under provisional budget
management if the exceedance is due to irrefutable payment
obligations.
Budget consolidation plans should aim for the fastest possible
restoration of budgetary equilibrium. In justified cases where the
municipality demonstrates an exceptional willingness to consolidate,
consolidation periods beyond the financial planning horizon may be
acceptable.




23.02.2000 If the budget by-law violates the principle of budgetary equilibrium,
the budget is unlawful. In order to avoid objection to this unlawful
act, a budget consolidation plan must be passed at the latest in the
same session as the budget by-law.
The budget consolidation plan must specify the time at which
budget equilibrium of the administrative budget will be restored. In
case more than one year is required, a maximum deficit must be
specified for each year. In the exceptional case that the
consolidation period will be longer than the financial planning
horizon, financial planning must be carried forward until the point
of budget equilibrium.
A budget consolidation period beyond the financial planning
horizon is usually not approvable. Criteria for an exceptional
approval are, amongst others: Property tax rates are set at least
equal to the average tax rates of municipalities in their size range.
Hesse 03.03.2014 There are special reporting requirements by regulatory authorities
on muncipalities that will only achieve budget equilibrium in 2016,
as well as those with liquidity credits beyond 200 euro p.c.
The budget of a municipality with permanent deficits cannot be
approved if the property tax rate is not at least 10% higher than
the average in the respective size range.
When raising business tax rates, possible consequences regarding
jobs etc. are to be considered. The regulatory authority can
therefore refrain from insisting on an adjustment to average tax
rates. In case of permanent deficits, business tax rates below the
standard tax rate of 310% are not acceptable.
In case of rejection of budgets, regulatory authorities must inform
municipalities that they are now operating under provisional budget
management. They must monitor compliance effectively.
06.05.2010 Municipalities with permanent deficits must have tax rates,
particulary for property taxes, that are markedly above average
rates in the respective size range.
03.08.2005 In case of permanent deficits, tax rates for the property and




21.07.2014 In case of permanent and irrefutable deficits, mid-term financing of
the stock of liquidity credits may be justified. Maturities of up to
four years may be agreed for this stock of liquidity credits.
Municipalities without a deficit in the current budget year may also
make use of this arrangement in case they have accumulated past
deficits and a corresponding stock of liquidity credits. Municipalities
making use of this exceptional arrangement must develop a concept
for the medium-term reduction of liquidity credits.




29.01.2008 In case of permanent deficits and approved liquidity credits, it is
justifiable that municipalities take out the irrefutable stock of
liquidity credits with a credit period of up to four years if this is
more economical. This also applies to municipalities without a
deficit in the current budget year if they have an irrefutable stock of
liquidity credits due to past deficits.
24.01.2003 Failure to achieve a balanced budget must be justified towards the
regulatory authority, including by a budget consolidation plan.
Such budgets are to be regarded as lawful even if they are in deficit.
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
10.01.2007 Liquidity credit ceilings beyond the approval threshold should only
be approved within tight limits and only after submission of a
substantive liquidity preview. For municipalities in financial
difficulties, further liquidity credits should only be approved within
strict limits. Regular reports by the applicant on the prospective




16.12.2014 The local government law does not specify maturities for liquidity
credits. Municipalities have to agree on maturities of liquidity
credits with creditors on their own authority. Municipalities may
pass interest agreements for a part of its total stock of liquidity
credits according to the following rules: For half of its total stock
interest agreements may have maturities of up to ten years. For a
further quarter of its total stock interest agreements may have
maturities of up to five years. Interest agreements of more than five
years require consultation with the competent regulatory authority.
06.05.2011 The local government law does not specify maturities for liquidity
credits. Municipalities have to agree on maturities of liquidity
credits with creditors on their own authority. Municipalities may
pass interest agreements for a part of its total stock of liquidity
credits according to the following rules: For half of its total stock
interest agreements may have maturities of up to ten years. For a
further quarter of its total stock interest agreements may have
maturities of up to five years. Interest agreements of more than five
years require consultation with the competent regulatory authority.
9.10.2006 The local government law does not specify maturities for liquidity
credits. Municipalities have to agree on maturities of liquidity
credits with creditors on their own authority. Interest agreement
may not exceed five years. Interest agreements of more than three
and up to five years require consultation with the competent
regulatory authority.
05.01.2006 The current rules for the approval of budget consolidation plans,
according to which business and property tax rates should be
markedly above average rates in the respective size range, were not
intended to trigger an upward spiral of tax rates. In the future, tax
rates equal to the average are sufficient. Tax rates may only be
lowered when budget equilibrium has been achieved.




30.08.2004 It is justifiable for municipalities to have a permanent stock of
liquidity credits of up to 50% of average yearly liquidity credits.
04.06.2003 Municipalities without an approved budget consolidation plan have
to report the amount of liquidity credits to the regulatory authority
quarterly. If the liquidity credits exceed a third of gross revenues in
the administrative budget, they have to submit a liquidity plan to




26.09.2008 It has been considered acceptable for municipalities with permanent
deficits to have a stock of liquidity credits, and to have liquidity
credits with maturities of three to four years for the minimum
stock. Now it is considered acceptable for regulatory authorities to
allow maturities of five years if liquidity credits are needed to ensure
solvency in the face of permanent deficits.
Saxony 14.12.2007 If the budget cannot be balanced in the foreseeable future, the rules
of provisional budget management apply. Additionally, a budget
consolidation plan must be passed specifying the feasible
consolidation potentioal.
The approval of credit ceilings beyond the approval threshold may
be subject to conditions.
Municipalities under provisional budget management may take out
liquidity credits to fund permissible expenses. The municipality has
to announce the take-out to the municipal council and the
regulatory authority two weeks in advance for assessment.
Liquidity credits must not exceed the ceiling set in the budget
by-law at any time.
Schleswig-
Holstein
31.03.2006 In case of permanent stocks of liquidity credits, it may be more
economical to fund this stock with medium-term as opposed to
short-term credits. It is therefore acceptable for municipalities with
medium-term permanent deficits to take out liquidity credits with
maturities up to the end of the financial programming period if this
appears more economical.
Thuringia 09.07.2012 Municipalities operating under a budget consolidation plan must
keep daily records of liquidity credits. Such municipalities must levy
property and business taxes at at least the weighted average of tax
rates in their size range.
Source: Circular decrees and offical government statements. Selective summary and translation by
authors.
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Table 4.11: Number of municipalities with tax rate changes, 1998-2013



























































Baden-Württemberg 109 366 540 41 222 571 258 5
Bavaria 842 768 433 7 993 689 363 5
Brandenburg 12 26 18 2 31 18 9 0
Hesse 28 93 268 32 68 148 200 5
Lower Saxony 39 234 662 50 61 269 606 49
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 128 236 206 4 196 218 147 13
North Rhine-Westphalia 0 18 296 82 4 55 312 25
Rhineland-Palatinate 53 230 1907 82 314 980 968 10
Saarland 5 22 21 3 1 3 41 6
Saxony 14 55 185 36 56 87 136 11
Saxony-Anhalt 17 20 83 41 26 21 69 45
Schleswig-Holstein 126 265 572 107 151 383 507 29
Thuringia 69 445 256 6 55 447 268 6
Total 1442 2778 5447 493 2178 3889 3884 209
Notes: Number of municipalities with tax rate changes calculated for the balanced panel of 10,160
municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013. See Table 4.12 for details on the panel structure of the
unbalanced original panel.









Table 4.12: Panel structure by state
Federal states 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 N in all years
Baden-Württemberg 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.6 1.0 96.0 17600
Bavaria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 32896
Brandenburg 2.1 0.2 13.2 9.7 23.2 1.3 0.7 0.6 2.7 5.6 7.6 2.9 1.1 3.5 16.5 9.1 10425
Hesse 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 99.1 6797
Lower Saxony 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.1 96.8 16304
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.8 5.0 1.7 0.2 1.7 1.2 4.1 2.7 5.3 3.9 4.5 67.6 13795
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 6336
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 99.8 36887
Saarland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 98.2 831
Saxony 2.9 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.9 1.7 0.8 1.3 3.7 5.0 24.0 56.8 8173
Saxony-Anhalt 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.0 1.7 3.5 3.3 0.8 1.4 1.2 13.8 53.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 17.9 14537
Schleswig-Holstein 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 97.9 17966
Thuringia 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 1.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 2.8 3.9 3.3 84.3 15566
Total 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.7 1.5 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.8 4.4 1.1 1.0 2.7 83.0 198113
Notes: Panel structure of unbalanced panel by federal state. The table shows the share of munici-
palities of each federal state present in the dataset in 1, 2,..., 16 years.
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Notes: Number of observation by state for the balanced panel.
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1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . . 0 0
3.2 . . . . . . . 1 . . . . 1 1 . .
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bavaria
1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 0 . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . .
3.2 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brandenburg
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . .
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hesse
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0
1.2 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .







































3.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . .
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1
Lower Saxony
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Rhine-Westphalia
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 . . . . . . .5 .5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . . . .
3.3 . . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1
Rhineland-Palatinate
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .







































1.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . .
3.3 . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saarland
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . .
1.3 . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 1 1 1 . . . . . . . 1 . . . . .
3.3 . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 . 2 2 2 2 2
4 . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Saxony
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 . . 0 0 . . . . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.2 1 1 . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . .
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saxony-Anhalt
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .








































1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . . . . .
1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.1 0 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thuringia
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notes: Component 1.1 equals 0 if the local government law contains an unconditional approval clause
or an upper limit for liquidity credit ceilings and missing (.) otherwise. Component 1.2 equals 1 if the
local government law contains a conditional approval clause for liquidity credit ceilings and missing
(.) otherwise. Component 1.3 equals 2 if the local government law contains no approval clause for
liquidity credit ceilings and missing (.) otherwise. Component 2 amounts to up to 1 point if circular
decrees are in force which expand credit access beyond what is suggested by the letter of the law and
missing (.) otherwise. Component 3.1 equals 0 if the aggregate stock of municipal liquidity credits
per person is below the 15th percentile (14,8 euros per person) of all territorial states and missing (.)
otherwise. Component 3.2 equals 1 if the aggregate stock of municipal liquidity credits per person
is above the 15th percentile and below 85th percentile (544 euros per person) of all territorial states
and missing (.) otherwise. Component 3.3 equals 2 if the aggregate stock of municipal liquidity
credits per person is above the 85th percentile of all territorial states and missing (.) otherwise.
Component 4 equals 1 point if more than one third of municipalities have a liquidity credit stock of
more than 544 euros per person and missing (.) otherwise.
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Table 4.15: Summary statistics by state, main variables
Federal state Statistics Number of changes Mean of credit Funding need
PT BT BT and PT access index growth
Baden-Württemberg Mean 1.87 1.11 2.98 1.19 37.76
Std. Dev. 1.28 0.85 1.86 0.00 65.17
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.19 -154.83
Max. 7.00 7.00 14.00 1.19 975.61
N 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056
Bavaria Mean 0.89 0.75 1.64 0.88 -2.82
Std. Dev. 0.96 0.90 1.64 0.00 58.45
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 -342.33
Max. 6.00 7.00 9.00 0.88 725.78
N 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050.
Brandenburg Mean 1.47 0.72 2.19 2.88 30.52
Std. Dev. 1.27 1.01 1.91 0.00 61.63
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.88 -203.07
Max. 5.00 4.00 8.00 2.88 238.79
N 58 58 58 58 58
Hesse Mean 2.38 1.59 3.96 3.00 46.86
Std. Dev. 1.39 1.14 2.09 0.00 58.42
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 -172.70
Max. 7.00 7.00 12.00 3.00 374.00
N 421 421 421 421 421
Lower Mean 2.32 2.12 4.45 2.38 48.50
Saxony Std. Dev. 1.30 1.26 2.31 0.00 87.57
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.38 -376.93
Max. 8.00 7.00 15.00 2.38 972.60
N 985 985 985 985 985
Mecklenburg- Mean 1.32 1.15 2.47 1.88 53.34
Vorpommern Std. Dev. 1.08 1.20 2.01 0.00 131.11
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.88 -642.64
Max. 7.00 7.00 13.00 1.88 989.75
N 574 574 574 574 574
North Rhine- Mean 3.39 2.62 6.01 4.38 48.56
Westphalia Std. Dev. 1.43 1.20 2.36 0.00 40.97
Min. 1.00 0.00 1.00 4.38 -22.56
Max. 9.00 8.00 17.00 4.38 365.52
N 396 396 396 396 396
Rhineland- Mean 2.54 1.44 3.98 3.81 58.89
Palatinate Std. Dev. 1.07 0.94 1.69 0.00 126.53
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.81 -891.83
Max. 8.00 6.00 13.00 3.81 910.74
N 2272 2272 2272 2272 2272
Saarland Mean 1.78 3.04 4.82 3.94 92.00
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Federal state Statistics Number of changes Mean of credit Funding need
PT BT BT and PT access index growth
Std. Dev. 1.40 1.25 2.15 0.00 103.72
Min. 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.94 -44.75
Max. 7.00 6.00 10.00 3.94 431.03
N 51 51 51 51 51
Saxony Mean 2.67 1.77 4.44 1.50 42.71
Std. Dev. 1.58 1.48 2.66 0.00 97.39
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.50 -85.44
Max. 11.00 8.00 18.00 1.50 940.92
N 290 290 290 290 290
Saxony- Mean 3.33 3.20 6.53 2.56 81.02
Anhalt Std. Dev. 2.28 2.58 4.50 0.00 126.54
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.56 -441.45
Max. 10.00 11.00 21.00 2.56 833.36
N 161 161 161 161 161
Schleswig- Mean 2.23 1.73 3.96 2.19 84.59
Holstein Std. Dev. 1.59 1.25 2.64 0.00 166.22
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.19 -984.52
Max. 7.00 6.00 12.00 2.19 999.78
N 1070 1070 1070 1070 1070
Thuringia Mean 1.37 1.43 2.80 1.88 31.94
Std. Dev. 0.86 0.90 1.61 0.00 201.72
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.88 -837.95
Max. 6.00 6.00 12.00 1.88 974.03
N 776 776 776 776 776
Total Mean 1.96 1.44 3.40 2.28 42.56
Std. Dev. 1.41 1.21 2.37 1.14 118.14
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 -984.52
Max. 11.00 11.00 21.00 4.38 999.78
N 10160 10160 10160 10160 10160
Notes: Cross section derived from balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for the period 1998 to
2013. Index of credit access corresponds to the mean over the 16-year horizon. Funding need growth
(in %) is defined as the growth in funding need between 1998 and 2006. The number of property tax
(PT) and business tax (BT) changes and funding need growth are municipal-level variables while
the index of credit access is a state-level variable.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Regional Database Germany, Statistics Local, the
FDZ and state statistical offices. Credit access index by authors.
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Table 4.16: Summary statistics by state, control variables






Baden- Mean 1.00 9941.35 0.24 19056.92 27137.46 0.01
Württemberg Std. Dev. 0.00 26404.72 0.14 986.72 4070.35 0.07
Min. 1.00 170.00 0.01 16761.07 20654.13 0.00
Max. 1.00 594457.69 1.09 26845.67 56478.33 0.62
N 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056
Bavaria Mean 1.00 6056.91 0.21 18251.39 24723.27 0.01
Std. Dev. 0.00 32065.60 0.16 1817.73 8300.74 0.06
Min. 1.00 232.19 0.01 15518.73 16508.47 0.00
Max. 1.00 1.29e+06 1.84 28235.13 79894.07 0.31
N 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050
Brandenburg Mean 0.66 11501.12 0.24 15216.02 18248.92 1.00
Std. Dev. 0.48 12811.81 0.15 810.17 2770.97 0.00
Min. 0.00 537.81 0.01 13775.47 14436.60 1.00
Max. 1.00 65117.38 0.63 16822.00 28046.27 1.00
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
Hesse Mean 1.00 14326.22 0.22 18176.74 25212.67 0.23
Std. Dev. 0.00 37715.47 0.14 1730.46 5724.32 0.29
Min. 1.00 679.06 0.05 16015.93 19299.13 0.00
Max. 1.00 660622.06 1.40 25293.80 74934.33 1.00
N 421 421 421 421 421 421
Lower Mean 0.28 7359.12 0.17 17011.27 20883.16 0.31
Saxony Std. Dev. 0.45 15905.72 0.13 1203.93 4417.90 0.18
Min. 0.00 314.19 0.01 14966.60 14517.80 0.00
Max. 1.00 246477.81 0.91 20986.87 76327.27 1.00
N 985 985 985 985 985 985
Mecklenburg- Mean 0.06 2577.40 0.19 14014.18 15932.03 0.59
Vorpommern Std. Dev. 0.24 10718.81 0.15 525.94 1596.47 0.36
Min. 0.00 124.25 0.00 13055.43 14123.58 0.19
Max. 1.00 201322.19 1.00 14893.60 28901.20 1.00
N 574 574 568 574 574 574
North Rhine- Mean 1.00 45292.18 0.26 18702.23 24064.24 0.34
Westphalia Std. Dev. 0.00 87117.45 0.09 1593.17 4446.20 0.36
Min. 1.00 4220.19 0.06 15109.40 16622.87 0.00
Max. 1.00 987816.88 0.61 23023.87 64717.87 1.00
N 396 396 396 396 396 396
Rhineland- Mean 0.02 1767.11 0.13 17485.10 20209.04 0.74
Palatinate Std. Dev. 0.14 7597.48 0.16 921.43 3447.34 0.33
Min. 0.00 8.00 0.00 15634.53 12548.73 0.00
Max. 1.00 192906.06 1.94 20931.13 57722.07 1.00
N 2272 2272 2180 2272 2272 2272
Saarland Mean 1.00 16901.06 0.24 17579.70 24651.89 0.12






Std. Dev. 0.00 9953.28 0.15 2324.96 5017.17 0.19
Min. 1.00 6407.94 0.04 15263.53 19034.07 0.00
Max. 1.00 49003.63 0.67 22502.47 32668.40 0.47
N 51 51 51 51 51 51
Saxony Mean 0.50 10106.45 0.25 14796.39 6944.61 0.00
Std. Dev. 0.50 43911.73 0.12 441.15 1219.15 0.00
Min. 0.00 412.00 0.05 14070.50 6119.70 0.00
Max. 1.00 504054.63 0.82 15741.33 22167.83 0.00
N 290 290 290 290 290 290
Saxony- Mean 0.44 7338.16 0.25 16130.09 20045.84 0.25
Anhalt Std. Dev. 0.50 9589.40 0.15 518.85 2565.91 0.00
Min. 0.00 569.19 0.03 15363.67 16259.33 0.25
Max. 1.00 47484.38 0.91 17041.50 25971.17 0.25
N 161 161 161 161 161 161
Schleswig- Mean 0.07 2555.09 0.14 17514.71 21918.22 0.37
Holstein Std. Dev. 0.26 11275.65 0.27 1213.23 3420.02 0.06
Min. 0.00 6.25 0.00 15145.67 15213.33 0.36
Max. 1.00 236321.94 7.70 21071.07 35782.73 1.00
N 1070 1070 1060 1070 1070 1070
Thuringia Mean 0.11 2658.63 0.20 14595.69 17020.85 0.03
Std. Dev. 0.32 10355.50 0.21 481.05 1465.65 0.10
Min. 0.00 42.38 0.00 13462.27 15074.00 0.00
Max. 1.00 202767.94 2.18 16703.47 28488.20 0.67
N 776 776 755 776 776 776
Total Mean 0.47 6895.98 0.19 17308.89 21587.73 0.31
Std. Dev. 0.50 28791.31 0.18 1890.88 6345.32 0.36
Min. 0.00 6.25 0.00 13055.43 6119.70 0.00
Max. 1.00 1.29e+06 7.70 28235.13 79894.07 1.00
N 10160 10160 10031 10160 10160 10160
Notes: Cross section derived from balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for the period 1998 to
2013. All variables correspond to the mean over the 16-year horizon. Municipal association status,
population, employees (p.c.) are municipal-level variables, GDP, private income (both in euro p.c.)
and left majority at state elections are county-level variables.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Regional Database Germany, Statistics Local, the
Federal Employment Agency and state statistical offices.
139
Bibliography
Adler, J. (2006). The tax-smoothing hypothesis: Evidence from Sweden, 1952-1999. Scan-
dinavian Journal of Economics 108 (1), 81–95.
Ahmad, E. and G. Brosio (Eds.) (2006). Handbook of fiscal federalism. Cheltenham, UK,
and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Aldasoro, I. and M. Seiferling (November 2014). Vertical fiscal imbalances and the accumu-
lation of government debt. IMF Working Paper 14/209, International Monetary Fund.
Available online: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14209.pdf.
Alesina, A. and N. Roubini (1992). Political cycles in OECD economies. Review of
Economic Studies 59, 663–688.
Bailey, S. J. and S. Connolly (1998). The flypaper effect: Identifying areas for further
research. Public Choice 95 (3/4), 335–361.
Barro, R. J. (1979). On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 87 (5), 940–971.
Barro, R. J. (October 1995). Optimal debt management. NBER Working Paper 5327, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research. Available online: http://www.nber.org/papers/
w5327.pdf.
Baskaran, T. (2014). Identifying local tax mimicking with administrative borders and a
policy reform. Journal of Public Economics 118, 41–51.
Baskaran, T. (September 2015). The revenue and base effects of local tax hikes: Evi-
dence from a quasi-experiment. Discussion Paper 257, Center for European, Governance
and Economic Development Research. Available online: https://www.econstor.eu/
bitstream/10419/118657/1/835077888.pdf.
140
Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 141
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2015). Kommunale Sozialausgaben – Wie der Bund sinnvoll helfen
kann. Available online: https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/
BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/KommunaleSozialausgaben_LK_150608.
pdf.
Bird, R. M. and A. V. Tarasov (2004). Closing the gap: Fiscal imbalances and intergovern-
mental transfers in developed federations. Environment and Planning C: Government
and Policy 22, 77–102.
Blöchliger, H. (Ed.) (2013). Fiscal Federalism 2014. OECD Publishing.
Blöchliger, H. (2014). Dezentralisierung und Wirtschaftswachstum. Wirtschaftspolitische
Blätter 61 (1), 81–95.
Boadway, R. (2006). Intergovernmental redistributive transfers: Efficiency and equity. In
E. Ahmad and G. Brosio (Eds.), Handbook of fiscal federalism, pp. 355–380. Cheltenham,
UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Boadway, R. (2007). Grants in a federal economy: A conceptual perspective. In R. W.
Boadway and A. Shah (Eds.), Intergovernmental fiscal transfers, Public sector gover-
nance and accountability series, pp. 55–74. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Boetti, L., M. Piacenza, and G. Turati (2012). Decentralization and local governments’
performance: How does fiscal autonomy affect spending efficiency? FinanzArchiv /
Public Finance Analysis 68 (3), 269–302.
Bohn, H. (1990). Tax smoothing with financial instruments. The American Economic
Review 80 (5), 1217–1230.
Bordignon, M., M. Gamalerio, and G. Turati (October 2013). Decentralization, vertical
fiscal imbalance, and political selection. CESifo Working Paper 4459, CESifo. Available
online: file:///C:/Users/Caroline.Leno.000/Downloads/cesifo1_wp4459.pdf.
Bucovetsky, S. and M. Smart (2006). The efficiency consequences of local revenue equal-
ization: Tax competition and tax distortions. Journal of Public Economic Theory 8 (1),
119–144.
Büttner, T. (2006). The incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on tax policy.
Journal of Public Economics 90 (3), 477–497.
Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 142
Büttner, T., F. Holm-Hadulla, R. Parsche, and C. Starbatty (2008). Analyse und Weit-
erentwicklung des Kommunalen Finanzausgleichs in Nordrhein-Westfalen: Gutachten
im Auftrag des Innenministeriums des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Available on-
line: http://www.mik.nrw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/editors/import/bue/doks/
ifogutachten2008.pdf.
Ciagala, S. and F. Heinemann (2012). Debt rule federalism: The Case of Germany. ZEW
Discussion Paper 12-067, Centre for European Economic Research. Available online:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp12067.pdf.
Coen-Pirani (2013). Comment on vertical fiscal imbalances and fiscal performance in
advanced economies. Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 588–592.
Courant, P. N., E. M. Gramlich, and D. L. Rubinfeld (1979). The stimulative effects of
intergovernmental grants: Or why money sticks where it hits. In P. Mieszkowski and
W. H. Oakland (Eds.), Fiscal Federalism and Grants-in-Aid, pp. 5–21. Washington,
D.C.: The Urban Inst.
de Mello, L. (2000). Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations: A
cross-country analysis. World Development 28 (2), 365–380.
de Mello, L. (2007). Local government finances: The link between intergovern-
mental transfers and net worth. Economics Department Working Paper 581,
OECD. Available online: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/
5l4gqfmfrtbq.pdf?expires=1467732167&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=
1FE80B006C962873987C65964BC10AE7.
Egger, P., M. Köthenbürger, and M. Smart (2010). Do fiscal transfers alleviate business tax
competition? Evidence from Germany. Journal of Public Economics 94 (3-4), 235–246.
Evers, M. P. (2012). Federal fiscal transfer rules in monetary unions. European Economic
Review 56 (3), 507–525.
Eyraud, L. and L. Lusinyan (2013). Vertical fiscal imbalances and fiscal performance in
advanced economies. Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 571–587.
Federal Statistical Office (2014a). Fachserie 14 Reihe 4: Finanzen und Steuern 2013.
Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 143
Federal Statistical Office (2014b). Pressemitteilung 109/14 (21.03.2014): Kommunen
erzielten im Jahr 2013 einen Überschuss von 1,1 Milliarden Euro. Available on-
line: https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/
2014/03/PD14\_109\_71137pdf.pdf?\_\_blob=publicationFile.
Federal Statistical Office (2014c). Realsteueraufkommen und gewogene Durch-
schnittshebesätze ab 1949. Available online: https://www.destatis.de/DE/
ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/OeffentlicheFinanzenSteuern/Steuern/
Realsteuervergleich/Tabellen/ZeitreiheRealsteuern.html.
Foremny, D. (2014). Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal
rules and tax autonomy. European Journal of Political Economy 34, 86–110.
Fuest, C., A. Peichl, and S. Siegloch (2016). Do higher corporate taxes reduce wages? Mi-
cro evidence from Germany. ZEW Discussion Paper 16-003, Centre for European Eco-
nomic Research. Available online: http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp16003.
pdf.
Geys, B., F. Heinemann, and A. Kalb (2010). Voter involvement, fiscal autonomy and
public sector efficiency: Evidence from German municipalities. European Journal of
Political Economy 26 (2), 265–278.
Ghosh, A. R. (1995). Intertemporal tax-smoothing and the government budget surplus:
Canada and the United States. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27 (4), 1022–1045.
Goerl, C.-A., A. Rauch, and M. Thöne (2013). Weiterentwicklung des kommunalen
Finanzausgleichs in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Available online: http://www.mik.nrw.
de/fileadmin/user\_upload/Redakteure/Dokumente/Themen\_und\_Aufgaben/
Kommunales/kommunale\_finanzen/130318gfg\_fifogutachten.pdf.
Gröpl, C., F. Heinemann, and A. Kalb (2010). Die Zweckentfremdung des kommunalen
Kassenkredits - eine rechtlich-ökonomische Analyse. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspoli-
tik 11 (2), 178–203.
Guo, G. (2008). Vertical imbalance and local fiscal discipline in China. Journal of East
Asian Studies 8, 61–88.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science 162 (3859), 1243–1248.
Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 144
Heinemann, F., L. P. Feld, B. Geys, C. Gröpl, S. Hauptmeier, and A. Kalb (2009). Der
kommunale Kassenkredit zwischen Liquiditätssicherung und Missbrauchsgefahr, Vol-
ume 93 of ZEW-Wirtschaftsanalysen. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Herndon, T., M. Ash, and R. Pollin (2014). Does high public debt consistently stifle
economic growth? A critique of Reinhart and Rogoff. Cambridge Journal of Eco-
nomics 38 (2), 257–279.
Hummel, C.-A. and M. Seiferling (2015). Income inequality, fiscal decentralization, and
transfer dependency. In B. Clements, R. Mooij, S. Gupta, and M. Keen (Eds.), Inequality
and Fiscal Policy, pp. 321–340. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Hunter, J. (1974). Vertical intergovernmental financial imbalance: A framework for eval-
uation. FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis 32 (3), 481–492.
Hyman, D. N. (2014). Public Finance: A Contemporary Application of Theory to Policy
(11th ed.). Stamford: Cengage Learning.
Inman, R. P. (2003). Transfers and bailouts: Enforcing local fiscal discipline with lessons
from U.S. federalism. In J. Rodden, G. S. Eskeland, and J. I. Litvack (Eds.), Fiscal
decentralization and the challenge of hard budget constraints, pp. 35–83. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
International Monetary Fund (December 16, 2009). Fiscal rules: Anchoring expectations
for sustainable public finances. Available online: https://www.imf.org/external/np/
pp/eng/2009/121609.pdf.
Kornai, J. (1979). Resource-constrained versus demand-constrained systems. Economet-
rica 47 (4), 801–819.
Köthenbürger, M. (2002). Tax competition and fiscal equalization. International Tax and
Public Finance 9, 391–408.
McKinnon, R. I. (1995). Intergovernmental competition in Europe with and without a
common currency. Journal of Policy Modeling 17 (5), 463–478.
Neyapti, B. (2010). Fiscal decentralization and deficits: International evidence. European
Journal of Political Economy 26 (2), 155–166.
Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 145
Neyapti, B. (2013). Fiscal decentralization, fiscal rules and fiscal discipline. Economics
Letters 121 (3), 528–532.
Neyapti, B. and Z. B. Bulut-Cevik (2014). Fiscal efficiency, redistribution and welfare.
Economic Modelling 41, 375–382.
Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovic, Inc.
Oates, W. E. (1979). Lump-sum intergovernmental grants have price effects. In
P. Mieszkowski and W. H. Oakland (Eds.), Fiscal Federalism and Grants-in-Aid, pp.
23–30. Washington and D.C.: The Urban Inst.
Oates, W. E. (1999). An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature 37 (3),
1120–1149.
Oates, W. E. (2005). Toward a second-generation theory of fiscal federalism. International
Tax and Public Finance 12 (4), 349–373.
Oates, W. E. (2008). On the evolution of fiscal federalism: Theory and institutions.
National Tax Journal 61 (2), 313–334.
Olekalns, N. (1997). Australian evidence on tax smoothing and the optimal budget surplus.
Economic Record 73 (222), 248–257.
Parsche, R. and M. Steinherr (1995). Der kommunale Finanzausgleich des Lan-
des Nordrhein-Westfalen: Gutachten im Auftrag des Innenministeriums des Landes
Nordrhein-Westfalen.
Rauch, A. and C.-A. Hummel (2015). How to stop the race to the bottom: Empirical
evidence from North Rhine-Westphalia. International Tax and Public Finance. Forth-
coming.
Raudla, R. (2010). Governing budgetary commons: What can we learn from Elinor Os-
trom? European Journal of Law and Economics 30 (3), 201–221.
Rehm, H. and S. Matern-Rehm (2010). Kommunalfinanzen (1st ed.). Wiesbaden: VS,
Verl. für Sozialwiss.
Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 146
Reinhart, C. M. and K. S. Rogoff (2010). Growth in a time of debt. American Economic
Review 100 (2), 573–578.
Reitschuler, G. (2010). Fiscal policy and optimal taxation: Evidence from a tax smoothing
exercise. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 57 (2), 238–252.
Rodden, J. (2002). The dilemma of fiscal fedealism: Grants and fiscal performance around
the world. American Journal of Political Science 46 (3), 670–687.
Rodden, J. and G. S. Eskeland (2003). Lessons and conclusions. In J. Rodden, G. S.
Eskeland, and J. I. Litvack (Eds.), Fiscal decentralization and the challenge of hard
budget constraints, pp. 431–465. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Rodden, J., G. S. Eskeland, and J. I. Litvack (Eds.) (2003). Fiscal decentralization and
the challenge of hard budget constraints. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Sanguinetti, P. and M. Tommasi (2004). Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior:
Insurance versus aggregate discipline. Journal of International Economics 62 (1), 149–
170.
Sharma, C. K. (2012). Beyond gaps and imbalances: Re-structuring the debate on inter-
governmental fiscal relations. Public Administration 90 (1), 99–128.
Smart, M. (2007). Raising taxes through equalization. Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics 40 (4), 1188–1212.
Spars, G., P. Jacob, and A. Müller (2010). Kommunale Haushaltsnotlagen: Bestand-
saufnahme und Möglichkeiten der Reaktion im Rahmen der Städtebauförderung des
Bundes und der Länder: Endbericht des Bundesministeriums für Verkehr, Bau und
Stadtentwicklung sowie des Bundesinstituts für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung
im Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumentwicklung. Available online: http:
//www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/FP/ReFo/Staedtebau/2010/Haushaltsnotlage/
Endbericht_Haushaltsnotlagen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile\&v=2.
Strazicich, M. C. (1997). Does tax smoothing differ by the level of government? Time
series evidence from Canada and the United States. Journal of Macroeconomics 19 (2),
305–326.
Challenges of Fiscal Federalism 147
Vigneault, M. (2007). Grants and soft budget constraints. In R. W. Boadway and A. Shah
(Eds.), Intergovernmental fiscal transfers, Public sector governance and accountability
series, pp. 133–171. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Wooldridge, J. (2011). Introductory econometrics. Canada: South-Western.
